Every day, the United States sends an unconscious message to China that it has no deterrent power.
I know my friends and enemies The Pentagon cannot wage war In addition to its stock of weapons and ammunition, the Department of Defense Imports from major enemy countriesChina and its partner at risk of blockade, Taiwan, can manufacture virtually any platform and weapon. Drone.
President Biden Lame duck Unconstrained by political concerns, now is a good time to start easing this dangerous dependency. With two wars underway and a war with China, rapidly strengthening its military powerOur country can no longer afford to wait.
Despite multiple attempts by Congress and the Administration to address the issue over the years, Annual Defense Policy LegislationBut the United States remains as vulnerable as ever. Past attempts have failed because they focused on specific materials, such as rare earth materials, and on imposing future restrictions on purchases from China. Instead, the Department of Defense must look at the entire supply chain and urgently implement solutions that reduce reliance on China and Taiwan through a combination of stockpiles, secondary procurement, new production capabilities, and redesign.
The Chinese Communist Party recently issued a warning to our rare earth supply chain, and by implication thousands of defense-related items. Prohibited Germanium, gallium, and other export products AntimonyMoreover, as Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute recently put it, China Actively Sequestering Cobalt More Boxing in Africa, More Boxing in the U.S.
The Department of Defense Investing $650 million in rare earthsBut we still can't provide what our fighting forces need. The lack of urgency and piecemeal approach to addressing our dependencies is a grave failure. Therefore, the President must take four steps:
First, and perhaps most importantly, President Biden can introduce legislative changes to this year's National Defense Authorization Act to mandate supply chain resiliency, or, if he cannot, he can begin this process by enacting the following recommendations by executive order:
Second, Biden should create a single organization within the executive branch responsible for oversight and guidance of the Department of Defense to reduce reliance on supply chains and coordinate among the multiple federal departments and agencies that implement industrial policy.
In 2022 and 2023, Congress granted some defense oversight powers. Federal Acquisition Security CouncilThe organization could be restructured beyond its original mission of overseeing risks in the federal government's information and communications technology to provide leadership and coordination of supply chain risk activities that are essential to improving security, reliability, and resilience.
Currently, the bill lacks the powers and authorities even for its current mission and offers no relief for any of the limitations identified. Upgrading the Federal Acquisition Security Council, either through the National Defense Act or Executive Order, could accomplish both. The bottom line is that we need a single organization accountable to the American people to coordinate this effort.
Third, the Department of Defense should place a different emphasis on resilience than the “Buy America” policies that permeate inflation and infrastructure legislation. Resilience can be built by increasing inventories, developing or tapping new secondary and nearshore sources of supply, and redesigning weapons and platforms to eliminate inputs from vulnerable supply chains. Partners and allies both need to be part of our supply chain and can bring capabilities, costs, and availability that we cannot.
Additionally, many of the DoD requirements are dual-use (especially drones, batteries, and rare earth elements) and therefore can leverage inflation and infrastructure funding. For example, cheap, scalable drones are needed for both defense and nearly every industry covered in the bill.
Resilience requires reversing the U.S. approach to defining, analyzing, and addressing DoD supply chain vulnerabilities. To date, government efforts have been focused on well-known inputs, such as rare earths and certain semiconductors. Instead, DoD should focus on outputs—critical weapons and platforms—to remediate threats to the supply chain. Starting with outputs will facilitate a review of all dependencies through a bottom-up supply chain analysis. DoD currently does not address known and unknown issues in the supply chain with the urgency or thoroughness necessary to mitigate supply and risk.
Finally, oversight groups outside the Department of Defense provide authority beyond the Department's limited authority for grants, loans, purchases, etc. Additional authorities, such as those contained in the Infrastructure Act and Inflation Act, can help companies become world-class competitive while serving the Department of Defense.
But more needs to be done. Building globally competitive companies generally requires less government intervention, but under pressure from opponents who seek to exploit markets using the full power of government, the federal government may need to step in with initiatives such as regulatory reform, perhaps as in the case of agricultural products. Minimum price for rare earths This is to protect our companies from Chinese attacks.
The president is in a unique position, and with a rare opportunity, no longer tied to electoral politics. Biden can now work with Congress in a bipartisan manner to set the Pentagon on a resilient path, a move that would cement a lasting legacy while also positioning his successor better to counter China.
Retired U.S. Army Major General John G. Ferrari is a senior adjunct fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he previously served as director of program analysis and evaluation. Mark Rosenblatt runs Rationalwave Capital Partners, which invests in public and private technology companies.
