U.S. and Iranian negotiators are reportedly making headway on an interim framework agreement, but one major issue is still up in the air: what to do with Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles?
Iranian officials have made it clear that enriched uranium is a non-negotiable point, even as President Trump asserts that Iran “does not have nuclear weapons” and has hinted that the U.S. could “seize” nuclear materials if needed.
Nonproliferation experts stress that this issue is central to whether any future agreement can prevent Iran from swiftly moving towards weapons-grade enrichment. This concern is heightened after U.S. airstrikes damaged significant nuclear facilities, though they didn’t necessarily eliminate the nuclear materials involved.
According to Andrea Stricker, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, retaining a stockpile of enriched uranium—especially at 60% concentration—would pose a serious risk to any agreement: “They could upgrade their weapons whenever they choose,” she pointed out.
After the active military operations against Iran in 2026, the urgency surrounding this issue has increased. The airstrikes targeted various Iranian nuclear facilities, including those at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
While such strikes can hinder nuclear infrastructure, experts note that finding, securing, and neutralizing enriched uranium presents an entirely different set of challenges. Destroying facilities may slow down nuclear programs, but locating nuclear material itself demands reliable intelligence, sustained access, and international oversight.
Stricker highlighted that the focus of the administration needs to be on the stockpile of material, particularly the 60% enriched uranium.
Iran is reported to possess a substantial amount of enriched uranium, with concentrations going up to 60%, which is close to weapons-grade and can be quickly refined to a level suitable for nuclear weapons.
The Trump administration may push for the stockpile either to be destroyed within Iran or removed from the country under international supervision. “The best option would be to destroy Iran’s stockpile,” she mentioned, to avoid complications about ownership and further handling.
However, if Iran were to agree to relinquish or neutralize its uranium, implementing such a plan would require excavation teams, international inspectors, and materials experts, especially working in compromised underground sites.
Although the administration is under pressure to avoid extensive military engagements in Iran, any operation aimed at securing or removing uranium could provoke broader concerns over U.S. or international ground involvement.
“You’re dealing with locations that are in disarray and might not have intact material,” Stricker remarked.
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Stricker pointed out that underground facilities in Isfahan were targeted with Tomahawk missiles, while Natanz and Fordow faced strikes from powerful munitions designed to penetrate deeply buried structures.
Therefore, a hazardous materials team would be vital to manage it safely and dispose of it appropriately or export it under safe conditions overseas, she added. Although this enriched uranium is chemically dangerous and corrosive, it doesn’t bring the immediate radiological risks associated with a nuclear explosion.
Stricker also proposed a potential option of transferring recovered materials under international oversight, suggesting that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could oversee the uranium’s removal, potentially transferring it to a low-enriched uranium fuel bank in Kazakhstan.
Kelsey Davenport, a nonproliferation policy director at the Arms Control Association, mentioned that monitored down-blending might be more feasible than physically demanding operations to seize or destroy materials found in damaged facilities.
The IAEA is seen as the ideal agency to help monitor the uranium situation in Iran, similar to past instances.
As for the current stance, Iranian officials maintain that they have the right to enrich and keep uranium stocks as part of their civilian nuclear framework.
Ebrahim Azizi, chair of Iran’s parliament’s National Security Committee, reiterated that maintaining enriched uranium stockpiles constitutes one of Iran’s “red lines” in discussions with the U.S.
This mindset could clash with the goals of many advocates for nonproliferation, whose main aim is to ensure Iran doesn’t develop rapid nuclear capabilities.
Stricker believes international inspectors had a reasonable understanding of the amount and location of nuclear material prior to access limitations, but she emphasized that future agreements must secure ongoing oversight of uranium handling and removal.
Long-term agreements might need not only stockpile elimination but also strict limitations on Iran’s future enrichment capabilities, alongside increased access for international inspectors.
“A permanent enrichment ban would be ideal,” she suggested, but it seems that a prolonged moratorium is the most they’re currently considering.
Ultimately, any agreement will involve the IAEA re-establishing comprehensive access to Iranian sites, including military installations, to ensure compliance and track nuclear materials.
At this point, it seems negotiators are aiming for a temporary framework while broader discussions continue. However, the matter of how Iran’s enriched uranium is treated may very well be the key to any future agreement. Even if negotiations progress, the physical task of locating, securing, and finally eliminating these materials could remain complicated long after any deal is settled.
