Nuclear Arms Control Between the U.S. and Russia

Currently, there are no bilateral nuclear arms control agreements in place between Russia and the United States—a situation that hasn’t occurred in over half a century. The expiration of the New START Treaty has led to uncertainties. Moscow has informally suggested maintaining the treaty’s warhead limits while negotiations continue. Accepting this proposal might be beneficial for the U.S. as it could prevent a new arms race while allowing time to establish a formal agreement.

In the absence of a framework, both nations may resort to worrying about the worst possible scenarios regarding each other’s arsenals. This environment of uncertainty may lead to a new arms race. The previous New START cap provided a clear upper limit on deployed warheads, which helped reduce the urgency to develop more weapons out of fear.

Some critics argue that Russia hasn’t adhered to the terms of New START. Validation and data exchanges that were supposed to occur in 2023 were interrupted, and the U.S. has accused Russia of violating multiple arms control agreements under President Vladimir Putin’s leadership.

These concerns warrant discussion in future negotiations, but the informal agreement is still relevant. It offers a baseline for military planning, while the lack of any arms control, formal or informal, increases unpredictability and the potential for destabilization.

By January 2025, the U.S. is projected to have around 1,770 deployed warheads, enough to withstand an initial attack and retaliate decisively. But creating a more extensive arsenal also depletes resources and doesn’t necessarily enhance stability.

Crucially, New START does not restrict the U.S. from modernizing its nuclear triad, which is already quite advanced. It merely limits the number of Russian deployments. Should the U.S. exceed New START limitations, it could signal a lack of interest in mutual arms control, prompting Moscow to bolster its arsenal.

Some believe that this treaty is outdated and overlooks China’s expanding nuclear capabilities. This perspective deserves attention, particularly as Beijing continues to grow its program. Still, rejecting Russia’s informal offer might not be wise, particularly given the disparities between U.S.-Russia warheads and those held by China.

While an alternative framework to New START could facilitate future agreements—including for tactical weapons—a trilateral agreement involving China shouldn’t be a prerequisite for maintaining the informal cap with Russia. Additionally, a new arms race could deter China from engaging in future discussions.

The U.S. government ought to accept Russia’s proposal to maintain the New START cap informally while attempting to resume inspections and data exchanges. Utilizing this framework could aid in including China and addressing areas not covered by New START.

While no arms control agreement is flawless, the pressing question is whether having a partial cap is better than having none. Without some form of limitation, both sides could end up preparing for conflict, and the risk of miscalculation would rise alongside growing mutual distrust.