Nuclear Arms Treaty on the Brink of Expiration

The historic nuclear arms reduction treaty is poised to expire on Thursday, potentially ushering in a global nuclear landscape not seen in over 50 years. This change means there would be no legal limitations on the size of nuclear arsenals for either Russia or the U.S., alongside a lack of inspection measures to monitor Russia’s actions going forward.

Matt Korda, deputy director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, explained that the New START Treaty has played a crucial role in shaping the nuclear strategies of both nations for over a decade. “Up until now, both countries have based their nuclear modernization plans on the assumption of mutual limits,” he noted. “Without these core restrictions, both sides will have to reassess their strategies to adapt to an unpredictable nuclear future.”

Russia had already suspended its involvement in the New START treaty in 2023, halting inspections and data exchange. The treaty’s expiration would remove the final legal framework that governs the size of the nuclear arsenals of both nations.

The administration insists it cannot reach any new arms control agreement without including China, which is a significant player due to its rapidly growing nuclear stockpile. “The President has made clear in the past that viable arms control in the 21st century cannot happen without China’s involvement,” the Secretary of State mentioned.

Experts express doubt that China will agree to curtail its nuclear arsenal until its stockpile is on par with that of the United States, and they suggest Russia might not push China to engage in discussions.

China aims to reach 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, a figure that still pales in comparison to the nuclear inventories of the U.S. and Russia. Together, these two countries possess roughly 86% of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Currently, both nations have around 4,000 warheads, with nearly 1,700 deployed. Over the decades, global nuclear stockpiles have plummeted from over 70,000 in 1986 to about 12,000 in 2025.

In February 2023, Russia announced that it would cease participation in the New START treaty and stop exchanging data, though it claimed it would adhere to numerical limits. Recently, there have been discussions about extending the treaty for another year.

Korda suggested that this discussion indicates common constraints rather than any abrupt shift in Russia’s motives. “Given the current state of Russia’s modernization efforts, a rapid escalation of the arms race isn’t in their best interest, especially with their industrial resources stretched due to the conflict in Ukraine,” he stated.

According to Korda, the removal of inspection and data exchange agreements heightens uncertainty, compelling countries to rely on their intelligence, which could lead to more pessimistic planning. “With the lack of onsite inspections and data sharing, nations are left without technological means to monitor each other’s nuclear capabilities.”

Experts like Ankit Panda from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggest that the immediate worry might not center on creating new nuclear weapons, but rather on how quickly existing ones can be deployed. “Russia could quickly ‘upload’ additional warheads to missiles already in service, potentially giving them a short-term edge over the U.S.,” he noted, emphasizing that such an action could happen faster for Russia than for the United States.

Korda remarked that large-scale warhead deployments wouldn’t occur overnight, but could still fundamentally alter force structures in a relatively short time frame—possibly within two years—if significantly funded by each nation. He also added that, in a worst-case scenario, the number of deployed nuclear weapons could roughly double.

However, production capabilities present limitations. Panda pointed out that the U.S. nuclear weapons complex no longer has the manufacturing capacity it once did. “The United States is currently unable to produce the 30 plutonium pits that would be optimal,” he stated, a stark contrast to Cold War-era production rates.

NICOLE GRAJEWSKI, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, indicated that Russia might outpace the U.S. in some aspects of nuclear weapon production but faces significant constraints, particularly concerning delivery systems. “Russia excels at warhead production,” she noted, “but their limitations lie within the delivery vehicle domain.”

She further highlighted that the ongoing war in Ukraine complicates Russia’s missile production, as their facilities are utilized for both nuclear and conventional weapons.

Grajevsky voiced larger concerns regarding Russia’s investments in advanced nuclear capabilities that exist outside current arms control frameworks, like the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. She insisted that these developments pose a more profound threat than the rapid buildup of nuclear forces covered by the treaty.

In previous statements, President Trump expressed interest in arms control talks with both Russia and China before calling for a resumption of nuclear testing in the U.S. “If we ever reach a point where we need the nuclear capabilities that Russia and China are developing,” he remarked, “it will obviously be a sad day.” However, in October, he shifted his stance, directing the War Department to start testing nuclear weapons immediately due to other countries’ actions.