Insights into Saudi Connection to 9/11 Hijackers

In a recent revelation, there’s speculation that officials from the Saudi government may have acted as a “pre-team” for the al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks, which claimed around 3,000 American lives.

An FBI report derived from a New York field office indicated that two officials from Riyadh—Mutaib al Sudairy and Adel Mohammad Al Sadhan—had prior ties to the hijackers and their supporters.

It appears that Saudi preparations were underway well before the arrival of hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar, who landed in Los Angeles on January 15, 2000. These preparations aimed to establish connections for the attacks, laying the groundwork several years in advance.

Reports reveal that Al Sadhan’s initial visit to the U.S. in 1998 was crucial. He traveled to Washington, D.C., alongside Al Sudairy, eventually heading to San Diego in June 1999. There, he stayed for about six weeks with a Saudi student named Omar Al Bayoumi.

Fahad Altum Eilee, an imam at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California, was reportedly a contact for Al Sadhan during this visit. Later, Al-Thumairy is said to have provided support to Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar, who hijacked an American Airlines flight on the day of the attacks, directing it toward the Pentagon.

Documentation suggests that Al-Tumeir, the imam, was placed in a Southern California mosque by Musad Al Jala, director of Islamic Affairs at the Saudi Embassy in Washington. Footage captured in 1999 showed Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy recording landmark sites like the Capitol and the White House, which were potential targets during the 9/11 plot.

While Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy were in Southern California, Al-Bayoumi was living at the same address where Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar would later reside, close to Al-Ribat Mosque. This mosque was led by Anwar al-Aulaki, an al-Qaeda operative who was killed in a 2011 drone strike in Yemen sanctioned by President Obama.

Documents also pointed to Albayomi having potentially “advanced knowledge” of the 9/11 attacks. Interestingly, Al Sadhan and Al Sudairy soon moved to Kansas and Missouri, returning to Saudi Arabia in October 2001.

The FBI records examined private phone logs and financial details, and earlier documents from the CIA highlighted findings from 2010 related to these investigations.

A tape revealing a “Welcome Party” for some of the hijackers in February 2000 surfaced, and former National Counterintelligence and Security Center director Bill Evanina emphasized that this file could provide valuable insights into the 9/11 timeline.

However, the extent to which Saudi officials were operating on behalf of their government—or merely aligning with al-Qaeda’s needs—remains uncertain.

Evanina underscored the importance of this data, suggesting it should have been presented to the 9/11 commission. He stated that these records illustrate the groundwork laid by the hijackers upon arriving in the U.S., not just involving logistics, but also how they ingrained themselves into communities.

Philip Zelikow, who once served as the executive director of the 9/11 Commission, expressed uncertainty about whether he had viewed a full video of the hijackers’ “Welcome Party.” He noted that they had identified several people of interest potentially connected to a support network for the attacks.

A representative from the Saudi Embassy in Washington expressed respect for the court’s decision regarding ongoing litigation but denied any involvement by the Saudi government in the planning of the 9/11 attacks. The CIA declined to comment, and the FBI did not respond to inquiries.