Last year, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) found that both Russia and China are increasingly leaning on nuclear weapons to advance their national interests. This means they might eventually outnumber U.S. strategic nuclear forces, leading to a situation where multiple challengers pose risks, including difficulties in coordinating responses to threats.
In simpler terms, the balance of nuclear power seems to be shifting against the United States.
The DIA is thinking beyond just stocks of missiles and warheads. Their report forecasts China will have 60 partially orbital artillery systems by 2035, designed to complicate detection and response protocols.
Let’s focus on Russia first. The DIA intends to field 400 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, including 50 Sarmat missiles, each capable of carrying up to 20 high-yield warheads—potentially totaling around 1,000 warheads. The remaining 350 will be Yars missiles, each holding about four medium-yield warheads, pushing the total land-based ICBM arsenal to about 2,400 warheads.
Adding Russia’s naval capabilities changes the scenario. The Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile reportedly has six warheads, and the DIA estimates an additional 1,152 warheads, making the total for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) about 3,552. Russian strategic bombers could further increase the tally by around 1,000 more warheads using air-launched systems.
This means Russia’s long-range strategic forces could hit around 4,552 warheads, well above the limits set by the 2010 New START treaty.
As for China, the outlook is even more daunting. The DIA predicts that China could possess 700 ICBMs by 2035, a significant adjustment that reflects previous underestimations of China’s capabilities. Current reports suggest they produce between 50 and 75 ICBMs annually, with about 400 already deployed and another 300 likely within reach by 2035—even assuming slower production rates.
The type of wartime missiles also influences how many warheads each can carry. For instance, the DF-31A can accommodate three reentry vehicles, while the DF-41 might hold up to 10. Depending on the mix, China’s potential ICBM warhead count could range from about 2,100 to 7,000.
The DIA also estimates that China will have 132 SLBMs by 2035, broken down into 72 JL-3 missiles and 60 additional ones for three new Type 096 ballistic missile submarines. If each JL-3 carries three warheads, that could yield 216 SLBM warheads. If the new SLBM can hold at least six, an extra 360 could be added, totaling China’s ICBM and SLBM warheads to roughly between 2,616 and 7,616.
It’s not solely about missiles and warheads for the DIA; they anticipate the deployment of 60 partially orbital artillery systems by China by 2035, further complicating the response landscape. Additionally, around 4,000 hypersonic weapons are predicted to emerge—many potentially eluding current defense systems with unpredictable approaches. Some could even carry nuclear warheads. It’s noteworthy that China is also scaling up hypersonic aircraft production, doing so at a fraction of the U.S. costs.
North Korea adds further complexity. The DIA estimates North Korea may possess around 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles, introducing a third nuclear contender. This could heighten the chances of some collaboration among Russia, China, and North Korea during crises.
No quick fixes
Now, let’s consider the United States. Its modernization efforts mainly focus on deploying 400 Sentinel ICBMs in existing silos by around 2045, with a maximum of 400 warheads, which could potentially rise to between 800 and 1,200. Additionally, the U.S. plans to launch 12 Columbia-class submarines, each equipped with 16 missiles. If every missile could carry up to eight warheads, that would total about 1,536 warheads. Thus, hypothetically, the total could reach around 2,736 fast-flying warheads.
Now, let’s not forget the bomber force, which could theoretically boost the count by about 720 warheads with B-52s and B-21s carrying cruise and gravity bombs. This could bring the hypothetical total to around 3,456 strategic long-range warheads. While this might exceed what is currently in stockpiles and planned inventories, it represents the highest feasible number based on existing plans.
However, even at its best, timing issues remain a challenge. Experts suggest it may require at least four years for the U.S. to bolster its warhead force effectively. With over 11,000 long-range warheads available, the U.S. could face a numerical disadvantage of at least 3-to-1 when matched against potential deployed contingents from Russia and China. More importantly, the U.S. has seemingly hit its construction limit, with systems reaching maximum capabilities.
Increasing the number of bombers is possible, though these aircraft also support essential traditional missions that a few allies can handle. Current plans indicate aiming for 100 B-21s, with support perhaps ranging from 150 to 200. Additional ICBMs, submarines, and bombers are likely to arrive gradually, often beyond 2040. There are also 50 unused ICBM silos left, which might become helpful, but the vulnerability window could persist for years.
Time to build — again
Some argue that merely counting warheads isn’t what matters. Sure, that might give U.S. planners some comfort, but it doesn’t necessarily reflect adversaries’ line of thinking. Historical arms control agreements, from SALT to New START, were premised on the importance of limits and verification. There’s a famous saying from President Reagan capturing this notion: “trust but verify.”
If numbers held no significance, then verification wouldn’t carry weight either.
The past also tells us that having an edge can lead to influence. Take President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis, for instance—he believed that nuclear superiority was key to the U.S. prevailing over the Soviet Union. He even called the newly deployed Minutemen troops “my aces in the hole.” Similarly, he saw the Polaris submarine force as insurance against potential Soviet pressure during the Berlin Crisis.
Still, healthy diplomacy is irreplaceable. After all, military power without strategy can spiral out of control, while diplomacy lacking reliable military power can be deemed ineffective. This is a point Henry Kissinger emphasized consistently, and it rings true even today.
If the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission is correct in its assertion that Russia and China are employing nuclear threats and coercion, then the U.S. must not cling to assumptions about deterrence, arms control, and restraint.
Now, when we look at the recent history around arms control, both the Moscow Agreement and New START saw the U.S. and Russia reduce their deployed strategic warheads by roughly 4,500, landing at about 1,700 to 1,800 each. For nearly two decades, it seems Russia may have aimed to maintain the number of U.S. troops below 2,000 while modernizing and gearing up for a new conflict era.
If both China and Russia successfully obtain significant numerical superiority, they could potentially influence behavior across the region. Meanwhile, some advocates are urging the U.S. to move away from deterrence and extended deterrence, which may render its military weaker than adversaries. This would undoubtedly signal vulnerability and diminish confidence in NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, possibly prompting some nations to rethink their nuclear strategies.
The irony here is striking. Critics had warned that asking European allies for more defense spending could weaken the alliance. However, reinforcing NATO—bolstered by U.S. military might and a conventional military buildup—actually raises the stakes for invasions while lowering risks of miscalculations.
The reality is that adversaries are casting their votes. They’ve made their choices, seeing nuclear capabilities as more than just deterrents. They view them as tools for coercion and protection against aggression, which fits into the tight scope of limited wars the U.S. is dealing with now.
Nuclear weapons are at the core of U.S. deterrence and provide the foundational support for the country’s military and diplomatic strength. Therefore, the U.S. must complete and enhance its nuclear modernization efforts. This should include not only long-range strategic systems but also credible theater and tactical nuclear capabilities. Such forces would serve as a buffer against coercion and attacks.
No matter how much advocates for disarmament wish otherwise, there’s simply no substitute.
