The upcoming meeting between Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump in Washington, D.C., is generating relatively low expectations for any significant breakthroughs.
If China remains rigid throughout these important discussions, the U.S. might consider ending years of diplomatic dialogue with Beijing.
The Trump administration is approaching the summit with modest aims. Officials are primarily hoping for a continuation of the trade truce established last October during a meeting in South Korea, and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has been discussing an extension with a Chinese delegation, as the truce is set to expire on November 10.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, speaking recently with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, stated that “China-US relations have generally moved along the path toward a constructive relationship of strategic stability,” as reported by China’s Global Times. This suggests that, from China’s perspective, maintaining the current state of affairs without any major disruptions might be considered a success.
However, this so-called “stability” allows China to continue engaging in troubling activities, such as dealing fentanyl, stealing U.S. intellectual property, practicing predatory trade, supporting Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and maintaining covert police operations on American soil, not to mention aiding Iran against American forces in the Persian Gulf.
On this front, evidence has emerged linking Chinese satellites to Iran’s targeting of U.S. military personnel. In March, data provided by China was reportedly used to kill six American service members in Kuwait, with a similar incident occurring in July when three more Americans died in Jordan due to Iranian actions linked to China’s satellite intelligence.
The history of U.S.-China relations shows a persistent attempt at diplomatic engagement since the 1970s, often characterized by U.S. leaders actively pursuing conversations and summits, even when tensions were high.
It might seem strange, but this ongoing push for dialogue has arguably inflated the self-importance of Chinese leadership, which has coincided with a noticeable decline in their behavior toward the U.S.
Looking back, Trump’s summit in Beijing last May didn’t produce much progress on contentious issues, raising questions about what can realistically be achieved in the upcoming discussions.
At some point, the U.S. will need to pivot away from this endless pursuit of talks. Xi Jinping’s presentation during the last meeting was notably arrogant. He referenced the “Thucydides Trap,” hinting at a dangerous rivalry between a waning power and a rising one—an implicit derogation of the U.S.
Additionally, when he spoke of a “new era,” it painted a picture of a world where the U.S. is sidelined while China assumes dominance. This perspective, as pointed out by Charles Burton from the Sinopsis think tank, reveals that Xi perceives himself as a modern-day emperor, devoid of notions of equitable relations with other countries.
Now, as Xi prepares to visit the U.S., he is a somewhat less powerful individual due to recent political strife back home, which could give Trump a slight edge. But, conversely, it limits Xi’s options for negotiation.
Burton notes that Trump might not realize he is dealing with a leader whose authority has been undermined by crises of confidence within his own party.
Noteworthy developments in the Chinese Communist Party have taken place recently, including the expulsion of high-ranking military officials accused of corruption and disloyalty, hinting at internal power struggles that challenge Xi’s leadership.
Moreover, there is growing unrest in China over its faltering economy and uncertainty surrounding Xi’s health, compounded by a less-than-successful BRICS summit in India.
All of these factors make it likely that Xi will not be in a position to engage constructively during talks with Trump. Burton suggests that creating conflict with the West may serve as a distraction from domestic instability and Xi’s struggling policies.
In conclusion, this week’s discussions with China might yield little of value. If that’s the case, the U.S. should reassess its approach and consider taking more decisive actions rather than continuing the current ineffective dialogue.
