China’s Population Declines Again

China’s National Bureau of Statistics released its yearbook for 2026 this week, indicating a population decrease of 3.39 million in 2025. This marks the fourth consecutive decline and the most significant reduction since 2022.

Despite this drop, China’s population is still quite substantial, exceeding 1.4 billion people. However, it’s noteworthy that the current numbers reflect a reduction of 7.71 million compared to 2021, which was when the trends signaling a population decline began to emerge.

Foreign Affairs referred to this situation as “China’s long twilight,” highlighting concerns that the total population figures do not capture the full gravity of the issue. A vital generation of young workers simply isn’t being born.

By the 2040s, if China continues along the path of other East Asian nations experiencing low fertility rates, it may lose about one percent of its population each year—around ten million people, which is more than New York City’s entire population. Meanwhile, the elderly demographic (aged 65 and older) is anticipated to double from the current 15 percent to approximately 30 percent by the 2040s, and could exceed 40 percent by the late 21st century. In contrast, the elderly population proportion in the United States is expected to rise more gradually, from around 19 percent today to just over 23 percent by 2060.

In essence, China appears to be stepping into a prolonged period of demographic decline. This shift could reshape the nation’s economy and politics as profoundly as the demographic boom of the previous century did.

Signs of this looming decline include an increasingly “regressive and rigid” political system. This system appears to depend more on repression and adherence to central directives rather than fostering innovation.

Foreign Affairs noted that under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China’s economy is heavily reliant on generating low-cost exports, as domestic consumer demand is waning. Furthermore, the government seems like a one-man operation, characterized by abrupt purges of high-ranking officials, lacking the flexibility that defined the boom years of Deng Xiaoping’s era.

“As the country approaches a demographic cliff, Beijing seems unable to adequately prepare for the social challenges it will encounter in the forthcoming decades,” the analysis concluded.

The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) expressed that China’s sudden “birth crash” would derail plans made by the Politburo over the last twenty years, as those strategies were based on a growing base of young workers.

AEI attributed much of this downturn to the “One Child” policy, which enforced strict reproductive controls and devastated fertility rates during the 1990s, leading to a significant population dip in the 2010s. The aftermath of this policy has resulted in a kind of demographic decline typically seen after major wars or plagues.

“With the number of births in 2025 falling to less than half of those in 2016, China’s working-age population is set to face a dramatic decline in the coming generation. This trend appears almost inevitable, with limited avenues for Beijing to change course,” posited the AEI analysis.

This situation highlights a dilemma faced by China’s central planners. Their attempts to recover from the demographic fallout of the One Child Policy clash with a broader trend observed in industrialized nations, where birth rates decline as young women pursue educational and career opportunities. Coupled with an aging populace benefitting from modern medicine, this results in more elderly individuals who lack the familial support typically needed for care or wealth accumulation, which larger families might provide.

AEI raised concerns about the diminishing extended family networks in China, which have been the country’s most reliable social safety net for centuries. The implications of this development could be significant, and likely negative. There’s speculation that, as China grapples with sustaining wartime casualties in the future, it might adopt a less aggressive approach to territorial expansion.

The Rand Corporation noted that, despite claims of rapid economic growth and reduced poverty, China has “yet to become a high-income nation.” This situation means China missed out on the “demographic dividend” enjoyed by other rapidly developing Asian countries decades ago. Thus, Beijing is left with fewer resources to address the challenges posed by an aging citizenry.

In simpler terms, the burden of financing a growing elderly population will increasingly fall on current Chinese workers, who haven’t experienced the same economic booms as other nations now seeing demographic declines.

Rand pointed out that “the United States and Japan got rich before they got old, but China got old before it got rich, which is going to pose challenges moving forward.”

The Chinese Communist government is still trying to tackle demographic issues through initiatives that subsidize the costs associated with raising children. Recently, the Chinese State Council—a body akin to a presidential Cabinet—recommended fostering a “fertility-friendly society” by providing additional financial support for maternity, preschool care, and educational costs.

They also suggested “equalizing” services for rural citizens relocating to cities, since the existing household registration system limits their access to certain benefits enjoyed by native urban residents.

However, it’s worth noting that China has been increasing maternity and child care subsidies for years, similar to efforts made by other countries dealing with declining birth rates. Unfortunately, making it more affordable to have children has only had a modest impact on improving birth rates. So far, no developed nation has found the secret to encouraging young people, particularly women, to prioritize family over career before reaching middle age.