Simply put, press conferences, bombings, or dreams of an instant regime collapse won’t “fix” Iran. A look back at Northern Italy in 1945 provides a more realistic glimpse of what might follow.
The circumstances then were quite dire. Civilians faced control from various enemy factions, including the SS, Waffen-SS, Wehrmacht units, and Italian fascists. There were public executions, all at the whim of local commanders.
It’s important to note: America won’t take charge in Iran; the Iranians will determine their future. Any U.S. involvement won’t turn into a mission for complete governance or extended presence.
The U.S. Strategic Directorate mirrors the Committee for the Liberation of Northern Italy (CLNAI), which integrated various anti-fascist and anti-Nazi factions to present a viable alternative governance.
The OSS managed to introduce both American and Italian anti-fascist operatives to form networks and train local partisans. By early 1945, OSS groups were unleashing chaos across northern Italy, focusing activities from Genoa to Ravenna. They effectively pressured the Germans by anticipating and countering their responses.
When the conflict concluded, results varied widely. While Wehrmacht units often gave up, the SS and Gestapo held out longer. On April 25, 1945, CLNAI announced national liberation, igniting a significant uprising across northern Italy that forced many enemy troops to surrender, while others were killed or captured.
However, stability didn’t arrive immediately. Italy didn’t transition to a republic until another year passed, and it took even more time for the postwar order to be fully established.
The lesson? Liberation unfolds in sequences, not as an on-off switch.
Lessons from Italy for Iran
Iran has the potential for internal change; the challenge is whether the opposition can sustain itself long enough to form a new government instead of collapsing into chaos.
1) There’s substantial resistance.
Many Iranians are clearly willing to stand against the mullahs and their repressive systems. Recent protests have claimed numerous lives—reportedly around 30,000—indicating a fierce willingness to confront the regime.
2) A diverse opposition.
Political views within the resistance are varied. Some seek to restore the Shah, while others strongly oppose that idea. There are Kurdish groups with differing goals, some desiring autonomy and others advocating for complete separation. Yet, the shared desire to dismantle the clergy remains a unifying factor.
3) Security force dynamics.
It’s possible some of Iran’s security forces might choose to withdraw quietly if the regime’s command crumbles. More hardline units may resist fiercely for a longer period, just as some Nazi units did after May 1945.
4) Addressing post-conflict needs.
If the transition falters, people could face hunger and despair before a new order is established. Ensuring civilian needs are met is strategic, not merely altruistic.
Potential Actions
1) Develop a robust political alternative.
Create and fund a coherent Iranian resistance that can function as a provisional authority, promoting clear leadership, consistent communication, and a national plan for after the regime.
2) Facilitate information exchange.
It’s vital to help Iranians bypass the regime’s controls, enabling greater communication among citizens. This could involve smuggling in tools like the Starlink communication kit to enhance coordination.
3) Provide a secure space for organizing.
Strategically important regions neighboring Iran should be designated to allow the opposition to organize and train without becoming an unrestricted American presence.
4) Diminish Tehran’s remaining power.
Often, regimes try to disrupt trade and energy lines as a form of leverage. A shift in approach should look to sustain maritime security and diminish Iran’s ability to use such points as bargaining chips.
In recent weeks, U.S. forces have taken control of Iranian military sites on Kharg Island, stopping short of a full ground assault to regain control of the strait.
Moreover, the U.S. could counter Iranian threats by absorbing their leftover military assets until the regime weakens further. There’s no need to risk American lives in this strategy. One option includes deploying “drone sponges”—decoy tankers designed to draw attacks.
With consistent air surveillance, any launch sites could be neutralized swiftly using weapons that produce significant psychological effects.
Defining an End-State
The U.S. should aim for a definitive outcome in Iran involving the disintegration of the regime’s coercive arms, the rise of a homegrown governance alternative, and quick stabilization of civilian life—without extensive military occupation.
This approach is framed by five commitments.
1) No nation-building.
The U.S. won’t control Iran; that will be for the Iranians to manage. Any involvement shouldn’t morph into an enduring governance mission.
2) An Iranian-led transition supported by the U.S.
The U.S. will endorse an Iranian resistance coalition that can lead the populace and negotiate the exit of regime representatives, aiming for political cohesion across the country.
3) Constant pressure on the regime’s potency.
A campaign should spotlight the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and internal security services until they can no longer maintain their oppressive grip.
4) Targeted support instead of ground force deployment.
U.S. aid should revolve around intelligence and logistics to aid Iranian factions willing to resist, allowing them to combat the regime’s forces effectively while establishing stability.
5) Humanitarian relief as a priority.
Large-scale humanitarian efforts must be planned to prevent a collapse post-conflict, ensuring civilians have access to food, medicine, and basic services. Addressing needs helps maintain legitimacy in the changeover.
Success would mean a weakened regime and a stable civilian life controlled by interim authorities capable of managing essential services. In this scenario, the U.S. would facilitate diplomacy and provide support before withdrawing.
