In a recent Supreme Court hearing concerning the constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson seemed to draw a comparison between Black Americans and individuals with disabilities.
The case, known as Louisiana vs. Curry, examines whether Louisiana’s congressional map, which features two majority-Black districts, infringes upon the 15th Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The plaintiffs contend that the Congressional map is gerrymandered along racial lines in a manner that is unconstitutional.
During the discussion, Judge Jackson appeared to argue that Black voters are akin to voters with disabilities.
“Returning to the issue of discriminatory intent, I think what you’re considering is that taking corrective action without discriminatory intent isn’t a novel concept in civil rights law. A prime example is the Americans with Disabilities Act,” Jackson stated.
She elaborated:
In a setting where individuals with disabilities often face barriers, Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act. This legislation was, in effect, a remedy for discrimination because these individuals lacked access to various facilities. The intent behind the building’s construction or the owner’s wishes is irrelevant. What matters is that facilities should be accessible to those with disabilities, whenever feasible. I’m puzzled as to why this principle doesn’t apply here.
Section 2 aims to address the ongoing consequences of decisions that historically disadvantage minorities and restrict their access to voting. It’s akin to how we refer to “disabled persons” and “persons with disabilities.” The processes currently aren’t equally accessible, so I don’t see why it matters whether the state intended this situation. Congress’s directive is clear: if an inequality exists, we need to rectify it.
“The distinction here is that remedies under the ADA and other anti-discrimination laws are not conventional,” attorney Edward Graeme pointed out to Jackson.
“Those remedies aren’t specific to race. I understand your perspective. But to say that if the issue relates to race, it somehow justifies the lack of a remedy makes little sense,” Jackson replied, prompting Graeme to assert, “That’s absolutely not the case.”
“The concern isn’t whether the remedies relate to race,” Graeme argued. “The real question is whether these race-based remedies perpetuate stereotypes and assumptions about voters based on their race. This particular provision isn’t found in other civil rights legislation.”
