The Supreme Court is currently reviewing the case of Louisiana v. Calais, which has the potential to fundamentally alter how electoral redistricting is approached in the U.S. Specifically, it raises an important question: Is it constitutional for states to utilize racial quotas when drawing district maps?
At present, there’s a tricky balancing act for states regarding voting rights. On one hand, not considering race enough can violate the Voting Rights Act. On the other hand, placing too much emphasis on race can contradict the equal protection clause found in the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance, Louisiana faced criticism after being stopped from implementing a plan for two majority-black districts, only to later be criticized again for actually attempting to do so.
The Voting Rights Act, established in 1965, marked a significant step forward. It dismantled overt barriers that limited the voting rights of black Americans—especially in Southern states. For example, in Mississippi, black voter registration surged from 6.7% to 59.8% in just two years. Alabama saw similar increases, jumping from 19.3% to 51.6%. By 1967, black registration rates in all states covered by the Act exceeded 50%.
Initially, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act was aimed at addressing intentional discrimination—laws that overtly restricted voting rights. However, in 1982, Congress amended this section to include broader “discriminatory consequences,” allowing for lawsuits even when the discrimination wasn’t overt, assessed through a somewhat vague “totality of the circumstances” test.
In 1986, the Supreme Court applied this revised language in Thornburgh v. Jingles, where the focus shifted from ensuring access to the ballot to scrutinizing the racial demographics of congressional districts. This shift transformed the Voting Rights Act from a civil rights guarantee into a mechanism for ensuring racial balance.
The Jingles framework, which comprises nine elements, is considerably broad and subjective, opening the door to potential misuse. For example:
- In Louisiana, claims about “subliminal messages” linked to a history of socio-economic discrimination were made regarding the sheriff’s office and registrar’s office being on the same floor.
- In Georgia, the introduction of voter ID and citizenship proof requirements was deemed sufficient “official state discrimination” to require the creation of additional majority-minority districts, despite 98% of voters being registered and both major party candidates in the previous Senate election being black.
- In Mississippi, issues stemming from “the nature of black poverty” were cited as proof of voter dilution.
- In Alabama, a federal court even suggested that Ben Carson’s loss in the 2016 Republican primary could indicate some “racial voting bias.”
Ultimately, the Jingles criteria have turned judicial proceedings into tools for social engineering. Yet the federal judiciary shouldn’t be in the business of crafting political theories on representation. The Voting Rights Act does not define a proper quota for black or Hispanic precincts states should create. As Justice Thomas argues, the Constitution fundamentally “abhors” classifications based on race.
In this context, the Supreme Court’s goal in the Calais case isn’t to refine this ongoing contradiction but rather to resolve it altogether. The Fourteenth Amendment demands that districting be color-blind, adhering to neutral principles like population size, compactness, and existing political boundaries. Prioritizing racial demographics can ultimately diminish our collective integrity. The authors of the Reconstruction Amendments never intended for judges and delineators to segregate voters by race to achieve balance; they aimed for equality under the law and the dismantling of caste-like divisions. It might just be time to realign with those original ideals.
