Former hostage urges Iraq to search militia stronghold for secret prisons and mass graves
Elizabeth Tsurkov, an Israeli-Russian researcher who was held hostage for 903 days by an Iran-backed Iraqi militia, says she spent the first four and a half months of her captivity in a home the group had turned into a prison. The house was in Jurf al-Sakhr, a stronghold that Iraq’s prime minister has now ordered the military to enter.
Kata’ib Hezbollah took over the private home, Tsurkov said, after abducting her in Baghdad in March 2023. She was released in September 2025 following negotiations and sustained pressure from the Trump administration.
Tsurkov says reclaiming the area should involve more than investigating alleged oil smuggling. Iraqi authorities, she argued, should search Jurf al-Sakhr and nearby communities for secret prisons, mass burial sites and weapons storage facilities—and return seized homes to their owners.
Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi has ordered Iraqi forces into Jurf al-Sakhr, also known as Jurf al-Nasr. Kata’ib Hezbollah, which the United States designates as a terrorist organization, has held sway there since 2014. Baghdad has reportedly given the group a deadline to withdraw, with a security source identifying Friday as the cutoff.
The order followed allegations by Iraqi officials that Kata’ib Hezbollah stole hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of state-owned oil from 2021 onward. The government has dismissed nine security and administrative officials and referred suspects to the courts. The militia denies wrongdoing.
For Tsurkov, the issue is about much more than oil. She described Jurf al-Sakhr as effectively off-limits to the Iraqi government since Iran-backed militias helped push ISIS out in 2014. The area’s mostly Sunni residents have not been allowed to return in large numbers.
She estimated that between 120,000 and 180,000 people were displaced from the district and surrounding communities. Allowing families to go home, she said, would be a sign that Iraq was restoring its sovereignty there.
Tsurkov said the operation is being framed as an anti-corruption effort, rather than a move to dismantle the militia’s military infrastructure. Kata’ib Hezbollah still has bases elsewhere in Iraq and access to border crossings with Iran, she noted, which could help it replace weapons even if it loses control of Jurf al-Sakhr.
Michael Knights, a researcher at the strategic consultancy Horizon Engage and an adjunct fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, questioned whether Baghdad would seriously challenge the militias. It can be difficult, he said, to distinguish a genuine crackdown from a largely symbolic one.
Previous Iraqi governments have announced operations against armed groups, only for detainees to be released or the groups to retain influence through new security arrangements. In 2020, then-Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi ordered the arrest of 14 Kata’ib Hezbollah members. Armed supporters later gathered in Baghdad’s fortified International Zone to demand their release, and most of those arrested were eventually freed.
Kadhimi survived a drone attack on his residence in November 2021. Security officials reportedly linked Iran-backed militias to the attack, though no group claimed responsibility.
Knights said Iraqi counterterrorism forces are better trained and equipped than Kata’ib Hezbollah. The greater risk, he argued, is that militia members could threaten officials and their families. In that sense, the challenge is not simply a question of equipment or training.
Tsurkov said her captivity gave her an unusual view of the group’s internal culture. She encountered about 45 people across three prisons, then supplemented what she observed with interviews with former members and people familiar with the communities around the militia.
In her view, Kata’ib Hezbollah includes a committed core of Iranian loyalists as well as many recruits drawn more by pay, status and the chance to wield power. Some embrace Iran’s revolutionary ideology, she said, but many joined after the main fighting against ISIS had ended, attracted by government-funded salaries and steady work. Many rank-and-file members, she added, are not eager to die for Iran’s government.
She distinguished those recruits from a smaller group of ideologically committed, better-trained operatives whom Iran can use in complex attacks. That difference, she said, might give Baghdad a way to reduce the militia’s reach without launching a full-scale confrontation. One option would be to let some fighters join the Iraqi army under independent commanders, while dismantling their existing chain of command.
Knights said the current campaign appears to focus mainly on the more confrontational Abu Hussein faction of Kata’ib Hezbollah. Another wing associated with senior commander Abu Fadak has largely escaped scrutiny, he said, though both factions ultimately answer to Tehran. He also doubted that disrupting a single oil-smuggling operation would seriously hurt the group, which has invested in hotels, property and other businesses.
Other developments have added to questions about Baghdad’s willingness to confront Iran’s influence. Iraq’s parliament recently approved Laith al-Khazali, a senior member of the Iran-backed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia, as a deputy prime minister. The United States designated him and his brother, militia leader Qais al-Khazali, as global terrorists in 2020 and has accused the group of attacking American and coalition forces.
Another newly appointed deputy prime minister, Muhsin al-Mandalawi, is the brother of two Iraqi businessmen sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department for financial dealings that benefited Iran. Meanwhile, Iran has reportedly nominated Revolutionary Guards Quds Force commander Abdolreza Meskarian as its next ambassador to Iraq. The reported nomination has not been formally confirmed by either government.
Knights said the appointments and the reported ambassador nomination raise basic questions about how far Baghdad is prepared to go. “On balance, we’re still in a pretty bad place in Iraq when it comes to militias,” he said.
Tsurkov agreed that an operation designed mainly to satisfy Washington could be exposed as hollow if displaced families still cannot return. A broader deadline for disarming militias, already extended to June 2027, is “utterly unrealistic,” she said, adding that Iraq’s security institutions would need years of reform before they could reliably confront the armed groups.
She is doubtful the current operation will bring lasting change, though she said genuine government control of the territory would be a significant breakthrough. The measure of success, in her view, is simple: whether the state is actually present and residents can return.
Knights also suspects Baghdad could reach an agreement that lets it declare victory without substantially weakening Kata’ib Hezbollah. Still, he said the confrontation might be the start of a wider effort, even if this operation alone is unlikely to decide the issue. “Every great journey starts with the first step,” he said.






