China’s Expanding Influence in Space Infrastructure
Over a decade ago, China initiated its Belt and Road Initiative, investing huge sums into developing countries’ infrastructure—railways, ports, and power plants—to extend its economic and political reach. Now, experts suggest that a similar approach is being applied to a more strategic domain: space.
Across Africa, Latin America, and other regions of the Global South, Chinese firms are discreetly establishing or enhancing satellite ground stations and space facilities, positioning Beijing as a bridge to orbit for nations like Pakistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Namibia. These countries, often lacking the resources to launch their own satellites, may find themselves reliant on China’s expanding space network. Analysts warn that this expansion carries significant economic implications, as well as potential impacts on future military conflicts and global power dynamics.
A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlights that China is deeply involved in the space endeavors of numerous countries, offering comprehensive services from satellite design and manufacturing to launch and training. This strategy could enable China to maintain long-term influence in increasingly critical areas for military power.
For example, a newly expanded Chinese satellite facility now operates in Ethiopia’s capital, tracking objects in orbit. Similar installations have emerged in Egypt and Namibia, equipped with large satellite dishes and antennas that facilitate both civilian and military space missions. Collectively, these facilities enhance China’s capability to monitor, communicate with, and potentially influence space activities, which defense strategists now consider a new battleground.
“This essentially revolves around who comes out on top in the space diplomacy contest within the Global South,” stated Matthew Funaioglu, a senior researcher at CSIS and one of the authors of the report. “Space is increasingly central to economic power and national security, and China is positioning itself effectively.”
Traditionally seen as a realm for science and commerce, space is now treated as a combat domain alongside land, air, sea, and cyberspace. Satellites are integral to modern military operations, aiding in communications, intelligence, navigation, and targeting.
Experts argue that China cannot fully achieve its aims as a global space power solely from its own territory. Continuous tracking and communication of satellites require a worldwide network of ground stations, prompting China to build facilities abroad to fill crucial gaps in its own system. This redundancy is vital during crises.
While the infrastructure China exports may serve scientific and commercial purposes, it can also facilitate military activities, such as monitoring military satellites and collecting sensitive information—tasks closely tied to the People’s Liberation Army.
Concerns amplify due to the lack of clarity around who controls the data generated through these systems. Funaioglu noted, “There are always questions regarding who has access to this data and how it’s utilized. The opacity is indeed worrisome.”
The report indicates that China is shifting its focus from exporting roads and ports to providing satellites, launch services, and ground stations. This transition embeds Chinese technology deeply into various nations’ critical systems, facilitating a streamlined path to space they’re terms as “Belt and Road in orbit.”
There’s noticeable interest in accessing space in Africa and Latin America, with many nations lacking the capabilities to achieve this independently. Funaioglu remarked, “China has stepped into that void in a way that the U.S. hasn’t really attempted to do.”
The report also launches a new China Space Cooperation Index that evaluates 64 countries based on their engagement with China, with over three-quarters of these nations located in the Global South, particularly in Africa.
Even though China’s commercial space sector trails behind that of the United States, it has made considerable inroads by leveraging state-backed funding, diplomacy, and technological offerings, making it challenging for competitors to counteract this momentum.
Funaiole emphasized that once countries align with China’s initiatives, transitioning away from that association becomes quite costly. Historical precedents suggest the same for other essential technologies.
When contrasting with the U.S., it’s noted that decades ago, a global space network for defense and combat predominated, largely relying on partnerships with close allies rather than developing nations. The U.S. government has never framed space access as a diplomatic strategy, a gap now being filled by China’s endeavors.
China’s partnerships in Latin America also catch the eye in Washington, especially regarding countries like Venezuela and Argentina, where developments are closely tied to U.S. security interests.
This ongoing expansion draws attention, especially in light of actions taken during the operation against Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro. President Trump has reiterated what he terms the “Donroe Doctrine,” a contemporary and more confrontational interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, asserting the U.S.’s right to push back foreign influences in the Western Hemisphere.
The economic implications are particularly concerning, too, if China solidifies itself as the go-to space partner for developing nations. With projections showing the global space economy could soar into trillions of dollars, current partnerships may determine future control over space markets.
Nevertheless, Funaiole remains optimistic about the U.S.’s capabilities, suggesting there’s still an advantage to be had if the U.S. chooses to act decisively. He mentions companies like SpaceX, which remain significantly ahead of their Chinese counterparts. “China is trying to mimic that success,” he noted.
The key question now, Funaiole asserts, is whether the U.S. government will recognize space as not just a scientific and commercial zone but also a strategic tool for diplomacy and deterrence. “It’s not too late,” he concluded. “The U.S. still has the chance to provide a genuine alternative, but that will require ongoing commitment and focus.”
