The recent run of outages looks like a cluster of technical failures, not a coordinated attack. Still, it should make us pay attention. There is real fragility in the systems we rely on.
Over the past week, Microsoft 365 services, including Outlook, went offline around the world after a flaw tied to a July network update emerged under heavy demand. The FAA then issued an unusual nationwide ground stop when routers in Arkansas and Texas overwhelmed aging air traffic control systems. Chase and other banks reported slower transactions because of a software bug, United delayed flights after an internal system failure, and reports later surfaced of disruptions to the NSA’s classified network. Officials, including Homeland Security Secretary Markwayne Mullin, have said they are highly confident the incidents were unrelated technical problems rather than a cyberattack.
It is natural to look for a pattern when so many things fail close together. But these outages point to a more familiar risk: systems built for efficiency can become brittle. Cloud services are concentrated among a small number of providers, and updates that have not been thoroughly tested can create single points of failure across email, aviation, banking, and other essential services.
That does not make the threat of an intentional attack imaginary. A serious strike by China or Russia would likely look very different from a series of scattered disruptions. Power could fail, water systems could stop, banking and payment networks could freeze, and mobile service could disappear in a short span of time. Such an attack might accompany military action, or come just before it, perhaps in a move against Taiwan designed to slow or deter a U.S. response.
Iran, North Korea, and Mexican cartel-linked groups also have some ability to threaten critical infrastructure. Iran has been suspected of involvement in attacks on water systems in recent months.
Hostile governments routinely search for weaknesses, and may carry out limited attacks to see how quickly authorities respond. There are also so-called gray-zone operations: actions that impose economic and psychological costs, divert defensive resources, and preserve plausible deniability without triggering open conflict. Recent attacks on industrial food freezers and blood banks in Europe, as well as freezer failures at U.S. military bases, have been cited as examples. Russia has been suggested as a possible culprit.
China, meanwhile, has spent years preparing for potential disruption. Volt Typhoon, which U.S. officials assess is connected to the People’s Liberation Army, has reportedly gained access to parts of U.S. infrastructure, including energy, water, transportation, and communications networks. The concern is that this access could be used to disrupt or damage systems during a crisis. Salt Typhoon, linked to China’s Ministry of State Security, has focused on gathering intelligence by penetrating telecommunications networks and collecting communications and metadata. One is positioned to cause damage; the other is there to listen. During the first Trump administration, officials also discovered a kill switch in a high-voltage transformer imported from China.
Closer to the U.S. border, relations with Mexico have grown more tense. The Mexican government under MORENA and President Claudia Sheinbaum increasingly describes the relationship as a struggle against the United States. U.S. efforts to arrest senior drug traffickers in Mexico or destroy drug-production sites are treated as serious threats to national sovereignty.
Ammon Blair, a senior fellow at the Texas Public Policy Foundation, says Mexico’s military has acquired about 2,400 short-range drones for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and attacks, while developing domestic production. Mexican officials have also expressed interest in longer-range systems. That could put infrastructure such as U.S. power grids and refineries at risk, a possibility underscored by the use of drones in Ukraine.
Governments and businesses in the United States are beginning to address these weaknesses, though there is a lot left to do. The Department of War is starting to use counter-drone technology along the 1,954-mile border with Mexico. States are reviewing their vulnerabilities in the event of a conflict across the Pacific, and some companies are working to bring critical manufacturing back to the United States.
High-voltage transformers are one important example. They carry electricity from power plants to homes, factories, and data centers, but most are imported, often from China. Delivery can take two to four years, and roughly 70% of the transformers currently in use in the United States are more than 25 years old.
Demand is rising quickly, driven by data centers, electric vehicles, and industrial growth. Companies such as Resolute Grid in Austin are trying to build transformers domestically. Some of its engineers previously worked at Tesla and SpaceX and are now applying that experience to equipment that, the company hopes, can be delivered in months instead of years. CEO Marcus Owenby has said resilience is not only about keeping the lights on, but also about how quickly broken equipment can be replaced. Without electricity, water, fuel, communications, and financial services can all be affected.
Expanding domestic manufacturing, maintaining strategic stockpiles, speeding up permits, and favoring U.S. production over supply chains controlled by adversaries are practical steps, not just slogans.
The latest outages are not the start of a war. They are a reminder that complicated systems fail, and that adversaries with the right access could make those failures much more damaging. Preparation, not panic, is the sensible response.
That preparation can include keeping some cash at home, since ATMs and card networks may stop working if the systems behind them fail. Store water and replace it regularly; in an emergency, water from a toilet tank can be used. A two-week supply of dried and canned food can help a household get through a disruption without immediately relying on strained local services. A shortwave radio, a hand-crank or solar charger, and, where possible, access to a generator may also be useful.
Resilience depends on taking ordinary weak points seriously: transformers, thoroughly tested software, supply chains with alternatives, and basic household readiness. The engineers working to build essential equipment in Austin have chosen to take on that difficult work. The rest of us should take the underlying lesson seriously, too.



