Freelance journalist Ben Olerenshaw recently expressed concerns that “America is not ready for a strike against our nuclear weapons.” He argues the country is uncertainly unprepared for nuclear threats due to its dependency on a “single point of failure” related to nuclear orders, control, and communications systems.
Olerenshaw points out that the U.S. relies on the E-6B Mercury command aircraft, which he says makes it a vulnerable target for surprise nuclear, drone, or missile attacks, primarily because it is only on “ground alert” instead of being operational 24/7.
If an attack were to occur, he claims the president might struggle to authorize nuclear weapons. However, that assertion doesn’t hold up. The country’s nuclear command, control, and communication channels offer multiple methods to issue executive orders.
This system connects various sensors and military assets to decision-makers. Detection utilizes sensors that recognize enemy launches, ensuring timely warning. Once an attack is detected, senior officials evaluate the situation and decide on an appropriate response.
The president’s commands are sent through a guaranteed system to nuclear forces responsible for engagement. To successfully execute this mission, the system needs to be robust, swift, and adaptable.
Essentially, the U.S. nuclear command infrastructure functions like a spider web. If one connection falters, other paths remain open for the president to communicate with forces in the field. Historically, it was feared that if a Soviet nuclear attack were to devastate the U.S., there would still be surviving lines of communication.
During peacetime, the National Military Command Center and the U.S. Strategic Command’s Global Operations Center act as the primary hubs for managing nuclear forces. Though these facilities aren’t designed to endure a direct nuclear hit, they’ve successfully operated through both peaceful and crisis times for the last seven decades.
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. maintained EC-135 command aircraft for continual airborne operations. These planes ensured that, even if ground command centers were compromised, airborne personnel could take over critical command roles.
These aircraft served as a precaution against unexpected Soviet attacks, reinforcing second-strike capabilities and overall strategic stability. Their presence sent a strong message about America’s dedication to preparedness and deterrence.
Nonetheless, it’s important to note that the National Military Command Center, Global Operations Center, and airborne command aircraft weren’t the only avenues for the president to manage nuclear forces. There were valid concerns that these assets could be neutralized early on during a nuclear strike.
There were also worries about the aircraft being taken out by enemy forces or running low on fuel, leading the Air Force to create backup plans for various scenarios. Extensive planning has taken place for situations where both command centers and the E-6B fleet might be rendered inoperable.
Throughout their careers, individuals have engaged in simulations and exercises reflecting catastrophic events. This kind of training is essential for those operating nuclear command systems to function effectively, even in degraded conditions.
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review outlined a policy under the Biden administration that maintains the U.S.’s capacity to launch nuclear forces during an ongoing nuclear attack, rather than depending solely on launch orders for a reliable response. The intent is for U.S. forces to withstand an initial strike.
For many years, the U.S. has relied on redundancy to enhance resilience. This includes multiple systems, command posts, and communication paths that require continual resources and movements, reflecting America’s commitment to maintain its deterrent capability.
Effective deterrence hinges on the credible threat of retaliation. This means that the nuclear command and communication systems must remain operational post-attack. America’s deterrent strength comes from its nuclear arsenal and launch policies, emphasizing that dependence on hope isn’t sufficient; actions must drive design and function.
