The election of Donald Trump has made the fears of Ukraine and its European and American supporters a reality.
The president-elect and many of his cabinet appointees have expressed deep doubts about the war, openly questioning Washington's support and unrestricted involvement in Kiev, and saying that change is necessary and will occur in the near future. hinted. What this change will be is unclear at the time of writing, but the precursors suggest a slowdown or end to aid and the pursuit of a solution, with or without Kiev's involvement. .
Waiting to see what that policy will be is untenable. Ukraine supporters in the United States and Europe need to stay ahead of political changes and recalibrate their message to both the incoming administration and the American people. This requires sustained effort. Britain could not convince the Roosevelt administration in one reception or one broadsheet why it needed to support London and Europe against Hitler's Germany.
As in World War II, the key for President Trump is how to sell his support for Ukraine. The debates and narratives about war (and America's role in the world) that the Biden administration tacitly understands and shares are not those of Trump or his inner circle. Rather than trying to convert these officials into true believers, Ukraine supporters should rely on President Trump's proclivities and self-image.
Trump sees himself as a businessman and dealmaker, and this should be embraced rather than resisted. The only thing the president-elect hates more than no deal is a bad deal for him.
Any deal with Vladimir Putin, even one that has a good chance of excluding Ukrainians themselves, is a bad deal and not worth the paper it is printed on. Temporary respite or pause will only increase the long-term costs of resolving this conflict. Ukraine's allies need to open their eyes to this reality.
The collapse of Ukraine needs to be presented without exaggeration as a possibility for Afghanistan under the Trump administration around August 2021. President Trump hates to lose, and the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan is understandably seen as a failure for both him and the American people. Painting the collapse of Ukraine and the collapse of continental resolve in similar terms is one way to convey to President Trump the seriousness of the situation.
Similarly, America's European allies need to more directly link continental stability to continental economic productivity and, by extension, American prosperity. The security and economic disconnect brought about by Europe's relative peace to date has manifested itself in doubts about America's transatlantic efforts, as evidenced by Trump's candidacy and campaign. .
At the same time, America's European allies need to clearly and concisely demonstrate to both the president and the new Congress what they are doing for their own security and defense. Ukraine and Europe's security are closely intertwined, and progress on the latter will likely make support for the former easier, or at least cheaper.
Currently 23 out of 32 NATO member countries meet 2 percent of GDP spending Obligation. That is no longer enough and should be a subfloor rather than a floor. Meeting the criteria is neither a pass nor a fail. If you exceed that level, a passing score will be displayed. Linking increased spending to a corresponding reduction in U.S. commitments will also help sell Europe's case. For example, because NATO is doing X, the US can do less of X.
European efforts must also be clearly and directly linked to the US's desire to rebalance the Indo-Pacific region, a strategically more important theater. The more NATO members demonstrate increased responsibility for their own security in Europe, the more likely the U.S. will be able to pivot to the Indo-Pacific.
Similarly, the more NATO members can demonstrate support for and recognition of China's strategic threat, the better. Doing more at home, allowing America to do more in the Indo-Pacific, and providing more support for that arena, even rhetorically, will help advance Trump's case in Europe. It would be helpful.
Messaging efforts need to look beyond President Trump to the broader Congress. A large contingent of pro-Ukrainians remains in the incoming House and Senate. Trump may inherit an “imperial presidency,” but that doesn't mean Congress will have no voice or involvement in national security or foreign policy.
The American people are important here too. Once that is explained, Americans understand why Ukraine and Europe are important to them and their prosperity. The problem is that the Biden administration has abandoned efforts to convey Ukraine (and most other issues) to small-town America. This situation must change if the United States continues to support Ukraine and Europe.
Of course, there is no guarantee that these messaging efforts will be successful. Will President Trump have a moment when House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-Louisiana) takes office, receives a brief, and changes his mind? Probably not, but that doesn't mean there's no hope.
The desire to end the war is noble, but ending the war on terms favorable to the United States, Europe, and Ukraine while avoiding the risk of escalating the war is not just a naked pursuit of ending the war. , must drive policy.
Joshua C. Huminski is senior vice president for national security and intelligence programs at the Center for Presidential and Congressional Studies and senior fellow at the National Security Institute at George Mason University.
