Reflections on Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis
In October 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower found himself in a tense situation, picking up the rotary phone on his mahogany desk, fueled by a staggering consumption of coffee—reportedly up to 24 cups a day during crises. His anger was palpable as British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, alongside France and Israel, launched an attack on Egypt, aiming to reclaim the Suez Canal.
It’s often assumed that the post-World War II period meant unwavering U.S. support for the newly established Jewish state, particularly given the record-high church attendance in America at that time. However, the reality was quite different. In 1956, the so-called “special relationship” that shapes today’s foreign policy toward Israel didn’t really exist. Instead, Washington viewed Israel as a minor, vulnerable entity, lacking significant geopolitical weight. The memories of Nazi atrocities were still fresh, yet they hadn’t woven into the fabric of military or foreign policy priorities. Moreover, the influence of Christian Zionism was not yet a factor.
Eisenhower’s main concern was straightforward: to deter the Soviet Union and protect essential oil supplies. A lens through which to gauge the era’s priorities can be found in Billy Graham, a prominent pastor and Eisenhower’s advisor. That year, he launched Christianity Today to amplify evangelical voices. Yet, during the Suez Crisis, neither Graham nor his magazine pressed for U.S. intervention on Israel’s behalf. Evangelicals were more focused on personal salvation and combating domestic communist atheism than on foreign political entanglements.
For churchgoers of the 1950s, the fact that Jesus was a Jew didn’t carry significant political implications. They didn’t feel a religious duty to support either a specific ethnic group or a secular state embroiled in a twentieth-century territorial dispute.
This contrasts sharply with today’s situation, where leaders like PM Benjamin Netanyahu frequently reference the Bible to support their geopolitical actions. Back then, you wouldn’t find pastors galvanizing their congregations to back Israel from the pulpit. Even Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a devout Presbyterian, approached the crisis through a containment strategy. Aligning with European colonial powers would have painted the U.S. as a proponent of imperialism, especially in light of the concurrent Soviet crackdown on the Hungarian Revolution.
Eisenhower believed that if the U.S. condoned a Western assault on Egypt, it would undermine its moral standing against Moscow. Adding fuel to his outrage was the revelation that the invasion had been planned covertly—timed just before the Presidential Election—leading to manipulation that Eisenhower found intolerable.
Determined not to compromise U.S. interests, he used financial pressure, threatening to divest from British investments, which could trigger an economic collapse in Britain. The coalition of Israel, France, and the UK eventually backed down, contrasting sharply with today’s typical American support for Israeli actions, which often includes UN vetoes and sanctions despite ongoing international law violations.
The pivotal shift in U.S.-Israel relations occurred after the 1967 Six-Day War when Israel defeated Soviet-allied Arab nations, becoming a vital anti-communist ally. This relationship later fused with the emerging evangelical end-times rhetoric, setting the stage for the dynamics we see today. Interestingly, it wasn’t until after 1967 that Billy Graham began endorsing support for Israel. During 1956, discussions surrounding the Holocaust were culturally muted, largely due to Hollywood censorship, which prevented graphic depictions of atrocities. Consequently, the horrors of the Holocaust did not yet find a substantial place in the cultural narrative.
Secretary Dulles later noted that most of the dissent concerning U.S. pressure on Israel came from Jewish Americans, with little pushback from Christian groups.
Fast forward to 2017, when President Donald Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, explicitly stating it was aimed at satisfying evangelical supporters. Similarly, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee often links policy decisions to God’s promise to Abraham.
In today’s context, military decisions aren’t strictly secular. For instance, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth openly identifies as a Christian Zionist and incorporates religious framing into military discussions, claiming that U.S. service members act “under the protection of divine providence.”
This reflects a stark departure from the mindset of Eisenhower’s administration, which prioritized national interests without succumbing to religious pressures. Eisenhower won the 1956 election by a significant margin, capturing over 57% of the vote, suggesting that his strong stance against the invasion did not alienate him from the Christian electorate.
Looking back at the Suez Crisis offers important insights into the evolution of U.S. foreign policy. The robust ties we observe today are neither a relic of ancient Christian duty nor a constant in American history. They represent a carefully constructed reality from the late twentieth century, raising questions about whether the pragmatic approach of Eisenhower in 1956 could provide a useful framework for today’s foreign policy challenges.
