Vladimir Putin, who was re-elected for a fifth term as President of the Russian Federation, has To strengthen governance for the coming years, changes have been made at the highest levels of government, the most notable being in the defense posture.
Former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu was named chairman of the Security Council and replaced by Andrei Belousov, a longtime Kremlin economic official and recent deputy prime minister, at the same time that Shoigu’s deputy and several other senior military officials were arrested on corruption charges in what appeared to be a coordinated campaign.
What is Putin trying to achieve with these moves? How will they affect Russia’s future? Here are five key points to keep in mind.
First, Putin wants to demonstrate his determination to win the war in Ukraine, no matter how expensive it is or how long it takes. This war will be his legacy. It costs a third of Russia’s budget (6.7 percent of GDP) are currently trying to finance the war, but Putin intends to win what he sees as a war of attrition.
Belousov’s job will be to manage the economy of the war more efficiently and in a less corrupt way, while Putin and his military and intelligence advisers control the strategy and tactics of the war.
It is ironic that the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, who led a failed revolt against Russia’s defense establishment last June, ultimately achieved what he wanted: Shoigu was ousted and some of those who profited from his position have been arrested.
Putin has also strengthened his control over the military-industrial complex by bringing to the Kremlin Alexei Dyumin, whom many see as Putin’s groomed successor. Dyumin, a former chief bodyguard of Putin, has served as governor of Tula Oblast for the past eight years. Secretary of the State CouncilThis may signal that Putin wants to give the body more power in governing Russia in the long term.
Dyumin will oversee the defense industry under the presidential administration. Collaborate with The appointment was made to one of Putin’s former KGB colleagues, Sergei Chemezov, who served as CEO of defense-industrial conglomerate ROSTEC for more than a decade, along with one of Chemezov’s business partners, Denis Manturov. First Deputy Prime Minister It will oversee Russia’s arms industry.
Second, apart from the defense ministry, there have been few major personnel or substantive changes in other areas of governance. Putin seems content with those running the economy, security services and foreign policy. The heads of key departments within the Kremlin have remained in their positions. include Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, who oversees Putin’s domestic politics. Replaced Putin’s key advisers, including Shoigu, remained in their posts in the Kremlin.
Most notably, Putin has not changed how the country’s economy is run. Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin has remained in his post. He will continue to work with the team that has been running Russia’s macro economy through the past two-plus decades of war. Anton Siluanov, who has been finance minister since 2011, said:Remaining.yesElvira Nabiullina, Governor of the Central Bank of Russia.
This team, backed by a large emergency fund, has helped Russia overcome a possible economic collapse despite Western sanctions, institutional problems and inflationary pressures.
Third, Putin continues to give greater responsibility to younger politicians and technocrats in managing ministries and state institutions. These “trials” include five former regional governors who have been given jobs in the federal bureaucracy in Moscow, as well as the sons of his longtime successors.
“The Princes”, Mikhail DzigerCall themThese include Patrushev’s son Dmitry, who has been promoted from agriculture minister to deputy prime minister for agriculture, and Boris Kovalchuk, the son of Yuri Kovalchuk, perhaps Putin’s closest ally, who has been appointed auditor general.
Fourth, Putin continues to balance the various families that hold power in Russia, most often headed by individuals who control state institutions and have close access to Putin and government assets, which they then distribute to their own patron-client networks, consolidating their power bases. Putin remains the final arbiter of the behind-the-scenes, opaque battle between the rich and powerful.
The Shoigu family was the clear loser in the recent cabinet reshuffle, while the Chemezov family gained influence, but as Meduza points out, the Chemezovs were unable to gain control of the prime ministerial position, and Putin gave it to Belousov, a non-family member whose loyalty is solely to Putin.
Putin’s closest aide Yuri Kovalchuk has seen his family’s status improved with the appointment of his son and the continuing influence of Sergei Kiriyenko. Nikolai Patrushev has been demoted but remains a Kremlin adviser with access to Putin. The family will be helped by his son’s promotion to deputy prime minister. Patrushev undoubtedly maintains influence in the security services that helped him rise to power.
The internal struggles for power and money are hard for those outside Russia’s elite to understand, but the competition is very real — and Putin is a master at managing it.
Finally, what does all this say about Putin’s successor? There are no imminent plans. Putin is apparently intent on running for a fifth term. I remain skeptical that he will stay in power until 2036, as allowed by the revised constitution. Putin continues to groom younger leaders he believes are capable of carrying on his legacy after he steps down. But a lot will depend on how the Ukrainian war goes and its impact on the Russian economy and people in the coming years.
Putin’s actions, with the exception of recalling Dyumin from Tula to the Kremlin, have offered little indication of who would succeed him if, for some reason, he were to step down early. If something were to happen to Putin, 58-year-old Prime Minister Mishustin would become acting president and early elections would be called.
Putin has been careful throughout his presidency not to usurp the leadership of future generations, and given that he likely intends to stay in power for a fifth term, it would be best to keep the focus on potential successors.
The current family leaders are in their late 60s and 70s and will eventually retire, while the most notable politicians and officials are in their early 60s or younger.
Dyumin is 51, Mishustin 58, Kiriyenko 61, Boris Kovalchuk 46, Dmitry Patrushev 46 and Manturov 55. And former President Dmitry Medvedev, who is struggling to transform himself from a liberal reformer into a war hawk, is 58.
Of course, there may be others who catch Putin’s eye and emerge from the power struggle to take power. As with many things in Russia these days, the future leader will depend on the outcome of the war with Ukraine.
John F. Tefft is Professor Emeritus of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research institute. He has served as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Lithuania, Georgia, and Ukraine, and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs.
