China may be preparing a surprise attack on Japan that would include a massive missile barrage against all major U.S. and Japanese military facilities on the Japanese archipelago.
The logic of such an operation is straightforward: To maximize the effectiveness of a complex amphibious operation to seize Taiwan, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) needs to establish air and naval superiority around Taiwan. Japan houses most of the ally's naval and sea power. But would China's leader, Xi Jinping, risk World War III to increase the odds of success of his plan?
There is no doubt that the People's Liberation Army of China is capable of launching a devastating first strike against Japan. The PLA has developed a formidable precision strike force combined with extensive intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance and targeting capabilities that make it the best in the world. The largest missile arsenalAccording to analysts Thomas Shugart and Toshi Yoshihara, if Beijing were to pull off a surprise pre-emptive attack, It can destroy most of the US military's assets. They attacked the Japanese archipelago, destroyed the US military's hideout base, and disabled important ports for both Japan and the US.
PLA doctrine emphasizes a preemptive neutralization attack to pave the way for a large-scale invasion of Taiwan. In such a scenario, the PLA would transport hundreds of thousands of invasion forces across the strait in naval vessels and dual-use ships. A preemptive strike by China against U.S. and allied air and naval forces would give China the air and sea superiority necessary for such a large-scale, complex amphibious operation. Indeed, historically, no modern amphibious operation has been successful unless the aggressor neutralized the enemy’s navy and air force.
But here's the problem: for Xi Jinping, attacking the world's first and fourth largest economies poses huge strategic and geopolitical risks. Neither the United States nor its allies have been attacked like this since World War II. Even Russian President Vladimir Putin is limiting his highly aggressive operations against Ukraine to avoid attacking the United States or its allies. He is accepting more operational risks and military losses to avoid strategic catastrophe.
Certainly, U.S. and allied forces are highly vulnerable to such an attack by the PLA. Washington is only just beginning to respond to decades of Chinese military buildup. China’s forward-based assets are soft targets, and given the dangerous decline of U.S. military power, its ability to launch a swift counterattack from the relative safety of the Pacific and Australia is questionable.
Thus, from a military perspective, this approach is attractive. But it carries high strategic risks. If the United States were to begin to recover from such an attack, an eventual massive counterattack by its allies would be guaranteed. Such a bloody and unprovoked attack would remove all political obstacles for the United States and Japan to an all-out war with China. Both countries would then be fully committed to confronting China, rather than wasting time on domestic political squabbles about whether to support Taiwan.
Countries from South Korea to Singapore that would likely remain neutral if China limited its attack to Taiwan would almost certainly join in if China attacked Japan. Footage of People's Liberation Army missiles destroying Japanese territory and U.S. assets for no apparent reason would rapidly turn world opinion against China.
Ultimately, a counterattack against military targets on the Chinese mainland would be massive and would severely damage the Chinese economy as the United States pressures Chinese commodity exporters and global financial markets to squeeze the Chinese economy.
Moreover, the United States would likely use cyber and other means to sow widespread fears within China and directly challenge the regime. The United States may also consider other forms of escalation after such a major surprise attack.
Hopefully, the United States has explained all this to the Xi Jinping regime in its many recent military actions. If so, Xi Jinping knows he faces a real strategic dilemma: attacking U.S. assets or allies might increase the chances of a military victory over Taiwan, but it might also entail unacceptably high risks. His alternative is to limit the attack to Taiwan alone, thereby subjecting an amphibious force to high operational risks.
Abandoning a preemptive attack on Japan would ensure that U.S. and Japanese air and naval power could destroy an invading force, which is why China is likely to continue escalating military conflict, while not ruling out the possibility of all-out war. Compulsory campaign These include limited attacks on Taiwan and naval quarantine measures, a strategy aimed at breaking Taiwan's political will while keeping the United States out of the fight.
Of course, the United States and Japan should forego the temptation for a Chinese preemptive strike by strengthening the defense of their bases and ports, dispersing U.S. and allied forces across the Japanese archipelago and the Philippines, and strengthening joint air and missile defenses. But Tokyo and Washington should also prepare to repel intensifying hybrid warfare operations aimed at avoiding a devastating war while breaking the resolve of their allies.
Dan Blumenthal Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
