The recent comments from China’s foreign minister to Kaja Karas, the European Union’s foreign and security policy chief, were quite telling. He indicated that “Russia cannot accept that it has lost its war with Ukraine, as this will allow the US to focus its full attention on China.”
But was he being entirely truthful? It’s important to remember that diplomats often don’t share the full picture. There’s a worry about miscommunication and interpreting intentions—a lesson that’s kind of ingrained in diplomatic circles.
Moreover, this minister represents a totalitarian regime, one that heavily employs propaganda to shape narratives. His private remarks seem especially misleading when we consider that, rather than the US, Russia poses a more significant concern for China right now.
It’s true that China would prefer the US not to meddle, as diversions can be handy. However, the US isn’t directly involved in a war that’s draining resources. Despite the bluster from previous administrations, the situation regarding tariffs remains muddled.
On the other hand, Russia represents a pressing security challenge that might even escalate into a threat against China.
Let’s think about three potential scenarios regarding China’s security interests.
If Russia were to achieve victory in Ukraine—where “victory” might look like Putin reclaiming his confidence and sense of superiority—it could lead to a Russia emboldened enough to take aggressive actions against neighboring nations like Kazakhstan. Such a scenario wouldn’t particularly benefit China.
Then there’s the question of relationships changing. A victorious Russia might feel stronger in its partnership with China, possibly renegotiating terms of their alliance. Maybe China would find itself paying more for energy. It raises the question—would China rethink its territorial claims in relation to Russia?
While a commitment to friendship might endure, it could certainly create complications that strain relations.
Conversely, if Russia were to lose, a scenario of intense instability could unfold. A defeated Russia might descend into internal chaos, with potential for coups or civil strife. Such instability could lead to significant challenges for China, overshadowing any immediate territorial gains, like in Far East Russia.
Interestingly, a long, drawn-out conflict might actually suit China’s preferences. An adversary like a weakened Russia—stuck in turmoil—might provide opportunities without direct confrontation. In this case, a sudden end to hostilities might benefit not just China, but also America and Europe, even if that’s not their first choice.
This raises questions about what China genuinely wants. Perhaps the foreign minister was suggesting that China’s interests align with those of the West.
The implications for US policy are pretty clear: the US should aim for a weakened Russia. Supporting Ukraine in its fight against Putin might be the way to achieve this goal, similar to strategies employed previously.
In the end, the foreign minister might lament Russia’s predicament but won’t actively oppose actions that diminish its strength.
