In February, an Iranian strike targeted the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan, destroying an American missile-defense radar system valued at around $300 million. The U.S. military has suffered significant losses in its ongoing conflict with Iran, reportedly losing at least 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones. Interestingly, to intercept relatively inexpensive Iranian drones, the military may need to use missiles that cost millions of dollars.
This situation presents a complex challenge for Pete Hegseth as he develops the FORTRESS America initiative, a Department of War program aimed at bolstering the defense capabilities and supply chains essential for military operations.
Hegseth argues that FORTRESS America should extend beyond mere stockpiling; it should foster resilience through American scale.
While it’s commendable that he’s advocating for resilience, there’s a risk that without a grounded perspective, this initiative might turn into just another catchy phrase amidst a defense budget that hits $1 trillion.
FORTRESS America lays out five main pillars: energy independence, supply chain and defense industrial base resilience, a strategic defense reserve, enhanced fortification and cyber resilience, and bolstering resilience in space and spectrum. Each of these pillars responds to a genuine necessity. However, the concept of resilience should not involve confining everything within a governmental silo. The war with Iran serves as a reminder of how quickly a technological advantage can turn into an economic disadvantage.
The Pentagon has historically aimed for technological superiority by investing in advanced aircraft, sensors, missiles, and networks. Yet, highly specialized and costly systems are often hard to replace, while adversaries can continue deploying cheaper weaponry.
The losses in Iran don’t negate the U.S.’s military dominance but do reveal an expensive imbalance: a nation can have superior technology yet still confront an economic scenario where enemies impose disproportionate costs.
Strategies for Scaling
The lessons from this situation should resonate across the broader FORTRESS America framework. An energy strategy shouldn’t rely on a single, vulnerable source; supply chains need to be robust against disruptions; and defense systems should be designed for mass production rather than being custom-built and costly.
Palmer Luckey’s Anduril Technologies presents a useful model here. Their Arsenal-1 manufacturing facility in Ohio aims to produce autonomous military systems at scale, leveraging commercial manufacturing techniques to achieve that aim.
In the realm of space, American entrepreneurs have been driving improvements in rocket and satellite efficiency. The government ought to create an environment that encourages American firms to compete and innovate rather than just duplicating a commercial manufacturing base within military structures.
A Spectrum Arsenal, Not Just Storage
This reasoning also applies to wireless spectrum management. Numerous federal agencies have access to frequencies sought after by commercial service providers. Congress has, however, limited commercial auctions for the widely-used 3.1–3.45 GHz band to protect military radar and other defense operations. Yet, exclusively viewing spectrum as a resource to hoard might hinder commercial innovation and capacity.
The objective should not be to favor one specific frequency but to strike a balance. Federal entities currently manage significant sections of the most valuable spectrum, which could facilitate commercial wireless networks if policies struck a better equilibrium between national security and public benefits.
The military doesn’t need to control every frequency but should ensure reliable access to the capabilities those frequencies support. During the conflict in Ukraine, commercial low-Earth orbit satellite networks proved invaluable in the fight against Russia. Such networks offer military advantages at a substantial scale without necessitating the Pentagon to independently build all underlying infrastructure.
Even if the spectrum leans towards commercial usage, U.S. law equips the president with extensive authority over communications during wartime and emergencies. Military-grade satellite services, like those utilized for Ukraine, operate under Pentagon contracts and protocols designed with national security in mind, while retail satellite internet generally functions under standard commercial terms.
The Pentagon has acknowledged the importance of commercial technology, adopting new acquisition guidelines that prioritize commercial products and services. Spectrum policy should reflect this principle: procure where commercial networks can deliver effective capabilities.
America requires a spectrum arsenal that taps into its robust wireless and technology sectors, encompassing competitive network providers, satellite constellations, sensors, and communications infrastructure developed with U.S. investment and labor. In crisis and wartime scenarios, the military can secure priority access and arrangements for capacity.
The Fortress is the Industrial Base
The most effective fortress isn’t one where the government owns all resources within; rather, it’s one where American companies have established the networks, factories, and technologies used daily, allowing the military to leverage that industrial might in times of need.
The FORTRESS America concept should mean more than just stockpiling resources; it should encourage resilience through scale derived from American production.
Current events, particularly regarding Iran, provide a necessary reality check. It’s an opportunity to reevaluate spectrum policies, defense manufacturing, and military procurement—or risk facing a similar misalignment in future conflicts, which may involve stakes that are significantly higher.
