Israel executed its most significant decapitation strike against Iran, swiftly taking out high-ranking military figures including Generals Mohammadbagieri, Amir Alihajizadeh, and Alirashid. In addition, the strike targeted missile development facilities and crucial military coordination centers, disrupting some of Iran’s communication lines with proxy forces in Syria and Iraq.
Interestingly, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader himself, was not among those targeted. This choice might seem puzzling to some, but eliminating Khamenei could have far-reaching consequences beyond just military implications.
The death of the Supreme Leader triggers a succession process according to Iran’s constitution, managed by a council of experts. Since the March 2024 elections, this council has leaned heavily towards hardline elements within the clergy.
Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader’s son, is being positioned as a candidate, yet he faces significant hurdles. He currently lacks the necessary religious credentials for such a role. He hasn’t issued formal legal opinions, hasn’t studied in traditional seminaries like QOM or Najaf, and hasn’t been recognized as a senior administrator.
In Shia Islam, authority isn’t simply inherited; it is earned through years of scholarship and peer validation. Should Khamenei be killed, the transition to Mojtaba could face considerable backlash. Figures like Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani have historically opposed the idea of clergy wielding political power. While Khamenei remains alive, Mojtaba’s position is precarious, lacking the universal acceptance needed to unify the factions, potentially leading to doctrinal confusion.
The theology of Shia Islam emphasizes resistance and sacrifice, rooted in the historical martyrdoms of figures like Ali and Hussein. If Khamenei were to die due to an Israeli strike, it wouldn’t just be a political incident; it would be seen as a tragic reenactment of significant historical events, sanctifying his son and prompting a violent response from Iranian-backed groups.
Groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq view themselves as protectors of Khamenei’s religious authority. There have been suggestions among Iranian exiles about using the Supreme Leader’s assassination as a catalyst for widespread retaliation, a scenario I think may be avoided if Khamenei remains safe.
This strategy also allows for some level of ambiguity. By targeting military capabilities rather than spiritual leaders, Israel prevents the Iranian regime from invoking a crisis. This sends a clear message to mid-level Iranian commanders: there is still room for adjustment before things escalate further.
The Khamenei administration has always relied on more than just sheer force. One crucial aspect of this is the office tasked with preserving and disseminating Khamenei’s works. While it appears to be an administrative body, it functions as a means of enforcing doctrinal compliance under Mojtaba’s informal leadership, regulating discussions, overseeing access to the Supreme Leader, and managing the economy of the seminary.
This office is protected by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard’s main headquarters. The recently killed general was vital in maintaining adherence to the administration’s doctrine. His absence could weaken Mojtaba’s authority and expose the core ideology of the administration.
Israel should continue targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guard installations but should avoid taking out Mojtaba or other well-known hardliners, as that could destabilize their plans. The focus instead should be on disrupting the networks that support Mojtaba’s influence, cutting financial support for loyalist seminaries and revealing internal conflicts within QOM’s leadership. Ultimately, the objective is not to eliminate the regime but to hinder, fragment, and obstruct its functioning.
For the first time in years, Iranian religious institutions face the risk of internal conflicts that could disrupt their authority. In this evolving landscape, a figure who used to maintain a distance from the state might emerge as a serious challenger to Mojtaba’s succession, potentially causing rifts that could impact Iranian militias across the region. This could undermine not just the financial backbone of the Tehran Ministry but also the symbolic power of the Supreme Leader.
If that authority is questioned—if Mojtaba rises without wide acceptance—these groups could start aligning with other clerics and factions. Figures like Kais Kazari and Hashem Safideedin, who combine militia leadership with religious goals, might begin to rise in prominence. As a result, the once-cohesive resistance movement could evolve into a network of semi-autonomous, competing entities.
In conflicts, whether they are ideological or military, a decisive hit doesn’t just eliminate individuals; it can also dismantle myths.
