Supreme Court Ruling on Immigration Enforcement

The Supreme Court recently decided that border officials are not required to present “clear and convincing evidence” that a lawful permanent resident has committed a disqualifying crime. This ruling allows these officials to treat such individuals as applicants for admission rather than as persons already admitted to the United States.

The decision, which was split along ideological lines, involved the case of Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese national holding a green card. Lau was charged in 2012 for selling counterfeit clothing and faced complications when he traveled to China while awaiting his trial. Upon his return, he was prevented from entering the country and was instead paroled into the U.S. He later pleaded guilty to trademark forgery.

During the oral arguments held in April, the government argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not impose the requirement for clear and convincing evidence at the border regarding acts of moral turpitude. Government attorney Sopan Joshi claimed that any necessary burden would be addressed during the removal hearing that follows.

Justice Clarence Thomas agreed with the majority opinion, which maintained that the INA allows authorities to view lawful permanent residents as applicants for entry if they have committed relevant crimes. The ruling emphasizes that no evidence burden is needed for border agents to make swift decisions.

“Border officials did not have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Lau committed a crime involving moral turpitude,” Thomas stated.

This ruling reverses a prior decision by the Second Circuit, which sided with Lau. It had determined that immigration authorities must present clear evidence proving Lau’s alleged crime before classifying him differently regarding his entry status.

In dissent, Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, along with Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan, argued that the government needs to assess whether exceptions under the INA apply before disqualifying a green card holder. Jackson expressed concern that the ruling grants the government excessive power to parole lawful residents and later justify those actions.

“The court acknowledges that the government deems an LPR ‘permit-seeking’ to validate an exception later. This not only undermines the statutory framework but also the benefits and security associated with holding a green card,” Jackson commented.

The court, however, chose not to rule on whether Lau’s conviction for trademark counterfeiting qualifies as moral turpitude and sent the case back to the Second Circuit for further consideration.