Donald Trump's demands for European allies may resonate with Republican officials and voters, but his clear European policies, or at least those as they are known, are ultimately self-defeating. Little consideration has been given to the fact that this may be the case. Far from reducing Europe's dependence on U.S. security, there is a risk that the continent will become more vulnerable to both Russian aggression and Chinese economic domination.
Europe is also preparing for the worst, albeit in a characteristically fragmented and uncoordinated manner. ofThe European Commission is reportedly devising a deterrence-based scenarioIn anticipation of almost inevitable trade tensions with the United States, member governments are busy currying favor with key players in a future Trump administration. What are their hopes? To secure even a modicum of favoritism, or at best preferential treatment, over our fellow European countries in terms of defense spending and trade negotiations.
President Trump's future strategy highlights two priorities: reducing the U.S. trade deficit with the EU and encouraging European allies to shoulder more of the defense burden. These are not fundamental goals. Indeed, they reflect America's enduring national interests and enjoy considerable bipartisan support. Burden sharing and securing strategic advantages in key industrial sectors are also hallmarks of the Biden administration's approach.
The real difference lies not in the objectives themselves, but in the methods employed to achieve them.
The Biden administration has grasped an important truth: Europe can only achieve more if it acts collectively. This realization explains why, perhaps for the first time in history, the President of the European Commission has become this way. Ursula von der Leyen — emerging as a central figure in transatlantic relations. Partly because of leadership vacuums in Berlin and Paris, and partly because of a tacit recognition of the growing authority of EU institutions, Washington often sacrifices bilateral relations with member states. and deepened engagement with Brussels.
This approach further promoted European unity. Biden did not shy away from applying economic pressure on Europe, but he generally avoided sowing divisions among allies to advance U.S. interests, particularly through anti-inflation legislation.
In contrast, President Trump has adopted a divide-and-conquer strategy with the EU. He is demanding that European NATO members increase their defense spending. 3% of GDP However, it opposes deepening European defense integration. Rather, it supports these countries purchasing off-the-shelf military equipment made in the United States rather than investing in their own defense industries. At the same time, President Trump has imposed unprecedented tariffs on European industrial exports while insisting that the EU work more closely with the US government on China, including trade and investment, Taiwan, and freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific. is envisioned.
Further complicating matters is President Trump's ideological alignment with Europe's illiberal leaders.Viktor Orbán of Hungaryand far-right parties like Germany's AfD. In doing so, he is actively fomenting divisions within the EU, and the fact that the pro-Russian, pro-China and anti-EU agenda of these actors directly undermines the ability of EU member states to live up to their own expectations. Appears to be uninterested.
At first glance, it is clear that President Trump's priorities of increasing defense burden sharing, strengthening cooperation with China, reducing the trade deficit, and supporting Europe's radical right are incompatible. Pursuing one goal inherently puts other goals at risk.
For example, imposing significant tariffs and empowering far-right groups in Europe would be necessary for Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security or to take a unified stand against China. It has the potential to destabilize economic and political foundations. This scenario results in a lose-or-lose outcome. It would not be a strategic victory for any US administration, as Europe would become increasingly exposed to Chinese and Russian influence both economically and security-wise.
In contrast, the United States is likely to have an EU willing to step up its efforts on difficult security challenges and to work closely with it on China, with the notable exception of nuclear deterrence. be. But the price would be to abandon policies of division, especially pandering to Europe's radical right, and provide a trade lifeline for Europe's export-oriented industries.
It could develop into a win-win scenario from a realist perspective, and the U.S. government would just need to carefully select appropriate policy goals from President Trump's original priorities. A comprehensive transatlantic agreement on trade and security will help balance the US trade deficit through increased energy exports to Europe, while securing Europe's strategic commitments on China and Pacific security. There is a possibility. Instead of getting drawn into trade tensions with Europe, Trump should focus on getting a deal done.
As is often the case with conflicting priorities, no one, not even President Trump, can accomplish them all. There is no win-lose scenario in the future of the transatlantic partnership. It's either a win or a loss. The next government will need to choose which path to take in its approach to Europe.
Daniel Hegedus is Regional Director for Central Europe at the US German Marshall Fund.
