The US International Development Agency has critics. Critics argue that the lack of accountability led to downfall. However, this argument not only oversimplifies the challenge of measuring impacts in humanitarian and developmental tasks, but also misapplied the market-driven lens into complex, multifaceted fields.
If foreign aid is implemented solely on market logic, it cannot address the subtle political, social and conflict-related dynamics inherent in efforts to promote democracy, build peace and promote development.
USAID wasn't like that Rogue Agency. It was responsible for the Congress and played an important role in overseeing its activities. The surveillance was regulated by a set of US government agencies focused on surveillance, accountability and measurement, including inspectors, the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Government Accountability.
This meant that I had to have a USAID A wide range of monitoring, assessment and learning systems that require multiple levels of accountability. It also meant that when Congress wanted to see an improvement in the USAID accountability mechanism, it included it. Requirements in the Expenditure Act.
Was USAID perfect? Of course, not. Inspector. and USAID itself has been recognized It was essential to improve that system.
However, the key to understanding the accountability challenges of USAID is to understand that measurement in development work is not as simple as traditional business models.
In fact, short-term funding cycles are combined with a shift towards strict regulations and quantifiable outcomes, at the expense of effective development practices such as institutional construction, new democratic institutions and increased local support and trust for long-term sustainability.
Unlike commercial companies, where success is measured through profits and losses, development work often involves long-term structural changes in volatile environments.
Measuring the success of governance reform, development, or conflict prevention is inherently complicated. For example, increasing confidence in local government agencies, an important goal of many USAID programs, cannot be easily quantified. that's right It's difficult to measure accurately In an unsafe environment affected by the most important conflict, it may be impossible to conduct polls and focus groups. Instead, its success must often be observed through progressive behavioral changes over time.
Of course, the difficulty of measuring impact does not mean that the work is worthless. for example, Global Vulnerability Lawwas signed into law by President Trump in 2019, highlighting the importance of preventing conflict.
Of course, it is inherently difficult to know which conflicts have not occurred (but New techniques is being developed continuously). But it does not undermine both moral and financially, the benefit of preventing violent conflict from exploding.
Recent progress has been made Evaluation and monitoring techniques It promotes data collection in challenging environments, including the USAID's Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilizing Peacebuilding Assessment, Analysis, Research and Learning Projects. these Analysis Tools Includes data science, geographic information systems, remote sensing, and satellite image analysis.
Development programs differ in their ability to quantify. Some such USAID initiatives The president's emergency plan for AIDS reliefcan be measured in more specific terms – tracking the mortality rate or the number of medications administered. However, programs that address the root causes of injustice and conflict are the most difficult to quantify.
Experts such as Andrew Natsios I insisted on the development program The most accurate and easiest to measure is the least transformed, whereas the most transformed is the least transformed. Under the current administration's accountability logic, its output and impact are easy to quantify, so the minimum transformation program is likely to return under the USAID reorganization to the State Department.
Rather than focusing solely on quantifiable outcomes, one should focus on understanding the processes leading to change.
Effective development work is more than a number. We need to assess whether institutions are strengthened, whether communities are more resilient, and whether people feel empowered to participate in governance. This type of change is progressive and is not always captured through stiff, data-driven assessments.
Furthermore, the immediate effects of intervention may be It will temporarily dissipate. Thus, a purely outcome-driven approach can not only encourage short-term and easily measurable projects across long-term structural reforms, but also lead to ineffective fundraising initiatives.
Similarly, what may appear to be a careful decision based on perceived financial efficiency can actually undermine the overall program's goals.
For example, this number might seem wise to close AIDS clinics in certain cities that will treat fewer patients and keep patients treating more patients. But if the city's broader social and political context is not considered – development experts Conflict Sensitivity Lens – Such closures can exacerbate joint conflicts and orders rather than improve health interventions without intent.
If you believe that the kind of development, conflict resolution, and democratic promotion work that USAID was engaged in is valuable, you need to carefully consider how to balance accountability and flexibility. We also have to ask whether we should be solely responsible for US taxpayers, or whether we should be responsible for the developments we want to support, everyday people in war-instable contexts.
The demand for quantifiable outcomes should not come at the expense of meaningful long-term change. Instead of dismantling aid agencies, reforms should focus on strengthening learning mechanisms, improving evaluation criteria, addressing components and beneficiaries, and improving communication with components.
Ultimately, the discussion should not be about whether foreign aid should continue, but about how to ensure that it is as effective as possible. The question is how to track all dollars, as well as how to measure success in a way that reflects the complexity of development and peacebuilding efforts.
Both quantitative data and qualitative insights should inform effective surveillance and ensure that foreign support maintains both accountability and impact in the most important way.
Pamina Firchow is an associate professor of conflict resolution and coexistence at the Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University. Agnieszka Paczyńska is a professor of conflict analysis and resolution at George Mason University's Carter School for Peace and Conflict Resolution.
