Debate Over Quantum Computing and Bitcoin’s Security
Concerns about the potential for quantum computing to compromise Bitcoin’s encryption have ignited considerable discussion within the cryptocurrency community.
However, Alex Thorne, who leads research at Galaxy Digital, believes the narrative that Bitcoin is unprepared or that investors should steer clear due to this risk is overstated.
While the risk of quantum attacks is real, with advanced quantum computers theoretically capable of deriving private keys from public ones, Thorne suggests that viewing this as an urgent crisis, especially one solely affecting Bitcoin, oversimplifies the situation. Important context about both the technology and the ongoing efforts to mitigate risks is often overlooked.
“The risk is real but recognized,” Thorne stated during an interview. “And those best positioned to address it are already on it.”
Quantum computing fundamentally differs from traditional computing, employing principles of quantum mechanics instead of classical physics. Instead of binary bits, quantum computers utilize “qubits,” which can exist in multiple states simultaneously—a concept known as superposition. This ability allows them to explore numerous possibilities at once.
When combined with another quantum property called entanglement, these machines can tackle complex problems much more efficiently than their classical counterparts. This is particularly relevant for tasks like factoring large numbers, which is the foundation of modern cryptography.
A report by Project Eleven, a firm focused on the quantum risks to digital assets, suggests there are about 7 million Bitcoins in circulation, valued at roughly $470 billion currently. This situation could be considered vulnerable, particularly if one defines “long exposure” as having the public key disclosed on-chain. However, different interpretations can lead to varying estimates.
Most Bitcoins are not immediately at risk, as vulnerabilities arise primarily when public keys are exposed on-chain. Factors contributing to this include users reusing addresses, operational short-cuts taken by some administrators, or coins remaining in outdated address formats. While millions of Bitcoins may fall under these categories, they remain secure against known quantum threats.
This distinction is central to Galaxy’s argument. The debate tends to polarize into two camps: those who see quantum computing as a far-off concern and those who predict immediate danger. Thorne’s perspective occupies a middle ground—recognizing significant potential future threats while asserting that the urgency doesn’t overshadow Bitcoin’s adaptive capabilities.
Moreover, proactive measures are already in motion.
There’s a growing initiative aimed at making Bitcoin more “quantum-proof” in the long run. A notable approach includes the creation of new address types based on post-quantum cryptography, which would enable users to relocate assets away from potentially vulnerable formats, thereby lowering long-term risks.
“There’s much more happening behind the scenes than many realize,” Thorne noted. “Developers are actively working on advancements to enhance the system.”
Other proposals target specific issues, like dormant coins linked to permanently published public keys. One concept, referred to as the “hourglass” approach, involves gradually restricting the usage of such coins to mitigate systemic risk without completely confiscating or causing major disruptions.
Additionally, developers are considering strategies for incremental improvements that would help Bitcoin adjust to more drastic scenarios, such as a future where quantum systems can rapidly breach encryption. This may involve altering the way public keys are disclosed in transactions, which could potentially minimize the risk of attacks.
Despite the complexities involved in these initiatives, Thorne stresses that Bitcoin’s open development model is advantageous. It provides the ecosystem with ample time, skilled individuals, and the incentive to solve issues before they escalate into critical problems.
Crucially, the number of attackers capable of instigating a “Q-day,” when quantum computers could successfully breach current encryption systems, is still quite limited. Even optimistic forecasts suggest that only a small cadre of highly specialized researchers could achieve such breakthroughs in the near future.
In this context, Thorne believes that the growing wave of anxiety surrounding quantum-related threats is disproportionate.
“Quantum computing is a significant and potentially disruptive technology, but that doesn’t necessarily mean all associated risks are immediate or unmanageable,” he remarked.
For investors, the implications are straightforward. While it’s wise to monitor quantum risks, they shouldn’t serve as a blanket rationale for avoiding Bitcoin altogether. The history shows that networks can adapt to credible threats, and foundational work for quantum resilience is already underway.
“We’re uncertain if quantum poses an existential threat to Bitcoin, but even the possibility that it could is a concern,” Thorne concluded. “What is evident is that Bitcoin developers are not turning a blind eye to it; quite the opposite, many are actively engaged in addressing it.”





