A House of Dynamite, which you can find on Netflix, is a film that really resonates with anyone who enjoys a gripping nuclear thriller. It’s particularly relevant for nations that are working on missile defense systems, as experts highlight that these could incur costs in the trillions of dollars. The United States has already invested over $400 billion into ballistic missile defense, but it seems to be falling short, and history might just repeat itself. The movie prompts viewers to consider the potential fallout from a nuclear attack should missile defenses fail, all while presenting a narrative of what is likely to occur.
Arms control specialists have appreciated this film as a timely exploration of the risks associated with nuclear weaponry. It underscores the importance of reducing their numbers while challenging the misconception that missile defense can adequately safeguard us. On the flip side, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency suggests that the film “highlights that deterrence can fail, which underscores the need for a homeland missile defense system.” These perspectives seem quite different. So, which one is accurate?
In a fictional exchange, a Secretary of Defense, when asked about the probabilities of a ground-based defense system stopping an incoming nuclear missile, responded, “We’re talking about hitting a bullet.” They noted that the system has a 61 percent success rate, which may sound somewhat reassuring.
However, the bullet analogy could be misleading. The chances of successfully defending against a nuclear strike might be likened to hitting 12 bullets with another 12—a daunting task. In reality, a nuclear attack could involve a barrage of missiles aimed at crippling the nation’s retaliatory capabilities. Plus, these missiles could be equipped with countermeasures and decoys designed to confuse radar systems, thus heightening the likelihood that the real warhead reaches its intended target. The consequences of even one warhead getting through would be devastating.
The oft-cited “60 percent” success rate from the movie appears to stem from actual tests of ground defense systems. According to records, 12 out of 21 tests were deemed successful by the Department of Defense. Still, this statistic can lead to an unrealistic perception of the system’s efficacy.
A 2025 report from the American Physical Society Public Affairs Committee indicates that these tests are conducted in controlled scenarios, engineered to succeed. The Department of Defense has consistently acknowledged that these tests lack robust operational realism. Typically, test launches are timed perfectly and aligned with sunlight to enhance visibility. Moreover, the tests only attempt to intercept single missiles rather than addressing a multiple-target situation.
Though the proposed Golden Dome defense system aims for a multi-layered strategy with both ground and space-based interceptors, the truth remains: no missile defense can assure a 100 percent success rate against nuclear threats. There are simply too many tactics to circumvent these systems. Crafting decoys isn’t particularly complex, yet it necessitates a defense capable of differentiating between decoys and actual warheads.
A single missile can harbor multiple warheads, and all must be intercepted once they separate from the primary missile. Also, a nuclear detonation in space—whether resulting from a successful intercept or a direct strike on a space-based defense—could severely disrupt radar operations trying to identify further targets.
Since 1957, the United States has spent around $400 billion trying to secure itself against ballistic missile threats, but to date, no system has demonstrated the capabilities needed. According to the American Enterprise Institute, one component of the proposed Golden Dome—a resilient architecture of space-based interceptors—may end up costing about $6 trillion over 20 years. Even then, a 100% success rate isn’t guaranteed.
Interestingly, the pursuit of missile defense has prompted U.S. adversaries to enhance their nuclear arsenals and create technologies specifically aimed at evading these defenses. It’s paradoxical, but missile defense may, in fact, make global security more precarious.
“House of Dynamite” effectively conveys the fear stemming from nuclear weapons, but funneling trillions into vulnerable missile defense systems seems counterproductive. A more viable approach might involve the U.S. engaging in negotiations to limit nuclear arsenals globally, addressing the considerable risk these weapons pose to humanity.
The New START Treaty, which governs the number of nuclear weapons the U.S. and Russia can deploy, is nearing its expiration in February. Perhaps attempting to renew it would be wise, especially considering the cost-effectiveness of nuclear diplomacy for a nation grappling with over $38 trillion in debt.
Gabe Murphy serves as a policy analyst at Taxpayers for Common Sense, a national nonpartisan budget watchdog committed to transparency and scrutiny against wasteful expenditures.
