Why Putin’s new ‘technocrat’ defense minister is destined to fail

Vladimir Putin’s recent cabinet reshuffle has generated a wealth of often contradictory assessments, but there is general agreement that Andrei Belousov’s appointment as defense minister is a positive for the administration. He has been promoted to the position of “respected” economist“, “Technocrat” and my favorite, “Rembrandt’s Fan.”

In other words, Belousov is not a mere thug like many of Putin’s shadowy allies, but a true professional, the right man for the job of rooting out endemic corruption within the military and integrating it into the civilian economy (and vice versa).

Indeed, it is almost certain that Belousov will fail, so his appointment is yet another sign of great leadership incompetence rather than a stroke of genius by Russia’s self-elected president.

Let’s start with the fact that Belousov graduated with honors from the Faculty of Economics at Moscow State University in 1981. Note the year: the late 1970s and early 1980s were the height of Brezhnevism, and what Mikhail Gorbachev later called the “era of stagnation.”

Although the USSR excelled in the hard sciences (which were not tainted by Soviet ideology), Soviet economics, like the study of Soviet history and law, was not an empirical and theoretical discipline as practiced in the West. Perhaps this is why Vladimir Milov, a Russian liberal opposition economist, wrote: To tell Belousov is a good mathematician but a poor economist.

Belousov revealed Dirigiste Model The principle of economic development is that the state, not the free market, has the final say in investment, production and consumption decisions. As one Russian commentator put it: It is called Belousov is a “gosplanshchik,” a follower of Gosplan, the State Planning Committee that mismanaged the Soviet centrally planned economy and ultimately led to its collapse. Commandoism may suit Putin’s tastes and help militarize the Russian economy, but at what cost to ordinary Russians?

Even worse for Belousov’s reputation, he was part of Putin’s government for nearly two decades. Reuters reports: Summarized his career“In 2000, Belousov was appointed non-permanent adviser to the Prime Minister of Russia and six years later joined the Ministry of Economy as Deputy Minister. From 2008 to 2012, he served as head of the Economic and Financial Department of the Government Structure during Putin’s term as Prime Minister. In 2012, he was appointed Minister of Economy. From 2013 to 2020, Belousov served as an adviser to the President of Russia. Since 2020, he has served as First Deputy Prime Minister. When Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin contracted COVID in 2020, Belousov temporarily took over the duties of Prime Minister while Mishustin recovered.”

In short, Belousov is a close ally of Putin and an integral part of the highly corrupt, mafia-like regime he has built. Can a technocrat and Rembrandt fan really distance himself from the rampant corruption of the system? Or should we consider that a long-time servant of a get-rich-quick tyrant might have copied some of his colleague’s less-than-reputable habits?

In any case, Belousov will not be able to cleanse the army of corruption. If he is clean, everyone will hate him and refuse to cooperate, especially after turning a blind eye for 20 years. If he is corrupt, he will do little more than pretend to scratch the surface.

Finally, there is the fact that Belousov has little experience dealing with bureaucracy in general, and its worst embodiment, the Russian bureaucracy in particular. The Russian Defense Ministry has around 10 deputy ministers and numerous supervisory bodies, bureaus and agencies. Can he navigate these treacherous waters?

To complicate things, Belousov, an economist with a keen interest in mathematics, will have to find a common language with General Valery Gerasimov, the chief of staff and a veteran military man. They will likely not be able to communicate with each other and will quickly develop a frosty relationship, especially if Belousov decides he needs to prove his worth by intervening in military matters.

Putin’s decision to promote Belousov is not just a mistake; it has all the hallmarks of yet another of his many strategic errors. Russia is embroiled in a war it cannot win, though it may not win anytime soon, and as a result the country is suffering huge casualties. Russian aircraft, ships, and oil refineries are being destroyed with regularity.

The last thing the Russian military needs is chaos within the decision-making bodies responsible for the war, which, of course, is exactly what Ukraine wants and needs.

So why has Putin failed again? Because, like Belousov, he is both the creator and product of the system. The mafia-like network of old friends is not known for innovative thinking or problem-solving skills. And after an extraordinary 25 years in power as head of Russia’s presidency, the visibly aging president is especially prone to mediocrity and violence, which he uses to compensate for his own rampant incompetence.

Alexander J. Motyl Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark. Specialist in Ukraine, Russia, the Soviet Union, nationalism, revolution, empire, and theory. Author of ten non-fiction books.The end of the empire: The Decline, Collapse, and Rise of Empire” and “Why empires are re-emerging: The fall of empire and the rise of empire in comparative perspective.