In 2021, the White House released a national strategy arguing that misinformation and disinformation, often spread on social media, were deepening political divisions and could contribute to domestic terrorism. White House officials contacted social media companies and suggested that failing to remove or restrict certain speech could lead to violence. The issue drew wider attention in 2022, when the Department of Homeland Security briefly created its Disinformation Governance Board.
A recently released staff report from the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board examines the government’s campaign against online disinformation. The board, which is tasked with weighing counterterrorism efforts against Americans’ privacy and civil liberties, looked at claims linking disinformation to domestic terrorism and at safeguards intended to prevent speech from being suppressed.
After four years of investigation, the board’s staff found no evidence supporting the claim that disinformation was fueling domestic terrorism. Even so, former government officials urged platforms to label disputed content as false, make it harder to find, or, in some cases, remove it or suspend the accounts that posted it.
President Donald Trump issued an executive order in January 2025 aimed at ending this practice. Still, the country could repeat the mistakes of that period if it fails to take away a few important lessons.
As the report notes, governments have several ways to respond to disinformation, and they vary in how much they intrude on civil liberties. Speaking publicly to correct information the government considers false or dangerous is generally accepted and can be appropriate. Officials can make their case openly, using the authority of their office.
It is much more troubling when officials privately encourage social media companies to enforce their own rules by removing or limiting speech the government dislikes.
Documents now available to the public show that government officials encouraged platforms to suppress broad categories of speech without distinguishing between foreign and domestic speakers, or considering whether the speech was legally protected. The efforts were not limited to material that amounted to a “true threat” or encouraged what the Supreme Court describes as “imminent lawless action.”
Much of this activity took place behind closed doors, through direct exchanges between government officials and social media companies. Without lawsuits that led to the disclosure of those communications, the public might never have learned how extensive the government’s role was.
In response to the lawsuits and the release of emails that raised serious concerns, government lawyers issued guidance intended to keep future communications within legal bounds. A central point was that officials should avoid being “coercive.”
But the broader message of many policies was that executive branch officials could, and in some cases should, persuade platforms to monitor or limit speech as long as their requests were presented as suggestions.
It is fair to wonder whether a social media company would really view an email from the White House as a suggestion, regardless of any disclaimers attached. And even if it did, that would not make the practice sound policy.
It would be especially poor policy for the government to secretly send platforms lists of statements it considers false alongside lists of accounts that have posted them. Whether or not such actions are legal, the government should not be policing Americans’ speech in this way.
Practices first used to address disinformation from hostile foreign actors were readily adapted to efforts aimed at domestic terrorism. The risk that counterterrorism measures could be used to restrict civil liberties is well established. It was one reason the 9/11 Commission recommended creating the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
The commission also argued that the executive branch should have to show that a government power meaningfully improves security and that its use is adequately supervised. Any such power, it said, should come with clear guidelines and oversight to keep it within proper limits.
In this case, there was little clarity about whether disinformation contributed to domestic terrorism, or whether it did so on a significant scale. It is also far from clear that government efforts to suppress this speech would have made the country safer.
Trump’s executive order points away from government pressure on social media companies to restrict speech. But current agency policies do not clearly prohibit efforts to suppress Americans’ lawful speech, and those protections have not been written into law. The government could therefore reverse course relatively easily and restart the kinds of counter-disinformation efforts described in the report.
Americans should not have to wonder whether the government is urging private companies to censor them. Protecting the country also means continually demonstrating that the government deserves the public’s trust.





