Renowned political scientist Graham Allison, known for his 2015 Atlantic piece “The Thucydides Trap,” suggests that history shows established powers often engage in preventive wars against emerging rivals, fearing they might lose their dominance otherwise.
The title of Allison’s article refers to insights from the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who chronicled the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides noted that Sparta likely initiated its war with Athens due to anxiety over Athens’ growing power. Sparta, worried it would be overshadowed and overrun by its more dynamic neighbor, launched a preemptive invasion.
Allison and his colleagues contend that this concept is now relevant to the U.S., which they view as a nervous dominant power facing an ascendant China. They argue that, similar to Sparta, the U.S. might take aggressive actions to prevent a world increasingly influenced by China.
Yet, there are various issues with Allison’s theory, both from ancient and contemporary perspectives.
For one, Thucydides left his account unfinished and sometimes offered analyses that clash with other historical interpretations. Various historians have pointed out the stark differences between Spartan and Athenian systems, suggesting that these differences created tensions long before the Peloponnesian War erupted.
Sparta was an oligarchic, agricultural society relying on a large enslaved population, while Athens was democratic, had a robust navy, and was engaged in maritime trade. This contrast created a backdrop for conflict, beyond mere fear of Athenian expansion.
Interestingly, Sparta emerged victorious from the conflict, as many established powers have historically done. For instance, Britain’s naval superiority allowed it to repel Hitler’s invasions, and the U.S. swiftly defeated Japan during WWII, despite Japan’s ambitions.
Even during the Cold War, the U.S. outlasted a Soviet Union that was presumed to be gaining strength.
Moreover, it’s not uncommon for established powers to lose wars they initiated. Emerging powers have often pathologically pursued conflicts, as seen with Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union against the dominant U.S.
Great power tensions don’t always lead to war, either. Post-WWII, the U.S. became the global leader without military conflict against the remnants of the British Empire. Countries like Britain and France ultimately accepted the rise of Germany’s economic power without violence.
In both ancient and modern contexts, a more reliable indicator of conflict is the disparity in political and economic systems between adversaries. Generally, greater differences increase the likelihood of war—think of Athens and Sparta or the U.S. versus Imperial Japan.
So, what about the so-called “Thucydides Trap” concerning the U.S. and China?
Despite recent summit discussions, the situation is not as dire as some claim. The U.S. is a well-established global player, while China is an emerging competitor currently facing its own challenges.
Additionally, the U.S. expands its lead in crucial areas like energy production, innovation, and military capabilities. Given this, there’s no pressing need for the U.S. to initiate a preventive war against a weakened China.
The primary reasons are twofold: first, China does not hold a decisive advantage in critical areas; second, both nations have nuclear arsenals, making outright conflict undesirable.
In conclusion, the idea of a universal “Thucydides Trap” leading inexorably to war doesn’t hold up historically. This concept falls short of capturing the full reasons behind the Peloponnesian War as outlined by Thucydides. Established powers do not initiate wars simply out of fear, and often, rising challengers make risky decisions that backfire.
Ultimately, avoiding potential conflict with a weakened China is achievable through alliances, deterrence, and maintaining the balance of power with periodic respectful negotiations.
