French President Emmanuel Macron is attempting to reignite discussions around a two-state solution, though this idea has faced numerous setbacks over the years. The ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict shows no signs of resolution, suggesting a need to revisit foundational concepts. Notably, Jordan’s historical ties to the Palestinian identity may offer a new pathway for Palestinian self-determination.
Many have forgotten that Jordan is part of what was once considered historic Palestine. Back in 1921, under British oversight, what we know as Jordan was recognized as part of a larger Palestinian region, from the Mediterranean to the Iraqi desert. The territory, given over by the Saudi Hejaz to the Hashemite chief, remains closely linked to the Palestinian cause in both culture and identity.
Currently, more than 70% of Jordan’s populace is of Palestinian descent. These individuals see themselves not as outsiders but as integral citizens within the Hashemite kingdom. This does not dilute Jordan’s identity; rather, it enriches it. The contributions of the Palestinian community—from merchants in Nablus to educators in Jerusalem—are vital to the kingdom’s civic and economic landscape.
Jordan also possesses distinct religious and political legitimacy in the area. From 1948 to 1967, it governed the West Bank and continues to play a role in East Jerusalem. Muslim authorities who manage holy sites there have done so under international agreements, a trust that neither Palestinian authorities nor Hamas have managed to uphold.
In contrast to the often fragmented Palestinian political factions in Gaza and the West Bank, the Hashemite Kingdom has exhibited stable governance for a century. This stability reflects its ability to control extremism and align strategically with Western interests. Jordan remains a reliable partner for the U.S. and NATO, enduring various trials of regional conflict and political strife.
Palestinian efforts for autonomy, however, have frequently ended in disappointment, with leadership historically aligning with morally questionable entities. The embrace of internal corruption and violence has often robbed generations of Palestinians of the opportunity to live peacefully and with dignity.
Now might be the time to envision a different approach—a federal model in which Jordan oversees a unified Palestine.
This model would see Jordan acknowledging multiple Palestinian states within a federated structure. Within present-day Jordan, there might be three or four states, each with its own governance, while the Palestinian-controlled West Bank and Gaza would operate as distinct entities. These regions could maintain autonomy over local affairs while remaining accountable to a federal authority in Amman, structured to reflect shared governance.
This concept may seem innovative in the Middle East, yet it resembles the federal systems of the UAE or the U.S. Just as states like Alaska and Hawaii are unique yet valued parts of the American federation, so too can the West Bank and Gaza fit into a Jordanian federation. Amman would function as a political capital, managing Islamic holy sites on behalf of all Muslims.
The monarchy would remain, but the prime minister could be elected by popular vote, akin to the arrangement in the UK, where the people choose their prime minister despite the monarchy’s presence.
The benefits of this proposal are significant.
First, political expression in Jordan could become more structured, allowing Palestinians and Jordanians to embrace both their heritage and citizenship without conflict.
Secondly, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza would receive competent governance, as Jordanian officials are among the most respected in the Arab world. This could lead to reduced corruption and increased investor confidence, allowing for a vision of Palestinian autonomy free from instability.
Thirdly, Israel would gain reliable partners on its eastern and southern fronts, benefiting from a history of avoiding terrorism and upholding peace agreements. This would facilitate more secure borders while fostering authentic Palestinian autonomy within a legitimate framework.
In addition, this arrangement could ease political pressures for the West and the U.S., diminishing radical narratives and providing a realistic, long-desired solution for Palestinians.
Yet, achieving such a vision would require bold diplomacy, detailed constitutional design, and widespread support from Palestinians, Jordanians, and Israelis alike. The alternatives—a continuous stalemate and cycles of violence—are far from desirable.
A century after the fall of Ottoman authority, the moment has come for a new paradigm of federal governance, one that’s grounded in historical context, practicalities, and hope rather than mere rhetoric.
