Silicon Valley may be a center for spying after the Nvidia spy scandal

Silicon Valley may be a center for spying after the Nvidia spy scandal

Nvidia’s inquiry into CEO Jensen Huang’s reported relationship with a woman accused of being a Chinese spy has drawn attention to the espionage risks facing Silicon Valley companies. Firms working on advanced technologies, especially artificial intelligence and national defense, may be particularly attractive targets.

Huang acknowledged the relationship and apologized in a statement Sunday. The same day, Nvidia’s board said it had launched an independent investigation to assess whether national security information or company secrets had been exposed. The board said it had no evidence of a breach so far, but that investigators would review all available information.

Mark Trott, a former FBI special agent who now manages a program at Concentric Advisors, told FOX Business that Silicon Valley is a hub for espionage and that people working there should not assume they are beyond its reach. Anyone with access to confidential company information, he said, could be a target.

Foreign governments may seek technologies developed in the U.S. because they could strengthen a country’s economy or military, Trott said. Intelligence efforts might aim to obtain access or insight, or to slow American progress.

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Espionage can give foreign governments and businesses access to corporate strategies, research and development, and plans for products such as advanced AI chips, some of which are subject to export controls. By taking advantage of work already done, companies abroad may save substantial time and money and advance their own development, Trott said.

Some operations may also involve passing information to executives in the hope it reaches political leaders and helps sway U.S. policy.

Short seller previously questioned Huang’s ties to alleged Chinese spy

Trott said technology executives should stay alert to approaches that exploit personal vulnerabilities. Intelligence officers, he said, may study someone’s behavior and try to build trust by appealing to ambition, financial interests, greed or personal attraction.

Initial contact may be relatively low-risk, he added, such as a message on social media or an approach through a professional platform at a conference. Those interactions can be used to learn about a person and their work.

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Trott said there is a balance between being overly suspicious and staying aware of potential risks. Employees with access to sought-after information should recognize that they may be targets, while continuing to collaborate with others in their field.

If a message or an encounter at a professional event seems unusual, employees should raise it with their company’s insider-risk program, he said. Those programs should consider the countries employees visit and the industries operating there, rather than focusing only on U.S. relations with other nations—including countries that are traditionally considered allies.

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