US-China Competition: The Importance of Africa
When Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping met in Beijing recently, many were focused on issues like tariffs, Taiwan, and technology. That makes sense. Yet, if you want to grasp the real long-term rivalry between the U.S. and China, it’s crucial to look about 7,000 miles south—towards Africa.
Africa is stepping into the spotlight of global power dynamics. The U.S. seems to be lagging behind in its preparation for this shift. It’s important to note that Africa holds around 30% of the world’s significant mineral reserves. Think of cobalt, lithium, copper, and rare earths—the very elements that are essential for batteries, semiconductors, and the weaponry that will shape the future. Surprisingly, 11 of the 20 fastest-growing economies projected for 2025 are in Africa.
The youthful working-age population is expected to rise by about 740 million by 2050, making it the fastest-expanding demographic globally. Unfortunately, America’s historical engagement in Africa has fluctuated between genuine humanitarian efforts and blatant neglect, often responding only when events in China grab the headlines.
China, on the other hand, seized the opportunity years before the U.S. did. Over two decades, they invested heavily in infrastructure—building ports, railways, and power plants across the continent—not purely out of kindness but from a strategic viewpoint.
China’s approach, characterized by rapid execution, state-supported loans, and a lack of concern for governance issues, gave it an initial upper hand.
However, conventional wisdom may be underestimating the situation. China’s early advantages don’t guarantee lasting dominance. Just look at Kenya.
Back in 2014, Nairobi found itself deeply in debt—around $5 billion owed to the Export-Import Bank of China for the construction of a major railway project from Mombasa to Nairobi, which was once hailed as modernization. Nowadays, it’s viewed more as a cautionary tale. Kenya has since reduced spending due to disappointing passenger numbers and cargo traffic, needing to repay over $1 billion yearly. This debt represented a staggering 80% of the external debt service budget, causing the International Monetary Fund to classify Kenya as being at high risk of a debt crisis. Yes, the railway was built, but so was the looming bill.
Kenya isn’t alone, either. Countries like Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zambia have had to restructure their debts recently, a reflection of Chinese loans that seemed appealing at first but became burdensome later. The conversation on the continent is changing. Leaders who once welcomed Chinese investments with open arms are now demanding more accountability. If the U.S. is astute enough to respond to this shift, it could present a real chance for engagement.
The Trump administration appears to have some well-placed instincts. Initiatives like the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and Prosper Africa offer essential tools for engaging the private sector in a way that could rival Chinese state funding in terms of quality and transparency.
Moreover, the focus on securing critical mineral supply chains is a fitting approach. Cobalt from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and copper from Zambia should be viewed as vital national security assets—something long overdue.
Yet the effectiveness of these tools often hinges on the overarching strategy, which too frequently centers around a single question: “How do we counter China?” This isn’t the right mindset. It’s not that China isn’t a fierce competitor; it’s just that African governments are perceptive to this dynamic. A relationship built merely on the notion of “we are not China” risks being too transactional—and could come off as patronizing at worst.
With combined GDPs of $2.8 trillion across 54 nations, this relationship deserves more serious consideration. A more sensible approach would emphasize what the U.S. can genuinely offer: transparent lending that meets enforceable standards, technology devoid of built-in restrictions, resilient private capital, and enduring institutions that can weather political changes on both sides of the Atlantic. These factors aren’t just theoretical; they represent competitive advantages that China can’t genuinely replicate.
So, what would a comprehensive strategy entail?
It would involve proactive engagement rather than reacting to crises. This means financing through DFC and EXIM should happen at a pace that’s in sync with African governments. If the U.S. takes three years to respond to a loan request while China takes three months, the outcome is clear.
It also involves framing significant mineral agreements as strategic partnerships rather than merely extraction deals. Recognizing that nations with robust institutions and diverse economies are better positioned to resist Chinese influence is crucial. The U.S. needs to support their growth rather than exploit their resources.
While much took place at the recent Beijing summit, it didn’t settle the core competition over resources and strategic positioning that will shape the upcoming decades. This competition is as present in Kinshasa and Nairobi as it is in the Taiwan Strait.
The U.S. has certain advantages in this arena. The critical question is whether Washington can exhibit the necessary patience and discipline to leverage them effectively.
