U.S.-China Military Dynamics: The Missile Advantage

China has been steadily enhancing its land-based missile capabilities, aiming to shift the United States away from the Taiwan issue. U.S. officials now assert that China’s military poses a threat to significant airfields, ports, and military installations throughout the Western Pacific.

As Washington strives to bolster its own long-range artillery, experts caution that the ground domain, often overlooked, might be pivotal in the U.S.-China confrontation. Insights from military specialists suggest the conflict hinges less on troop movements and more on missile range, base access, and the U.S. military’s resilience in absorbing the initial strikes of a potential war, which could commence even before aircraft take off.

Seth Jones from the Center for Strategic and International Studies mentioned that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force is ramping up its arsenal of short, medium, and long-range missiles, capable of reaching beyond the first island chain and into areas further away.

Historically, Chinese military leaders concluded they couldn’t compete with U.S. air dominance directly. Consequently, their rocket troops emerged as a workaround—an extensive array of ground-based firepower intended to neutralize U.S. bases and prevent American aircraft and naval ships from participating effectively.

Eric Heginbotham from MIT noted, “They didn’t believe they could achieve air superiority through direct combat, which is why they opted for ground launchers.”

This approach has led to the creation of the world’s largest stockpile of theater-range missiles, supported by fortified underground facilities, mobile launchers, and tactics designed to overwhelm U.S. defenses.

Despite the numerical advantage of China’s missiles, the U.S. still retains key advantages in terms of targeting and survivability, with technologies like the Tomahawk and forthcoming hypersonic weapons integrated into a robust global surveillance network, something the People’s Liberation Army has not yet matched. Jones pointed out that China hasn’t been at war since the 1970s, which raises questions about their operational capabilities across multiple military branches.

On the flip side, the U.S. is developing a multidomain task force in the Pacific to converge various combat domains—cyber, space, electronic warfare, and precision strikes—though experts believe China has yet to demonstrate similar coordination.

Jones also highlighted challenges within China’s defense sector, asserting that many of its defense companies are state-operated and struggle with maintenance, efficiency, and overall system quality.

Yet, the U.S. grapples with its missile stockpiles. “If a conflict regarding Taiwan lasts about a week, we’ll be out of long-range munitions,” Jones remarked.

To bridge this gap, the U.S. government is rapidly boosting production of ground-launched weapons, including advanced artillery like Typhon launchers and long-range hypersonic missiles designed to strike the Chinese military from afar.

Heginbotham emphasized that significant changes are occurring, noting, “We are acquiring anti-ship missiles at an unprecedented rate.” Projections indicate the U.S. military could deploy around 15,000 long-range anti-ship missiles by 2035, a substantial increase from the current 2,500.

The Chinese strategy, heavily reliant on missiles, aims to capture U.S. military bases quickly at the start of a conflict. Conversely, the U.S. approach involves layered air defenses, incorporating systems like Patriot batteries and Aegis ships designed to intercept threats well before reaching U.S. installations.

Heginbotham cautioned that the U.S. needs to diversify its missile defense capabilities further. “We require a wider variety of defenses, preferably at lower costs,” he advised.

U.S. launchers in the Pacific are likely to face intense Chinese surveillance. After two decades focused on counterterrorism, the Pentagon is now re-investing in capabilities essential for surviving the initial phases of missile warfare.

If the U.S. intervenes in a Taiwan-related conflict, it faces the complex political dilemma of whether to strike missile sites in mainland China, which could lead to significant escalation.

“Yes, we could defend Taiwan without targeting bases in China,” Heginbotham noted. “But that would put us at a disadvantage.”

This restraint might keep the conflict from spiraling out of control, yet it also means China is likely to keep firing.

Ultimately, a land-based conflict between the two nations won’t involve large forces in traditional combat. Instead, it will be a missile-centric confrontation influenced by geography, alliances, and sustainment capabilities. Political access and command integrity will be as critical as sheer firepower.

The U.S. faces a clear challenge: to produce sufficient long-range missiles, secure strategic bases, and ensure the survival of launchers amid potential threats. In the meantime, China must navigate its own weaknesses in coordination, command structures, and on-the-ground combat experiences against its formidable missile arsenal.

The party that can shoot accurately, move quickly, and maintain sustained fire will likely dominate this land and shape the potential outcome of the Pacific conflict.