The assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is not only the most serious targeted killing in Israeli history, but also the first chapter in what could be a new and hopeful future for Lebanon, its long-suffering neighbor to the north. There is also.
Here are six things Nasrallah's death means.
First, after virtually wiping out Hezbollah's political and military command, from a spectacular bombing campaign of pagers and walkie-talkies to the killing of Nasrallah, Israel is unlikely to halt military operations in Lebanon. . On the contrary, Israel could take advantage of Hezbollah's confusion and do everything it can to destroy the group's offensive capabilities, including its entire arsenal of precision-guided missiles and the remnants of cross-border attack infrastructure in southern Lebanon. expensive. Hopefully, Israel will quickly achieve its objectives and avoid the deadly temptation of a prolonged reoccupation of Lebanese territory.
Second, among the third-level leaders who will inherit control of Hezbollah, Nasrallah and his comrades are vulnerable because they lacked the asset that Hamas had in Gaza after October 7: hostages. likely to claim that it was. This could lead to reckless plans to kidnap foreigners inside Lebanon. Attempts to launch cross-border raids into Israel through underground tunnels. And perhaps even the activation of the Hezbollah terrorist organization around the world, including in the United States.
Third, Iran, Hezbollah's backer, financier, and supplier, has so far preferred to stay out of this fight, but its inaction is a serious embarrassment and difficult to maintain. There is a possibility that it will become. Nasrallah, an Arab, was less important to Tehran than Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force leader whose killing of Soleimani in a 2020 U.S. drone strike triggered retaliatory strikes against U.S. forces in northern Iraq. But his death would be seen as a personal blow, as he was closer to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei than non-Iranians.
In this context, it is not surprising that Iran unleashes its proxies against American, allied, and Israeli targets, from the Houthis in Yemen to Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria. Iranian-backed terrorism against soft targets in the West cannot be ruled out. Given Iran's reliance on Hezbollah as a deterrent against direct attacks by the United States or Israel, the group's weakness could lead to Iran's attacks on Israel, such as the April 13 salvo of missiles and drones. That means it is less likely to launch its own retaliatory attacks. A key unknown is whether Iran's sense of vulnerability will cause a rethink of its nuclear strategy, with Iranian leaders now increasingly determined to acquire weapons capabilities as soon as possible to compensate for the loss of Hezbollah. There is.
Fourth, Lebanon is shocked by Hezbollah's sudden change in status. Until just a few days ago, Hezbollah was the country's undisputed power, behind the mere façade of the Potemkin regime. Now there is an opportunity for the disparate and often controversial elements of the anti-Hezbollah coalition to organize before the remnants of Hezbollah try to find a foothold and regain control.
One of the key variables is the belief that the Lebanese Armed Forces is currently relatively strong enough to assert authority in the name of the nation, and that it has the cohesiveness and leadership to take steps toward its destiny. It depends on whether or not there are. Another question is whether external actors from Washington to Paris to Riyadh will work together effectively to empower local allies to fill the void left by Hezbollah's disruption. Israel may have set the table, but it cannot implement Lebanon's new political system. Only the Lebanese themselves, with the help of their foreign friends, can do that. But that possibility is more real today than at any point in recent memory.
Fifth, as the anniversary of the October 7 Hamas attack approaches, Israel's dizzying success in Lebanon will also have repercussions in Gaza. The most obvious implication is that Hama's Yahya Sinwar is likely to be increasingly opposed to handing over hostages in a ceasefire agreement. Because Hama has probably concluded that holding onto that “asset” is what has kept him alive through nearly a year of war.
As a result, the unsatisfactory status quo in Gaza is likely to be frozen, with Israel's main combat operations effectively completed but the situation remaining at a stalemate. Amid this stalemate, Hamas cannot pose a serious military threat to Israel, but the motley remnants of its fighting forces continue to terrorize local populations and prevent anyone else from ruling the Gaza Strip. enough to prevent it. In this situation, the real losers are the local Palestinians, who will continue to be attacked by roaming street gangs in smaller but still powerful brigades and the targeted operations of Israel's counterterrorism mission in Gaza. There is a high possibility that you will be caught in the middle.
Sixth, the killing of Nasrallah should be a moment of jubilation for the United States that justice has been done, given the blood of hundreds of Americans at the hands of Hezbollah. But this is also a time for the Biden administration to shift its focus from Shishpeh's pursuit of a ceasefire in Gaza to exploiting the opportunities that Israel's tectonic shifts present to Hezbollah.
Through active and proactive diplomacy, the Biden administration will create new security policies that will allow civilians to return to their homes along the Israel-Lebanon border and work with local and international partners to build a new political structure for Lebanon. It will be possible to support the establishment of a security system.
This is not the Saudi-Israeli peace and normalization deal that the Biden administration wanted to leave behind as a legacy — although it may take one last bite during the presidential transition period — nor the Gaza cease-fire agreement that the White House had called for. do not have. I worked for months. But after a year of tragedy and sadness, this would be real progress. At the same time, it is imperative that the U.S. government warns the Iranian government of the high costs it will incur if it decides to accelerate its nuclear weapons capability.
In light of Israel's killing of Nasrallah, President Biden has an opportunity to leave the Middle East today in better shape than on October 8th, and this is no small accomplishment.
Robert Satloff is Segal Executive Director at the Washington Institute.
