U.S. Plans to “Manage” Venezuela After Maduro’s Detention

President Donald Trump’s recent announcement regarding the U.S. intention to temporarily “manage” Venezuela following Nicolas Maduro’s detention could turn out to be a significant moment for the Americas. This scenario could either lead to a concerted effort to stabilize the region or spiral into a prolonged and unnecessary involvement.

During a press conference at Mar-a-Lago, Trump declared, “We will continue to run our country until we can have a safe, appropriate, and wise transition of power.” He mentioned that his national security team would oversee the situation and didn’t dismiss potential “on-the-ground operations.” Later, while traveling on Air Force One, he reiterated, “We’re going to do it and we’re going to fix it.”

The logic here is straightforward. Venezuela possesses the largest proven oil reserves globally and is a hub for drug trafficking, corruption, and outside interference. The administration’s National Security Strategy, set for December 2025, includes the “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, focusing on preventing non-American powers like China, Russia, and Iran from controlling significant resources in the Americas. Thus, Venezuela isn’t just viewed through a humanitarian lens; it’s a critical test case.

However, this ambition needs a reality check.

Who Holds Authority?

A fundamental contradiction arises: how can the U.S. “manage” Venezuela when Delcy Rodríguez, the constitutionally appointed vice president, has already taken the role of interim president following Maduro’s ouster?

Rodriguez’s claims to power, supported by Venezuela’s Supreme Court and loyal institutions, are deemed invalid by Washington. Still, the reality is that Venezuela’s ministries, security forces, and local authorities are populated by individuals loyal to the previous regime. This complicates matters, as the U.S. can’t govern Venezuela in practice, even if Trump’s statements suggest otherwise.

This disconnect often leads to failures in post-conflict efforts.

Lessons from Iraq

I learned firsthand how crucial preparation is. In 2002 and 2003, I was part of then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s team, providing us with insights into the planned invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. In early 2003, discussions with retired military officers raised essential questions about security, governance, and infrastructure post-invasion. Unfortunately, most answers were vague, lacking concrete plans.

When I visited Baghdad afterward, the gap between removing a regime and establishing a functional government was glaring. One of the most impactful decisions—disbanding Iraq’s security services—came with little resistance at senior levels and has had lasting repercussions: security deteriorated, insurgency increased, and U.S. involvement expanded significantly.

Venezuela seems at risk of repeating similar mistakes. While detaining Maduro may appear straightforward, the real challenge lies in managing the aftermath, a task the U.S. has often approached haphazardly.

Comparisons to Panama

Some have drawn parallels between today’s Venezuela and the U.S. intervention in Panama in 1989. While the comparison is tempting, it’s not accurate.

Panama was small, U.S. forces were already present, and a recognized successor government was prepared to step in. In contrast, Venezuela has a much larger population of 30 million, with no widely supported transitional authority and entrenched military and criminal networks. What was possible in Panama can’t be simply replicated in Caracas.

Understanding Leadership Dynamics

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has since explained that the U.S. doesn’t plan on managing Venezuela “on a day-to-day basis.” While it’s good to clarify, it raises further questions. If Washington isn’t overseeing crucial aspects like budgets and law enforcement, what does U.S. leadership entail?

The management strategy appears more about indirect influence than outright governance, primarily through economic means, particularly oil. Venezuelan elites anticipate working within this system, potentially thwarting efforts for a complete overhaul.

A Broader Perspective

There’s a misconception that removing Maduro will dismantle the existing power structure. Maduro may be the face of drug trafficking and other crimes, but his power is supported by a complicated web of generals, judges, and other officials who won’t relinquish control easily.

Some might seek to maintain the status quo, resisting through bureaucratic means, violence, or public manipulation. Without a credible path forward that involves Venezuelan society and international support, the system Maduro created might not simply fade away.

Crucial Questions for the Administration

If the U.S. hopes to avoid history repeating itself, it’s imperative to address some pressing questions soon:

• What are the legal parameters of U.S. authority?
• Who will provide immediate security and under which guidelines?
• Which Venezuelan allies will take the lead?
• What economic framework will primarily benefit Venezuelans instead of just foreign interests?
• How will this mission come to an end?

Taking on the responsibility of “running” another nation means the U.S. must be prepared for both triumphs and failures.

Venezuela could serve as a lesson learned for the Trump administration rather than a cautionary tale. But that will require meticulous planning with specific objectives, reliable local partners, active security continuity, transparent reconstruction efforts, and a pragmatic exit strategy.

Venezuela isn’t Iraq, but when planning gives way to improvisation, history has a way of repeating itself.