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Secret Service Review of Trump Assassination Attempt Exposes Huge Failures

A summary of the Secret Service's internal investigation released on Friday found multiple failures in the near-fatal shooting of former President Donald Trump at a campaign rally on July 13.

A summary of the Secret Service's Office of Professional Conduct's initial mission assurance report said that a Secret Service advance team that first inspected the rally site failed to address or mitigate the concerns they encountered.

summary said The Secret Service and local law enforcement partners considered the Butler Farm Show site a “challenge,” and advance officers and multiple supervisors overseeing security planning “acknowledged visibility concerns,” the release said.

However, the report said measures to mitigate those concerns were not implemented as scheduled on July 13, 2024.

“Secret Service personnel did not have detailed knowledge of the state and local law enforcement agencies present in and around the AGR complex,” which is where sniper Thomas Matthew Crooks climbed to fire at Trump.

The report also said there was a “lack of knowledge regarding the specific deployment of resources” to protect the inner perimeter, which would be guarded by Secret Service personnel, and the outer perimeter, which would include the AGR complex and be guarded by local police.

The report states:

Construction of a protected site and mitigation of the site to address vulnerabilities created by the open grounds of the AGR complex should have been the primary objective of the site advancement. Lack of due diligence in site construction was evident. Advancement personnel should have reported any discrepancies or ambiguities to the Details and Field Office Supervisor.

The report also said the Secret Service did not know all of the local law enforcement agencies involved in perimeter security and therefore had never met with them.

Those local law enforcement agencies included a local anti-sniper unit that had occupied the second floor of the AGR building, but the report said they had no contact with the Secret Service before the rally.

Acting Secret Service Director Ronald Rowe previously suggested at a congressional hearing that a local counter-sniper team could have seen Crooks crawling up to position to fire at Trump, and some reports said members of that local team left their positions for a variety of reasons.

The report did not say whether those reports were accurate, but it did say that there was no consultation with the Secret Service advance team about stationing a local counter-sniper team on the rooftop where Crooks fired, and that the local team “did not object to the location.”

Although several law enforcement agencies involved in security at the rally questioned the effectiveness of the local sniper team stationed at the AGR building, there were no subsequent discussions about relocating them, nor were there any discussions with the Secret Service advance team about stationing the team on the roof of the AGR, a position that local sniper support units did not appear to object to.

At a press conference on Friday, Rowe said that ultimately it was the Secret Service's responsibility.

“As I said, this is a failure of the United States Secret Service. It is important that we take responsibility for the failure of July 13th,” he said, adding:

The Secret Service has primary responsibility for developing site plans. It cannot abdicate or delegate responsibility. Advance personnel are responsible for ensuring that each site meets Secret Service protection requirements and methodological principles.

“The Secret Service did not provide clear instructions or guidance to its local law enforcement partners,” he said.

The report also said the Secret Service failed to establish a system for communicating with local police before and on the day of the rally.

For example, there were two separate communications centers on the grounds: a Secret Service security room and the Butler Emergency Services Mobile Command Post.

“Some of the local law enforcement agencies supporting the Butler venue were unaware that there were two separate communications centers located at the venue. As a result, those agencies were operating under the mistaken belief that the Secret Service was directly receiving their radio communications,” the report said.

The Secret Service and local law enforcement also used different radio frequencies that were “not suitable for quickly sharing real-time information.”

The report also states that “there were several standard communication channels that were not operational on July 13, 2024 that, if present, would have increased the likelihood of relevant information and circumstances being communicated.”

This information gap meant that local police information about Crooks did not reach all Secret Service agents, particularly the security personnel who might have been able to prevent Trump from appearing onstage.

Failure to broadcast by radio to all federal personnel at the Butler facility critical information received from local police regarding the attacker's characteristics and the presence of suspicious individuals on the roof of the AGR complex prevented all Secret Service personnel from sharing the same information. This failure was particularly serious for the FPOTUS/RPN guards, who were not informed of how focused state and local police had been on locating the suspicious individuals in the minutes prior to the attack. Had this information been transmitted over Secret Service radio frequencies, the FPOTUS/RPN guards could have determined whether to move their protection while a search for the suspicious individual was ongoing. Critical information was transmitted in stages or in pieces by mobile/cellular telephone devices, rather than relayed over the Secret Service radio network.

The report also noted gaps in the physical co-presence of law enforcement officials and the Secret Service.

Additionally, the report states that contrary to some reports, Secret Service counter-sniper and counter-assault units were present at the rally, but that the counter-sniper units arrived “later in the week following the attack.”

“Having all members of the advance team present and negotiating with local law enforcement following the first formal police meeting provides more time and opportunity for nuanced discussions and planning to begin,” the report said.

The report also said that there was a Secret Service drone dedicated to the rally, but “advance personnel experienced technical issues with the system.”

“Had these elements of advancement been in place, the shooter may have been spotted while flying a drone near the Butler Farm Show earlier that morning,” the report said.

Finally, the report noted that the Secret Service was “overworked” because the “accelerated pace of activity” during the election season and the “addition of new protected individuals” had further overworked an “already busy organization.”

“The Butler venue was chronologically sandwiched between two special national security events,” the statement said, referring to the NATO ministerial meeting hosted by Washington a few days before the rally and the Republican National Convention which took place a few days after it.

The report said a supplemental report to make recommendations to agency leadership will be prepared in the future and that the investigation is separate from those being conducted by Congress, an independent investigative committee convened by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General.

Lowe said at a press conference that action would be taken against some staff, but did not say what those actions would be or against whom.

“The mission assurance review found deficiencies in advance planning and execution by Secret Service employees. These employees and this agency have the harshest penalty provisions in the entire federal government,” he said.

“These penalties will be enforced in accordance with our disciplinary procedures. Federal regulations prevent us from intervening in ongoing personnel matters,” he said, adding that “we do not intend to intervene in employee disciplinary matters.”

Lowe said it was clear the agency needed a “shift in paradigm and in the way conservation work is carried out.”

He said the shift will move the department from a reaction mode to a readiness mode, referring to the second assassination attempt on Trump, which took place last Sunday at a golf course in West Palm Beach.

Kayleigh McEnany, Trump's former press secretary, slammed Rowe's “paradigm shifting” announcement.

“I'm sick of hearing Acting Director of the Secret Service Ronald Lowe promise a 'paradigm shift' in presidential protection!” she posted on X.

“After two assassination attempts, President Trump has no time to wait for a 'paradigm shift'”

Follow Christina Wong's “X” at Breitbart News. The truth of society,or Facebook.

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