How an Obama-era solar plant costing $1 billion went bankrupt twice, leaving taxpayers to foot the bill

How an Obama-era solar plant costing $1 billion went bankrupt twice, leaving taxpayers to foot the bill

An Obama-era solar power plant in Nevada, once promoted as a breakthrough in clean energy, has gone bankrupt for a second time and sold for $7 million. The project received more than $1 billion in federal backing, and the eventual cost to taxpayers could reach an estimated $507.6 million.

Crescent Dunes rises from the desert near Tonopah, with more than 10,000 mirrors arranged around a 640-foot central tower. The facility was designed to keep producing electricity after sundown, using molten salt to store heat collected from the sun.

The Obama administration supported the project with a $737 million Department of Energy loan guarantee and about $275.6 million in Treasury grants. It was part of a wider effort to encourage clean-energy development and stimulate the economy after the 2008 financial crisis.

But the plant’s performance fell well short of its promise. Leaks and equipment failures repeatedly interrupted operations, while lower-cost solar technologies made its economics increasingly difficult. The setbacks eventually left the project in financial trouble.

The collapse recalls Solyndra, another solar company backed by the Obama administration that went bankrupt, costing taxpayers $528 million. Crescent Dunes’ potential public cost could come close to that amount.

Rep. Lance Gooden, a Texas Republican, called the project an example of wasteful government spending and alleged fraud and a cover-up. Those allegations are part of a broader dispute over what went wrong at the plant.

The facility sits about 13 miles northwest of Tonopah, on a 2,250-acre federal site surrounded by desert and distant mountains. Its mirrors, known as heliostats, direct sunlight toward a receiver atop the tower. That heat warms molten salt to around 1,050 degrees Fahrenheit, and the salt is stored in an insulated tank. It can later be used to make steam and turn a turbine, even after the sun has set.

The system made Crescent Dunes the first commercial-scale solar tower in the United States to use molten salt both to collect and store heat. The Energy Department projected annual production of 482,000 megawatt-hours, with a peak capacity of 110 megawatts—enough to serve more than 75,000 Nevada homes during periods of high demand.

SolarReserve developed the project, and Spanish contractor Cobra, part of ACS Group, built it. Both had stakes in Tonopah Solar Energy, the company that owned the plant. Banco Santander also held an ownership interest.

Then-Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid, a Nevada Democrat who died in 2021, was a prominent supporter. In 2016, he described the facility as an engineering and clean-energy achievement and said Nevada would benefit from it for decades.

The project embodied the administration’s approach of using public financing to help bring promising but commercially risky technologies to market. Crescent Dunes also illustrated how costly that strategy could be when a project struggled.

Problems surfaced early. A major leak in the molten-salt storage tank forced a shutdown in October 2016, less than a year after commercial operations began. During the outage, Treasury approved a grant payment in March 2017 through an Obama-era stimulus program. That funding later became the subject of allegations of fraud.

The plant returned to service in July 2017, but its output remained disappointing. In 2018, its strongest full year through 2025, it produced only 41% of the annual electricity output projected by the Energy Department, federal records show.

Another tank failure stopped generation in March 2019. Seven months later, after repeated breakdowns and poor performance, NV Energy ended its 25-year electricity purchasing agreement with the plant. Without that long-term customer, Crescent Dunes slid toward bankruptcy and filed in July 2020.

A restructuring transferred ownership to ACS through its affiliate, Crescent Dunes Investment, while Cobra continued operating the facility. The recovery plan depended on extensive repairs and aimed to raise production to 400,000 megawatt-hours a year—more than twice the plant’s best annual output.

The attempted turnaround did not last. The facility restarted in July 2021, but additional leaks in the molten-salt tanks in 2022 and 2023 forced more shutdowns. It later sold electricity through shorter-term arrangements, yet continued losing money and relied on financial support from affiliated companies, court records show.

Crescent Dunes returned to bankruptcy court in January 2026. In July, Sons of Liberty Construction, a Mississippi company owned by three brothers, bought the plant for $7 million and began trying to revive it.

The facility was generating electricity during a visit by reporters, though its output remained far below its original target. The new owners’ efforts to restore the plant are the subject of a separate part of this series.

