There is nothing more shocking than a series of events in which a team not only forces their opponents to make mistakes, but begins to force themselves to make stupid decisions that nearly destroy their chances of winning the game.
that’s exactly what happened minnesota timberwolves In Game 4 of the Western Conference Semifinal Series against the Denver Nuggets. Trailing by seven points with 30 seconds left in the second quarter, the Timberwolves realized they had to protect Nikola Jokic with their best defender in Rudy Gobert.
You might not think that’s a bad situation, and it’s not a disadvantage for Gobert at all, but the reason the Timberwolves were trying to avoid having to guard Jokic one-on-one is because they need Gobert. He has moved away from his ideal role on defense: wanderer and rim protector. When he has to be actively engaged on defense, he won’t be in a position to use the threat of shot blocking to eliminate mistakes, get rebounds, or shut down the paint.
On the other hand, Gobert’s single coverage against Jokic means the Timberwolves don’t have to be as aggressive against doubles, especially doubles from the top (i.e. one pass). The death of someone who could punish such a shadow warrior, such as Michael Porter Jr., further prevents that decision from being made.
Still, regardless of who Jokic is guarding, defenders will be forced to display an appropriate level of fear at the prospect of scoring from single coverage. This is why we still see this alignment even though Gobert is confident he can handle himself.
But it also opens up other avenues of attack, especially on the weaker side. Jamal Murray is blurry in the photo above as he cuts up the middle toward the basket. That means Jaden McDaniels will then have to cover for the cut by helping out on Kentavious Caldwell’s weakside wing. pope.
Of course, Jokic, being the type of player to notice such occurrences, makes the reads you’d expect, but it’s always something to be grateful for every time it happens.
That was the part where the Nuggets forced the Timberwolves to make a mistake. It was immediately after that that the Wolves forced themselves to take on the challenge.
The Timberwolves’ poor decisions aside, the Nuggets responded the way you’d expect champions to respond when faced with great challenges and adversity. They did that by making some tweaks that have a macro impact on the tenor of this series after the Wolves won the first two games in Denver.
Over the past two games, the Nuggets have figuratively pointed the finger at Gobert, emphasizing, “We always want him to be involved in defending our best players.” This is by no means a new strategy. Gobert has been the target of many hunts on the border, and he has developed an undeserved reputation for being a headless chicken whenever he is not in the territory protecting the paint. Even though he’s not the basic prototype defender, he deserves more recognition as a capable switch-out who thrives on the perimeter.
But as we explained earlier in this article, there is a way around the insanity of challenging the four-time Defensive Player of the Year in a head-to-head matchup. And there’s no better coach to embrace that madness than mad scientist Michael Malone.
You could practically hear the wheels turning in Malone’s head during the Nuggets’ dominant Game 3 victory. The focus was on moving Gobert out of his wanderer role and into a more active role as Jokic’s defender. The easiest way to accomplish this would be to reverse the way the ubiquitous half-court action is performed.
Long story short, the Nuggets had Gobert’s man Aaron Gordon set an inverted ball screen for Jokic.
In a way, the tweaks led to an overarching realization that must be said after two mediocre games. For the Nuggets to make this one series at a time, it could be as simple as Jokic needing to play better and meet the Nuggets’ standards. Also. That’s almost a “duh,” but it’s true for this series and will continue to be true for future playoff games.
Being better in Jokic’s words means being more decisive in his progress (such as his reading to Caldwell-Pope above), understanding where help comes from and being able to get out of it more quickly. Making better decisions, and perhaps most importantly, being more aggressive as a scorer.
The latter forced the Timberwolves to make a move in Game 4 by temporarily shelving the tactic of guarding Jokic with four players (Karl-Anthony Towns or Nas Reid) and keeping Gobert away from Gordon. These are some of the factors. But there’s also something to appreciate in the details of how Jokic reached that sweet spot. For example, in the middle of the paint, Jokic was able to get off his patented soft-touch floater before Gobert even had a chance to make an impact. they.
For example, Murray’s screen action (and the screen itself) was better, and Towns had to step up to the point where Murray missed, leaving Jokic free on the roll.
It also helped Murray improve his own scoring ability.
(As a quick side note, notice who was brought in as the ball handler on the possession above.) Gordon’s usage in Game 4 was a dramatic change – from off-ball dunker spot roamer (We saw changes to his ball-handling) initiator who used his new-found role to change the Wolves’ defense in a number of ways. )
In one-on-one situations with Towns and Reed, Jokic was able to nullify Gobert’s prowling presence. All he did was get to his sweet spot in the paint, where Gobert’s support abilities became less important.
The combination of the above events effectively forced the Timberwolves to guard Jokic with Gobert himself. This is more of a challenge than his three-time MVP welcomed.
When the Timberwolves finally ran out of counters to counter the Nuggets’ counters, they reverted to what they were familiar with and what had worked before: their natural reaction when their backs are against the wall. They removed Gobert from Jokic, moved Towns back to be Jokic’s primary defender, and returned Gordon to a wandering role while “guarding” him.
That’s when the Nuggets unleashed perhaps the ultimate counter to the Timberwolves’ tactic of keeping Towns attached to Jokic and keeping him in the roll.
The key to those lies in what Christian Braun does in those possessions. He sets the initial screen in his Towns. “Rum” screen — to further add to the confusion and delay Towns’ involvement in the ball screen action. Towns was then forced to pay attention to Murray coming off of Jokic’s ball screen, preventing him from clinging to Jokic a beat early and allowing Jokic to rotate short rolls to dissect the Timberwolves’ defense. Start.
This is the real thrill of a high-level playoff series. The observing team (in this case the champion team) exhibits vulnerability and concocts solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems. In a match of counterpunch after counterpunch, the haymaker proved to be Nikola Jokic’s problem-solving skills. In true Thanos fashion, his performance in Game 4 was inevitable, and he ultimately dug deep and told everyone around him that he was going to do it himself.
