American voters once punished Republicans over an unpopular war in the Middle East. Twenty years later, they have sent another clear message.
In 2006, the conflict was in Iraq. This time, it was Iran. Democrats won control of both chambers of Congress, flipping at least seven Senate seats, including in Texas, Ohio, Kansas and Iowa. Vice President JD Vance pointed to the war launched by President Donald Trump’s administration eight months ago as the reason for the losses.
I remember the earlier failure. In the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, I was a Pentagon strategist and sat in meetings with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and senior military officials. I questioned whether the administration had really thought through what would happen after Saddam Hussein was removed.
Trump now faces a reckoning of his own. U.S. forces have inflicted enormous damage on Iran’s military, but battlefield success does not necessarily translate into a lasting strategic result. That is especially true when the public begins to doubt the purpose of the mission.
Vance put it plainly in his Nov. 4 assessment: “The reason we lost is the war.” He also challenged anyone to claim that “losing the Senate for the next 6 years was worth it.”
Trump conceded that the conflict contributed to Republican losses, but stood by his decision. “I would have done nothing differently,” he said, adding, “You can’t let Iran have a nuclear weapon.”
He is right that Iran must not be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. But the election leaves a question hanging over the administration: What has eight months of fighting achieved that will endure?
I have long argued that a nuclear-armed Iran would be unacceptable. In June 2025, I supported a decisive strike on Tehran’s deeply buried Fordow nuclear facility. Four days later, though, I challenged claims that Iran was only weeks away from producing a usable weapon. The intelligence available to the public did not establish that.
Those views are not contradictory. Iran posed a serious threat, but military action required reliable intelligence, clearly limited aims and a sober understanding of what might follow.
Three days before Trump launched Operation Epic Fury on Feb. 28, I warned that his administration needed to establish the facts before drawing the country into another Middle Eastern war. I did not doubt that U.S. forces could overwhelm Iran’s military. I did doubt that Washington had a credible plan for what came next. Eight months on, I still don’t see a convincing answer, and the political fallout is now plain.
The Fox News Voter Poll offers one explanation for the Republican losses. More than a third of voters said the Iran war was central to their House vote, and roughly six in 10 said the decision to attack Iran was wrong.
Another survey found that nearly twice as many people favored ending U.S. military involvement to bring down gasoline prices as supported renewed attacks to stop Iran’s nuclear program. That should concern the White House. Many Americans may not have dismissed the Iranian threat; they may simply have decided that the price of confronting it was getting too high.
The financial bill is already substantial. A Pentagon estimate provided to Congress put spending on the war at $47.1 billion through Oct. 16, not counting repairs to damaged U.S. bases. Reporting by the Associated Press and The Wall Street Journal has described significant damage to American sites across the Middle East. The Journal estimated repair costs at between $5 billion and $15 billion. Congress needs to establish what was lost, whether any of it could have been avoided and how much it will take to restore U.S. defenses.
There is also a cost that does not show up on a Pentagon invoice: the choices Washington has had to make elsewhere.
In August, I looked at the decision to move the Japan-based USS George Washington from the Pacific to the Middle East. That left fewer U.S. carriers in a region where China represents the country’s greatest long-term military challenge. A carrier sent to confront Iran cannot at the same time operate in the western Pacific. Washington should not treat that as a minor tradeoff.
China remains America’s main strategic competitor. Every commitment made in the Middle East has to be weighed against that fact.
In 1974, when I was a young lieutenant in South Korea, I served in the battalion commanded by then-Lt. Col. Colin Powell. Powell later promoted a doctrine centered on clear goals, overwhelming force, public backing and an exit plan. In a column last July, I questioned whether the U.S. approach to Iran met those standards. Tuesday’s election underscored what happens when one is missing: a president cannot keep a costly war going indefinitely without public support.
Rather than the brief campaign Trump promised, the United States has spent eight months moving between strikes, ceasefires and negotiations, without reaching a lasting settlement.
Iran has suffered deeply. The first strikes killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and badly damaged key military facilities, but the regime remains in place. Tehran’s nuclear ambitions have not been resolved, and it continues to threaten commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The military campaign has weakened Iran, but it has not delivered the durable outcome Americans were led to expect.
That does not mean the United States should give in to Tehran. It does mean the country needs a strategy that can achieve more than another round of destruction.
In January, Democrats can investigate military losses, call Pentagon officials to testify, attach conditions to funding and challenge the administration’s authority to continue the war. Trump still has considerable power as president, but congressional opposition could make much of his national security agenda harder to pursue during his final two years.
Tehran is already celebrating. Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, said, “Americans said NO TO WAR.” Washington should be careful not to reinforce that interpretation. Beijing and Moscow will also be watching to see whether the conflict has weakened America’s ability to meet commitments elsewhere.
The day after the 2006 election, President George W. Bush announced that Rumsfeld would leave the Pentagon and be replaced by Robert Gates. Two months later, Bush unveiled a new Iraq strategy that included a troop surge. Gen. David Petraeus, whose counterinsurgency experience I had publicly supported, took command.
Trump may face similar pressure to replace Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth or other senior officials. Their assessments of Iran’s capabilities and the protection of U.S. forces deserve careful scrutiny. But changing personnel will not solve the problem if the president does not reconsider the strategy itself.
The administration appears split over what to do next. Axios has reported that Vance and presidential envoy Steve Witkoff support pursuing an agreement, while Hegseth and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu favor renewed military action. Some other senior advisers prefer continued economic pressure. Trump has to choose among these approaches, but first he needs to determine which one offers a realistic path to lasting security.
He needs advisers with the experience and independence to question his assumptions, a candid accounting of the war’s costs and a fresh look at how closely U.S. policy should track Israel’s preferences. The two countries have overlapping interests, but they are not always the same.
Most of all, Trump must define what victory means. Is the goal to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, protect shipping in the region, reach a durable agreement or remove the regime? Those aims require very different levels of commitment. Americans deserve to know which one their president is pursuing.
For now, Trump seems reluctant to resume major attacks while diplomatic efforts continue. That pause gives him a chance to reconsider before another round of fighting adds to the costs. He should take it.
Twenty years ago, voters pushed Washington to rethink a costly war. They have issued another warning.
Iran’s leaders should not interpret the election as permission to threaten the United States. But Trump should not confuse military superiority with a sound strategy.
American troops have carried out the mission their country gave them. Their commander in chief now owes them—and the public—a credible plan for bringing it to an end at a cost the country is prepared to bear.
