President Trump’s criticisms of higher education are extensive and impactful, but the underlying idea is not new. A gathering of 13 federal trial and appellate judges challenged him Almost a year.
Trump has leveraged the tremendous influence of the federal sector to halt billions in funding from seven major universities through strict alterations in curricula and administration. The judges selectively focused on Columbia University, predicting the same educational intrusion that Trump later executed in retaliation.
On May 6, 2024, a judge dispatched a Boycott Letter referring to the then-president of Columbia as “ground zero for student confusion, anti-Semitism, and an eruption of hatred towards diverse viewpoints,” asserting that “smashers made threats of violence, carried out assaults, and vandalized property.”
They proclaimed that the university would avoid employing Columbia alumni as law clerks, enforcing conservative curriculum and teacher hiring reforms unless the university imposed significant penalties on students and faculty who engaged in campus disturbances.
On March 7th, the Trump administration announced using notably similar language, revoking federal grants and contracts due to Columbia’s “persistent negligence in addressing ongoing harassment of Jewish students.”
Additional cancellations totaled over $5 billion currently affecting Harvard, Cornell, Brown, Princeton, Penn, and Northwestern (where I hold honorary law professor status).
The parallels are clear. The initial attempt to exercise control over government funding and contracts emerged from judges aiming to pressure universities into adhering to specific educational philosophies and social objectives through academic recruitment.
Trump embodies a destructive force that disregards norms, customs, and established practices. Judges are expected to act with intelligence, particularly in adhering to the U.S. Judge Code of Conduct, which forbids the employment of clerks for non-judicial reasons.
Canon 3B (3) indicates that judges are responsible for employment decisions, including those regarding law clerks. Additionally, Canon 2B prohibits leveraging positions to achieve non-judicial ends by “lending” the reputation of the Judicial Bureau to further the personal interests of judges.
The Columbia Boycott has no relevance to the qualifications of future applicants who won’t graduate until 2027 or 2028. Instead, it seeks to compel Columbia to impose unspecified disciplinary actions against the “brokers” and enhance the “diversity of viewpoints among faculty and administration, including admissions offices.”
There is no exception within ethical standards for honor and integrity.the purpose. A Law Clerk serves as a public servant, assisting the judge in case assessment. Regardless of integrity, it is improper to display such a position in front of a third party to incentivize advancing the judge’s ideological objectives.
Sadly, enforcement of the Code of Conduct relies solely on a committee of federal judges. a troubling situation. A formal complaint was lodged against some of the judges involved in the boycott. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, yet they have all been dismissed.
Recently, three judges were dismissed earlier this month by a panel of the Seventh Circuit Judicial Council convened in Chicago.
Acutely aware of their privileges, panel members noted the “sensitive and highly confidential” connection between judges and clerks. Consequently, it appears that “judges possess considerable discretion in selecting law clerks, in accordance with the significance and sensitivity of their roles.”
The panel’s ruling on page 12 simply overlooks the evident ethical dilemmas related to withholding funding to compel the university to act. In other contexts, utilizing government roles as either rewards or penalties is viewed as corrupt. However, the panel treats boycotts as merely another employment criterion, akin to GPA or legal review membership.
If individual judges merely opted to exclude Columbia graduates from consideration, it would have gone unnoticed or unimportant, but this was not the intention behind their public letters. The judges’ boycott was not merely a personal choice; it was a concerted effort to push their predetermined demands.
In this context, Canon 2b prohibits judges from using their official roles to benefit “private interests.” This clearly illustrates the misuse of clerks to enforce judges’ educational preferences.
The panel dismissively addressed the matter in a single sentence, asserting that the boycott aimed to “enhance the quality of legal education.” [which] pertains more broadly to law rather than the private interests of a judge or those of others.
This redefined interpretation shifts the ideological purpose, such as hiring more conservative educators being framed as a legal improvement. Consequently, this opens the door for various other abuses as long as they are justified as being in the public interest.
Thus, federal judges could refrain from hiring a graduate of a local university unless the athletic department dismissed a football coach.
Nonetheless, federal judicial appointments do not include a mobile committee aimed at resolving societal issues recognized through employment boycotts. Judges may assign a clerk to a chosen individual. However, they should not use the threat of non-employment to extract concessions from third parties.
Trump certainly did not require an example of a justice boycott to launch his initiative to reshuffle higher education in his image. In the meantime, federal judges should feel ashamed of their involvement and acknowledgment of such prototurpian tactics.
Stephen Loubett is Professor Emeritus of Williams Memorial Professor at the Northwest University Pritzker School.
