Preparing for Drone Security at the LA 2028 Olympics

The Olympic opening ceremony in Los Angeles is set for July 14, 2028, which is just under 22 months away. This event is classified as a National Special Security Event. A committee in the House Homeland Security has likened the security demands to “seven Super Bowls daily over 16 consecutive days.” Notably, the defense against drones is regarded as the most critical element, and time is running out to get it right.

Several recent incidents highlight the security challenges facing LA. During the Paris Olympics in 2024, police intercepted 53 drones in the initial week near Olympic venues. In February, at Milano Cortina, the director of the State Department’s major events security division described drones as “a massive issue.” This past summer, the Pentagon’s counter-drone task force detected around 1,700 unauthorized drones during the World Cup and managed to seize approximately 700. Before the event, DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin expressed, “The biggest concern I have is, honestly, with drone defense. It is one of the areas that we are struggling with every single day.” Additionally, there were incidents with drones breaching airspace at the Miami Grand Prix and the Masters.

The operation during the World Cup was successful due to effective interagency cooperation and training. Agencies like the military, FBI, DHS, and local law enforcement worked together, sharing a unified operational picture. Sixty officers from various locales underwent a two-week training with the FBI and were sworn in as temporary federal officers in 11 cities. FEMA allocated $250 million to host states, calling it the fastest non-disaster grant in its history.

However, much of this setup was temporary. The Center for Strategic and International Studies remarked that it resembled a rental scheme rather than a sustainable playbook, as the funding, authority, and command structures were designed for a single event. The FEMA grants will last only until September 2028, and most host cities lack plans for the ongoing maintenance of the equipment. New regulations for state and local officers came into effect on July 1, amid the tournament. The command structure, which was established months before, involved agencies that typically don’t collaborate at such scale. This limited the decision-making window to around 90 seconds, leaving little room for discussions on authority.

Los Angeles is expected to be a tougher challenge than the World Cup. The World Cup attracted a record 6.8 million ticketed attendees across 104 matches in 16 cities over 39 days. In contrast, LA28 anticipates about 13 million visitors condensed into just 16 days, with venues scattered across the city instead of centralized in one location. There will also be numerous legitimate drones operated by media, emergency services, and law enforcement, complicating the task of distinguishing friend from foe in just 90 seconds—this is a significant training hurdle. Under the SAFER SKIES Act, LA28 will be the first Olympic Games where local officers will have their own mitigation authority, provided they complete training at the FBI’s national facility. However, this schoolhouse has only trained about 1,000 people in the last three years, and it expects to graduate 250 more by the end of the next fiscal year. As one drone program director pointed out, “You wouldn’t even cover the metropolitan cities in the first year.” The DHS counter-drone grant program offers $500 million but is focused solely on detection, with only 12 anticipated awards, directing each operator through the same training facility.

Ryan Zinke, a Republican Congressman from Montana, stated on the Impact Point podcast: “I can buy the best shotgun in the world, but I’m not going to be very effective unless I train with it.” For LA28, four key decisions could establish a lasting defense.

Firstly, it’s crucial to establish a joint drone task force for LA28 right away, rather than waiting until 90 days before the Games. The Secret Service, FBI, DHS, LAPD, the Sheriff’s Department, the Highway Patrol, and the FAA should begin working collaboratively by next summer, ensuring that every sensor acquired in the area contributes to a unified operational view.

Secondly, training should occur in the Los Angeles area as a coordinated group. While certification can take place in Huntsville, rehearsals must happen in Los Angeles, incorporating scenarios that simulate the presence of friendly drones, loss of communication, and the specific venues that officers will protect. Repeated practices will help officers make correct decisions within the critical 90 seconds.

Thirdly, readiness should be assessed through practical exercises rather than by counting equipment inventories. Congress ought to inquire quarterly about the joint drills conducted in the region and the outcomes of those exercises.

Lastly, there’s a need to secure funding for post-Games operations. The grants will expire just two months after the closing ceremony, and without ongoing funding, the region risks losing the capabilities it has developed—much like what is already happening with World Cup host cities.

Paris, Milan, and eleven U.S. host cities have already demonstrated the threats and costs associated with late preparation. Los Angeles has less than two years to implement the lessons learned from these experiences.