For many years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been viewed as a cornerstone of regional stability, especially in the eyes of the U.S. and other governments. It’s seen as a model for consensus-driven diplomacy and a possible counterbalance to China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific.
However, in 2025, this perception feels increasingly outdated. ASEAN appears less like a strong political bloc and more like a fragmented entity, struggling with internal challenges and failing to unite in response to significant geopolitical pressures.
The situation is stark in Myanmar, where the military regime that took over in 2021 is fighting to maintain its grip on power amid a civil war. Resistance groups are gaining ground, controlling vast areas of the country, while the junta continues to commit atrocities, disregarding any diplomatic initiatives. The once-promising five-point consensus of ASEAN has essentially lost its relevance.
Despite rising international calls for action, ASEAN has opted not to suspend Myanmar’s membership. Instead, the bloc’s only move was to exclude its representatives from high-level meetings, a symbolic act that fails to address ongoing violence and humanitarian crises.
Myanmar isn’t alone in facing turmoil. Thailand, a founding member of ASEAN, is now embroiled in its own political upheaval. After the 2023 elections, the Progressive Party emerged with the highest number of seats. In a surprising twist, the Pheu Thai Party — originally the main opposition to military rule — formed a coalition with the very military it opposed, breeding distrust among voters and bringing back older power dynamics.
This uneasy coalition has been further complicated by a new scandal involving Paetong Tarun Sinawatra, daughter of a former prime minister. A controversial discussion with Cambodian leader Hun Sen has ruffled feathers in Bangkok, widening the divisions within the ruling coalition and prompting fears of a potential military coup, reminiscent of Thailand’s two-decade history of such events.
Meanwhile, in Cambodia, the transition of power from Hun Sen to his son was carried out with little transparency and minimal opposition, raising questions about democratic practices. Cambodia remains closely aligned with Beijing, often obstructing ASEAN’s efforts, particularly regarding South China Sea issues. Laos, too, has aligned with China and is largely absent from ASEAN’s diplomatic dealings.
These developments are interconnected, revealing significant structural issues within ASEAN. The long-standing principles of consensus, non-interference, and formal equality among member states seem increasingly outdated. They barely functioned during the Cold War, and the current geopolitical landscape is markedly different.
Today, as U.S.-China competition intensifies, ASEAN’s diplomatic framework appears insufficient. It struggles to produce a unified stance on crucial issues like security, democracy, trade, and technology. This lack of coherence is becoming a pressing concern.
The consequences of ASEAN’s inaction are significant. As tensions in the South China Sea escalate and China heightens its maritime activities near the Philippines and Vietnam, ASEAN has found itself unable to even issue a joint statement of condemnation. While the U.S. and its allies work to establish resilient supply chains and tech partnerships, ASEAN countries are individually making competing agreements, often to China’s advantage.
Even in trade, where ASEAN once exhibited a degree of harmony, the landscape has shifted. China is now the primary trading partner for many ASEAN nations, and agreements like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership have solidified Beijing’s critical role in regional commerce.
Behind closed doors, ASEAN officials acknowledge the bloc’s growing dysfunction. Many are disillusioned with the facade of unity, but the structure of ASEAN — with its rotating chairs and culture of avoiding conflict — makes genuine reform nearly impossible. The result is a facade of multilateralism that produces generic statements while avoiding pressing issues, leading to a widening gap between ASEAN’s projected image and its real influence.
This dynamic poses challenges for U.S. foreign policy. Historically, Washington has depended on ASEAN’s centrality for its presence in the Indo-Pacific. However, if ASEAN cannot function effectively as a reliable partner, U.S. policymakers may need to adapt their strategies. This might entail forging more flexible coalitions with individual countries, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Addressing the uncomfortable reality that a decline in ASEAN could benefit Beijing may also be necessary.
Southeast Asia remains one of the most vibrant regions globally, marked by economic dynamism, a youthful population, and strategic importance. Yet, its principal political institutions are faltering. While ASEAN isn’t defunct, it has certainly lost its robustness. Until member states and their international allies come to terms with this reality, the region will continue to face vulnerabilities, both from external pressures and from the slow self-erasure of its political framework.
