Next week, world leaders will gather in Washington to celebrate the historic 75th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On this occasion, there will be endless reflections on NATO’s successes over the past 75 years, but more than anything, there will be expressions of boundless confidence in the Alliance’s future.
Some of the participants will no doubt argue: NATO is essential He speaks glowingly of all the good things NATO will achieve over the next 75 years. And, of course, this self-congratulation is to a large extent justified. He compares NATO’s achievements since its founding with the famous expression of its raison d’être (its first Secretary-General, Lord Ismay) — keeping Russia out, Germany in, America in — there is no denying the success of the alliance.
The Soviet threat was contained, West Germany was integrated into the Western alliance system, and the United States remained deeply committed to European security.
But as my colleague Jennifer Kavanagh of the think tank Defense Priorities put it in a recent WebinarsNATO’s achievement of its original objectives has in itself sowed the seeds of its future decline.
The Soviet threat that had been the alliance’s unifying force ended long ago, and NATO’s European and Canadian members, having been part of the team that “won” the Cold War, have largely lost the resolve to maintain strong military forces and make their fair share of contributions to the collective defense, even after Russia invaded Ukraine.
Moreover, the success of “holding Germany in check” had an unexpected consequence: a disarmed Germany was essential to prevent a resurgence of the German threat in Europe after World War II. But it also meant that one of Europe’s major powers was effectively disarmed. But since Germany was a NATO member after the end of the Cold War, it had little incentive to spend on defense. The lack of a strong military by a major power created a gap in NATO’s overall European defense posture, one that has become evident since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Finally, the “Keep America in” strategy has resulted in the United States shouldering a disproportionate share of NATO’s financial and military burden. While the United States has historically been prepared to assume this role, the emergence of new global challenges may lead to a reassessment of security priorities. Persistent burden-sharing imbalances have long strained U.S. relations with its European allies and threaten to undermine U.S. commitment to NATO.
These challenges cast a long shadow over the future of the transatlantic alliance. The United States, NATO’s linchpin, is increasingly focused on the rise of China and the complex security challenges of the Indo-Pacific region. This shift in focus could lead to a decline in U.S. involvement in European security, further straining the alliance’s cohesion.
These challenges could be fatal for NATO in themselves, but I would argue that the alliance’s inevitable demise has deeper roots, which have to do with the shift in polarization over the past decade or so.
NATO was conceived to address the realities of superpower competition in a bipolar world, and its strict alliance structure and emphasis on collective defense were well suited to deterring Soviet aggression.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, NATO adapted to the new realities of what has been called the “unipolar era.” The absence of a major peer competitor allowed the United States to maintain its dominant position within the alliance, and NATO transformed into a vehicle for American superiority.
But the days of unipolarity are certainly over, and we have entered a new geopolitical era that is fundamentally multipolar. The rise of China, a resurgent Russia, an increasingly assertive India, and the rise of other regional powers have made the security environment more complex, chaotic, and competitive.
The challenge for NATO and its supporters is to adapt the alliance to the new multipolar reality;An Unbalanced Multipolar World”—is likely not possible and will prove not worth the investment of time, money, and energy it would require.
Why? Because NATO’s rigid, consensus-based decision-making process, designed for a single-threat world, is not suited to the fast-paced, dynamic environment of a multipolar world. The rise of new powers with competing interests makes it difficult to build consensus on a range of security issues. The focus on collective defense against a single adversary no longer reflects the diverse threats the Alliance faces.
We need a more agile approach. Flexible collaborations on specific issues, as opposed to the rigid structures of formal alliances, hold greater promise. Such collaborations would allow the United States to maintain freedom of maneuver and build ad-hoc coalitions to meet emerging threats. Oaks, Quad Various regional security organisations demonstrate the potential for countries to rally around common interests on specific issues in an agile manner.
Existing alliances may maintain a marginal role in this new world order, but their importance is likely to decline. The question for the United States and its European allies is not whether NATO can be saved, but whether it should be saved.
Resources currently being spent on maintaining a cumbersome alliance structure would be better spent on building a more agile and responsive security architecture that meets the challenges of the 21st century, including a more modular approach to security cooperation, with different countries taking the lead on different issues based on their respective capabilities and interests.
Does all this mean that we won’t be able to celebrate NATO’s 80th anniversary in a few years? Probably not. Does it mean that we’re unlikely to celebrate the alliance’s 100th anniversary in 2049? Definitely.
Andrew Latham He is Professor of International Relations at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minnesota, a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Peace and Diplomacy, and an Adjunct Fellow at the Institute for Defense Priorities in Washington, DC.
