While the California Army National Guard manages protests related to immigration enforcement, the California Air National Guard confronts a noticeably greater risk.
We should look back to January 12, 1981. On that day, Puerto Rican extremists attacked Carolina’s Munoz Marin International Airport, cutting through a fence and damaging $50 million worth of jets, which adjusts to $162 million today. Quite a shock, right?
Security forces are generally effective against physical attacks, but a drone? That’s a different story.
Jumping back to my experiences in Los Angeles 40 years ago—notably, vague recollections of so-called “voluntary” protests filled with signs made in both English and Spanish. No identification, no accountability.
But where exactly do these sudden flash mobs come from? Based on Jennifer Vanraal’s striking report from Red State, much of the funding seems to stem from our own taxes. However, we shouldn’t overlook the involvement of Mexican cartels with human trafficking and smuggling, especially given the disruptions from Trump’s policies. So, what’s the plan to prevent another attack on the National Guard?
How do we stop a repeat of the 1981 sabotage?
Understanding the vulnerability of soft targets
Consider Moffett Field near Palo Alto. It’s right against Highway 101, which makes it vulnerable to outsiders launching drones.
Airguard security can react to intrusions with enough advance notice. But when it comes to drones, they don’t have to enter through the gate. Drones can easily be launched from nearby parks, reaching their targets in seconds. A low-cost drone equipped with an explosive payload could easily wipe out a $77 million HC-130J.
Urban areas with high population density lack effective defenses against drone strikes. The US Air Force is aware of these limitations. For instance, consider the 17 days of drone overflights in 2023. Unchallenged and, frankly, quite embarrassing.
Federal regulations limit responses to drone threats, generally only allowing action beyond designated “sensitive” areas. But what if a missile intercept leads to debris raining down on nearby neighborhoods? And what happens if electromagnetic pulses incapacitate electronics in a mile’s radius?
Fresno’s vulnerabilities
The situation at Fresno’s Air National Guard base mirrors this. An F-15 is positioned within 75 yards of a busy highway, exposed to potential drone attacks.
While security forces could manage ground invasions, drones represent a different challenge. The current defense measures are essentially a series of warning signs along the perimeter—hardly a reliable security measure.
What’s the Airguard’s strategy for intercepting drones without endangering nearby civilians? Perhaps paintball guns? Or some other impractical solution?
Rethinking drone defense strategies
The solution isn’t about banning drones or launching missiles into populated areas. It requires rethinking how we can disrupt their accuracy.
Drones rely not on brute force but on precision. Military terminology refers to this as “circular error probability.” For example, the B-17 from World War II had a circular error of around 1,200 feet. Nowadays, first-person view drones can strike within a foot of their target.
That’s concerning.
On the bright side? You don’t have to shoot down a drone to neutralize it. What matters is undermining that pinpoint accuracy.
Drones can be easily disrupted. For instance, a baseball bat can destroy them. Their cameras can be overwhelmed by bright lights. And unexpected aerodynamic stress can throw off their inertial sensors. It’s all about making the guidance systems unreliable.
By targeting the accuracy rather than the drones themselves, the Airguard can safeguard its assets without risking civilian lives.
Cost-effective solutions available
Practical solutions are already available off the shelf—like ISO-luminescent lights, specialized atmospheric aerosols, or decoys.
These approaches don’t require massive funding like extravagant Pentagon programs; they act as inexpensive insurance against aerial threats.
If someone can rent a drone to launch fireworks, what’s stopping them from attaching small explosives? Nothing, really, unless the Airguard revisits its strategy.
Not preparing for the next wave of attacks isn’t an option anymore. If the military ignores its own defenses, others will exploit the gaps.
