We can’t afford to cut America’s nuclear modernization program

Tensions with China and Russia have never been higher since the Cold War. From Ukraine to the Middle East, the South China Sea to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear-armed dictators are challenging American hegemony. So why are some American politicians suggesting that we should reduce our nuclear arsenal?

The United States only recently ended a 35-year modernization hiatus. Defense officials are belatedly Nuclear Modernization Plan It’s about replacing Cold War-era strategic deterrents with new nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers, and submarines.

Most of these systems were scheduled to be retired or replaced decades ago. During the time of President Ronald Reagan — but decades-deferred maintenance costs are finally catching up with the U.S. As a result, we’re modernizing everything at the same time, and it’s not cheap.

A homeowner who hasn’t done any serious home maintenance since 1989 can’t afford to just repair a few shingles on an old roof after 35 years. They can’t afford a whole new roof, or a new water heater, refrigerator, electrical box, fireplace, and air conditioner all at once. It’s inevitable.

It’s never too early to start a nuclear modernization program. Threatening the West with nuclear attacks, Russia hChina has 2,000 more tactical nuclear weapons than the United States. Meanwhile, China is the fastest growing nuclear arsenal on the planet. 100 new warheads produced per yearand is on track to become a nuclear-equal country within ten years.

surely, Strategic Posture Committee President Trump told Congress that current nuclear modernization plans are “necessary but insufficient” to deter adversaries from launching a strategic attack on the United States, and that serious consideration should be given to expanding the nuclear arsenal.

But some lawmakers have suggested the U.S. cut back on this “necessary but insufficient” program.

For example, in a recent exchange with Secretary of the Navy Carlos del Toro, Sen. Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.) complained that the development of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles would reduce the number of torpedoes our nation’s ships carry, making them less capable of fighting. “The likelihood of using a torpedo against a warship is far greater than the likelihood of using a nuclear-launched cruise missile against it.” Kelly said.

That may be true, but the purpose of deploying a credible theater nuclear deterrent is to prevent war from breaking out with other nuclear powers in the first place, and even more importantly, if the United States were to find itself in a high-intensity conflict with China in which we were destroying each other’s ships, being able to deter China from escalating to the brink of nuclear use would be crucial.

Meanwhile, Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) A statement piece He argued that the United States should “reduce the total number of land-based ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles)” as a cost-saving measure.

Smith correctly points out that nuclear modernization programs are costly. $1.2 trillion But the nuclear weapons modernization program represents only a small portion of the $855 billion defense budget (about 7 percent, or $50 billion per year), and is itself only about 13.5 percent of the total budget. Federal Budget.

In other words, our nuclear deterrent accounts for less than 0.5% of our entire federal budget.

Given the worsening threat environment and Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang’s increasing reliance on nuclear arsenals, curtailing U.S. nuclear modernization plans would send exactly the wrong message to allies who rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and to adversaries who have placed the brakes on their own ambitions and actions because they believe in the credibility of U.S. strategic deterrence.

If the United States does not invest in a credible strategic and tactical nuclear deterrent, it will likely find itself on the brink of becoming the second largest nuclear power within a decade. The remaining nuclear superpowers, China and Russia, may conclude that the United States is not a country with which to engage in strategic dialogue and arms control negotiations.

The question is not “Can we afford to have a credible nuclear deterrent?” but “Can we afford not to have one?”

Robert Peters is a nuclear deterrence and missile defense fellow at the Heritage Foundation.