Iranian Opposition: A Complex Reality
In Western narratives, Iranian exiles depict an opposition movement keen to ally with Israel and bring down the Islamic Republic. However, the actual situation within Iran is much more intricate.
After the summer strikes in Tehran in 2025, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s regime faced significant challenges. During what some termed the Twelve-Day War, the pro-monarchy faction in the West believed victory was imminent. Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi characterized the moment as a “Berlin Wall moment,” forecasting a popular uprising that would topple the regime and pave the way for the return of the Peacock Throne.
The Pahlavi dynasty governed Iran from 1925 until the Islamic Revolution in 1979, which saw Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ousted and fleeing the nation. His son, Reza Pahlavi, evolved into a leading figure for the exiled monarchist opposition, advocating for a secular and democratic Iran while asserting that monarchy could still serve as a compelling alternative to the current regime.
However, a year later, with Israel embroiled in conflict once more and the U.S. playing a more active role, the anticipated “Berlin Wall” moment remains elusive. Mojtaba Khamenei has since taken over following Ali Khamenei’s assassination in February.
The reality for the U.S.-Israel alliance is stark: relying on the rhetoric from Iranian monarchists abroad was likely a miscalculation. Even with U.S. support, the expected military pressure didn’t lead to the political upheaval the monarchists envisioned.
Western intelligence has seemingly fallen into familiar traps of leaning too heavily on voices from the exile community, much like past mistakes in Iraq and Cuba. There’s a failure to differentiate between prominent diaspora activists and the millions still in Iran. History suggests that foreign military intervention rarely triggers local revolutions; more often, it creates a “rally-around-the-flag” effect, leading to an unwillingness among Iranians, even those discontented with the theocracy, to act as pawns for foreign interests.
The prevailing Western narrative assumes that a majority of Iranians yearn for a return to the pre-1979 Pahlavi era. Yet, dissent against the Islamic Republic doesn’t equate to support for the monarchy, especially among Iran’s various ethnic minorities.
Kamil Alboshoka, representing the Ahwazi Arab minority, articulated the complex feelings on this front, noting the past racism of the Shah towards Arabs. He highlighted that many in his community harbor negative memories of the Pahlavi era and worry about the potential for ethnic oppression under a Western-backed leader, suggesting instead, “The Ahwazi prefer to secede.”
Kurdish groups exhibit similar reservations regarding a return to monarchy. Hammid Bahrami from the Hana Human Rights Organization expressed concerns that a revived Persian monarchy might not support ethnic minorities’ interests. He criticized the crown prince’s characterization of Kurdish factions as “separatists” and pointed out that sentiments towards autonomy or secession vary within Kurdish populations.
Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi remarked on the difficulties faced by opponents of both the Islamic Republic and the crown prince in finding common ground within a cohesive alternative movement, describing the opposition as “fragmented.” She noted that Pahlavi has promised to manage a transitional phase and oversee a referendum—supervised by the United Nations—to determine the future government of a post-ayatollah Iran.
Abbas Ahmadi, an Iranian in Los Angeles, highlighted the disconnect between the diaspora and those who have lived through years of hardship in Iran. He pointed out that most Iranians are Muslim and criticized the crown prince for visiting the Western Wall without acknowledging the nearby Al-Aqsa mosque, a significant site for Muslims. “His father and grandfather had dignity, but this feels like disgraceful subservience,” Ahmadi asserted, emphasizing that monarchists are distancing themselves from the very people they claim to represent. “Do they really think most Iranians want a pro-Israel government after the bombings of their own?” he questioned, recalling the Pahlavis’ relatively short 54-year rule and the memories of oppression during that time.
As the U.S. evaluates its military resources and Israel confronts Iran’s military once again, a clear lesson emerges: an opposition relying on foreign support is likely destined for failure. Pahlavi may resonate within certain circles in the West, but he has missed his opportunity to galvanize support. By prioritizing the superficial agreement of the diaspora, Western decision-makers have set themselves up for a strategic downfall.
