Interview Insights from Former FBI Agent

Wayne Burns, a past FBI counterintelligence agent, shares that one effective method for identifying a spy is to simply ask them straightforward questions, such as their birthday.

In his recently published book, FBI Traitor: Chasing the Russian Mole, Burns reflects on nearly three decades in counterintelligence and the unprecedented number of Soviet assets he reported on. During a conversation with Align magazine, he discussed the psychological strategies, subtle eavesdropping, and moral dilemmas that defined espionage during the Cold War.

Unraveling Deceptions

Burns acknowledges that, while his career had its share of thrilling deceptions, like those depicted in films, he often relied on more everyday tactics. For example, he recalls an Afghan man who applied to join the FBI in the 1980s. Burns, then a security guard in Washington, D.C., wanted to scrutinize the candidate closely.

The interview occurred in late December. The man had noted his birthday as January 1st on his application, which led Burns to test his response with a casual question.

He asked, “Do you have any plans for your birthday?” The man, seemingly caught off guard, replied, “Why would you ask that?” Burns responded, “Well, in a few weeks.”

Without pause, the man corrected him, stating, “Oh, no, my birthday is July 6th.”

“Most individuals can’t forget the day they were born,” Burns says he often reminded applicants.

This inconsistency triggered further doubts about the man’s credibility. Ultimately, it was determined he had connections with the Afghan mujahideen.

Interrogation Techniques

Burns refers to his questioning style as a “verbal polygraph.” While it may not be foolproof, proper technique can help narrow down potential candidates.

This approach demands stringent discipline from FBI agents. Burns points out that, when conversing with Soviet agents or defectors, agents had to conceal what they already knew.

“You need to maintain the straightest poker face possible,” he remarks.

There were occasions when agents would lay out photos of suspected spies and casually inquire if the subjects recognized them from various locations. Every response was crucial. How long someone spoke, their level of anxiety, or if they appeared overly rehearsed all contributed to the assessment.

“Did he talk about himself for too long? Or too little?” Burns elaborates, “Intelligence interviews can be incredibly challenging.”

Moreover, it was common practice to assert that Soviet bloc agents had successfully infiltrated Western organizations.

“They frequently claimed, ‘Oh, we penetrated it,'” he notes, referring to allegations from various nations.

Recruiting Informants

Burns also touches on how Soviet agents enticed Americans into betraying their country.

He explains that an agent might follow a Soviet embassy member home, take note of their address, and leave a message on their car windshield stating, “I have a secret to sell.” This method was consistently effective, according to Burns.

Initially, the compensation offered was modest, just enough to encourage compliance.

“They’d say, ‘This was good, but it’s only worth $5,000. If you want another $5,000, you’ll need to provide more information,’” he recalls.

Once individuals accepted the money, they often remained cooperative, motivated by fear and intimidation. However, Burns insists that the Russians were rarely able to apprehend these spies.

“The Russians aren’t going to extradite him,” he explains, emphasizing their main goal was to gather information, not to catch informants.

Moral Contrast

Burns asserts that the Soviet Union often used threats against family members to control its agents.

“If your brother is in college, his life is over,” he says, illustrating the power of such leverage.

For Burns, this behavior starkly contrasts American intelligence practices, which often focus on providing assistance and protection to defectors.

He notes that many who defected from the Soviet Union did so not out of ideological differences, but rather because they realized they had been misled about life in the U.S.

“They come here and see grocery stores brimming with food. It’s a real eye-opener that they were deceived,” Burns remarks.

This disparity, he suggests, often fosters future cooperation with American intelligence.

“We live in the land of the free,” Burns concludes, highlighting the profound differences between America and the Soviet regime. “Their system was structured entirely differently, and it was really an oppressive place.”