There is disagreement about whether the main problem was the technology itself, the construction, or both. SolarReserve co-founder and former chief technology officer Bill Gould blamed ACS Cobra, describing the project as a case of mismanagement and accusing the contractor of delaying work and designing a flawed storage tank.

An engineer who said he had worked on the project from its early stages also pointed to design and welding problems in the tanks. He said the solar collection technology had encountered relatively few issues, while conventional thermal-power equipment caused more trouble.

Oliver Hemmers, a physicist and energy researcher who formerly led the Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, said the scale of the storage system created difficult engineering challenges. Large temperature swings can make metal expand and contract repeatedly, eventually leading to cracks and leaks, he explained.

Hemmers had not examined the plant’s engineering plans, but questioned whether the tank design had been adequately tested. He also noted that Crescent Dunes used one enormous molten-salt tank, while some other solar thermal facilities use several smaller ones to limit stress from heating and cooling.

Court records show that efforts to avoid further failures also reduced the plant’s output. When operations resumed in July 2023, operators lowered the hot tank’s temperature from its designed level of about 1,050 degrees to roughly 850 degrees. They later raised it to as much as 900 degrees, but the lower temperatures still cut electricity production and revenue.

At the same time, conventional photovoltaic panels were becoming cheaper, including panels made in China. Unlike Crescent Dunes’ mirrors and thermal-storage equipment, photovoltaic panels convert sunlight directly into electricity, making them a simpler and increasingly inexpensive option.

Crescent Dunes does have an advantage over standard solar panels: its stored heat can be used to generate electricity after dark, without relying on additional battery storage. But the falling cost of conventional solar has put pressure on other projects, too, including California’s Ivanpah plant, which also uses mirrors to concentrate sunlight but cannot store heat for nighttime generation.

ACS Group and its lawyers did not respond to requests for comment.

The federal support for Crescent Dunes included the $737 million Energy Department loan guarantee. The department said it resolved its financial interest through the plant’s first bankruptcy settlement in 2020, aiming to maximize the amount recovered by taxpayers. It estimated its loss on the loan at $232 million.

The Energy Department under the Trump administration criticized how earlier officials handled public money for the project. Assistant press secretary Caroline Murzin said the department had held no ownership, operational or financial interest in Crescent Dunes since 2020.

The project also received a $275.6 million Treasury grant. Unlike the loan, the grant did not have to be repaid as long as the project met the program’s requirements.

Together, the grant awards and the Energy Department’s estimated loan loss put the potential federal cost at about $507.6 million. Treasury has not confirmed that the full grant amount was paid, however, and the Energy Department has not provided a final accounting of its loan losses. Requests for records covering the loans, grants and taxpayer losses have been filed with both agencies.

The Treasury grant is also at the center of a lawsuit brought with backing from private investors. The suit alleged that companies involved in construction fraudulently obtained the grant. A judge dismissed the case at the Justice Department’s request, and the investors are appealing. The allegations and appeal are examined in another part of the series.

The project’s collapse has renewed debate over whether taxpayers should help finance energy ventures that private lenders consider too risky. Economist Véronique de Rugy of George Mason University’s Mercatus Center argued that government should not choose which companies or technologies succeed.

De Rugy said elected officials can celebrate publicly funded projects when they open but are rarely held responsible when the ventures fail. She also questioned why taxpayers should absorb the risks of commercial investments, particularly when some companies might have succeeded without government support.

Nick Loris, president of the conservative energy and environmental policy group C3 Solutions, offered a more favorable view of public financing. He said Crescent Dunes was a risky bet on a technology that might have helped address solar power’s intermittency, and argued that government funding can help promising ideas attract investment when private lenders are hesitant.

Loris said the project should be considered alongside successful ventures and interest earned across the Energy Department’s wider loan portfolio. One example is Desert Sunlight, a 550-megawatt California solar farm that uses panels rather than mirrors and molten salt. The Energy Department said in a 2024 assessment that the project had helped demonstrate the potential of large-scale solar and was meeting its loan obligations.

Across its broader program, the department reported that borrowers had paid nearly $5 billion in interest, compared with nearly $1 billion in default losses, through September 30, 2025.

Hemmers, however, questioned whether Crescent Dunes made economic sense from the beginning. He called it a failed, expensive gamble, while acknowledging that technical problems compounded the project’s difficulties.

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