This week, China’s National Bureau of Statistics released its 2026 yearbook, showing a population decline of 3.39 million in 2025. This marks the fourth consecutive drop, and it’s the most significant one since 2022.
While China’s population is still over 1.4 billion, it has decreased by 7.71 million since 2021, when the signs of a prolonged decline began to emerge.
Foreign Affairs described this as “China’s long twilight.” The publication suggests the issue goes deeper than the mere numbers; a significant loss of younger workers is occurring as fewer are being born:
If trends continue, by the 2040s, China could lose about one percent of its population each year—approximately ten million people, which is more than New York City’s population. Additionally, the number of citizens aged 65 and older is projected to double from 15 percent today to around 30 percent in the 2040s, ultimately exceeding 40 percent by the end of the century. In contrast, the U.S. is expected to see a gradual rise from about 19 percent today to just over 23 percent by 2060.
In essence, China is facing a long period of demographic decline. This shift will alter the nation’s economy and political landscape just as its previous demographic boom did.
Indications of this decline are evident in China’s “increasingly regressive and rigid” political system, which relies heavily on repression and adherence to central directives rather than innovation.
Foreign Affairs noted that under Xi Jinping, China’s economy seems tethered to producing waves of low-cost exports, even as domestic consumer demand dwindles. The central government has become increasingly centralized, often marked by sudden dismissals of key officials, lacking the flexibility seen during the leadership of Xi’s predecessor, Deng Xiaoping.
“Despite the looming demographic cliff, Beijing appears unprepared for the social challenges that lie ahead,” the article concluded.
The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) contended that China’s abrupt “birth crash” would disrupt plans made by the Politburo over the past two decades, which were based on a growing base of young workers.
The AEI assigned much of the responsibility to China’s notorious “One Child” policy enacted in the 90s, which severely impacted fertility rates and set the stage for a sharp decline in the 2010s. The demographic effects of this policy resemble those typically seen after catastrophic wars or pandemics.
“With births in 2025 dropping to less than half of what they were in 2016, China’s available workforce is on a downward trajectory in the coming generation, and it’s apparent that there’s little Beijing can do to change that path,” the AEI analysis highlighted.
This situation poses a serious dilemma for China’s planners. Their attempts to rebound from the demographic impact of the One Child Policy clash with the global trend of declining birthrates as young women increasingly pursue education and career aspirations. Additionally, an aging population benefits from modern medicine’s longer lifespans, leading to a rising number of elderly citizens without adequate family support to care for them or facilitate intergenerational wealth building, typical of larger families.
“The diminishing of traditional family networks—historically the primary social safety net in china—will have significant, likely negative consequences,” AEI remarked, raising concerns that China may adopt a more cautious approach to territorial expansion as it reckons with sustaining wartime losses.
The Rand Corporation noted that China has “yet to become a high-income nation,” despite claims of rapid economic growth and reduced poverty. This reality implies that China missed out on the “demographic dividend” enjoyed by other fast-growing Asian countries a generation ago, making it harder for Beijing to cope with the pressures of an aging population.
In other words, the burden of supporting a large elderly demographic will increasingly rest on the current Chinese workforce, which did not experience the same per-capita growth enjoyed by other nations currently confronting demographic drops.
“The U.S. and Japan became wealthy before aging, but China is facing the challenges of an elderly population before it achieves similar wealth,” Rand pointed out.
The Chinese government is still trying to tackle the issue of population decline through initiatives aimed at alleviating the costs associated with raising children. Recently, the Chinese State Council—akin to a presidential Cabinet—proposed creating a “fertility-friendly society” through increased financial support for maternity care, preschool, and schooling.
The State Council also suggested making services more accessible to rural residents who migrate to cities, as the existing household registration rules limit their access to various benefits available to permanent city inhabitants.
However, it’s important to note that, despite efforts to boost maternity and child-care subsidies over the years—mirroring strategies in other nations experiencing demographic challenges—reducing the cost of having children has only yielded modest effects on birthrates. No industrialized country has successfully unveiled the ideal strategy to persuade young individuals, particularly women, to delay their career progress to start families before reaching middle age.
