Over ten years ago, China initiated the Belt and Road Initiative, investing heavily in the development of infrastructure like ports, railways, and power plants in various countries. This effort significantly expanded China’s economic and political influence beyond its own borders.
Now, experts indicate that China is employing a similar strategy in a crucial new domain: space.
In regions such as Africa and Latin America, Chinese companies are quietly constructing or enhancing satellite ground stations and tracking facilities, establishing Beijing as a crucial partner for nations like Pakistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Namibia. These countries often lack the capabilities to launch their own satellites. Analysts caution that this maneuver could have serious economic and geopolitical consequences, possibly affecting future global conflicts.
A report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reveals that China is becoming deeply embedded in the space initiatives of numerous nations, offering a full spectrum of services—from satellite design to launch capabilities and training. This approach could provide long-lasting leverage for China in spaces that are becoming integral to military strength.
For instance, a new satellite tracking facility established by a Chinese firm is now operational in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. Similar setups have emerged in Egypt and Namibia, equipped with satellite dishes and tracking antennas that assist both civilian and military space missions.
Together, these stations constitute a growing global network that enhances China’s ability to monitor, communicate, and possibly influence space activities, which defense experts now recognize as a potential conflict zone.
Matthew Funaioglu, a senior researcher at CSIS, stated, “This is really about determining who leads in space diplomacy within the Global South. Space is becoming essential to economic power and national security, and China is strategically aligning itself.”
Traditionally a domain for scientific exploration and commerce, space is increasingly viewed as a theater of military action, akin to land, sea, air, and cyberspace. Modern military operations depend on satellites for communications, intelligence, missile alerts, navigation, and precise targeting.
Experts suggest that China can’t solely operate as a global space power from its home territory. Satellites need ongoing tracking and communication—capabilities that can only be achieved through a network of ground stations across various continents.
Therefore, China’s construction of overseas facilities addresses gaps in its network and ensures redundancy, which is vital in emergencies.
“The ground stations established by China can support civilian missions, but they also enhance China’s security capabilities,” Funaioglu mentioned.
The report raises significant concerns about the dual-use nature of the infrastructure China is exporting. Facilities marketed as scientific or commercial can also serve military purposes, enabling surveillance of defense systems and gathering sensitive intelligence, functions closely associated with China’s military.
Additionally, there is considerable opacity surrounding who controls the data processed within these systems.
“When it comes to space technology from China, questions about data access and usage inevitably arise,” Funaioglu noted. “This lack of transparency poses serious challenges.”
The Chinese government is now forwarding satellites, launch services, and ground stations, embedding its technologies and standards deeply into critical systems of partner nations—essentially applying its Belt and Road philosophy to the realm of space.
According to Funaioglu, “There’s strong interest in accessing space across Africa and Latin America. Many nations can’t achieve this independently, and China has adeptly stepped in where the U.S. hasn’t done much.”
A new measure, the China Space Cooperation Index, evaluates 64 countries concerning their collaborations with China, with over three-quarters situated in the Global South, and Africa holding the largest portion.
Although China’s commercial space capabilities lag behind those of the U.S., it has utilized substantial state funding and technology offers to secure a foothold that’s likely hard to undo.
“Once a nation joins the Chinese ecosystem, reverting becomes costly,” Funaioglu added. “We’ve observed this pattern with other critical technologies.”
In contrast, decades ago, the United States established a global space network mainly for military defense, emphasizing collaborations with close allies rather than developing nations. The U.S. has not framed space access as a diplomatic tool, presenting an opportunity that China now capitalizes on.
While Africa is becoming a focal point for China’s physical infrastructure developments, the report also highlights that some of China’s most significant partnerships in space are actually in Latin America, especially in Venezuela and Argentina, where these ties directly affect U.S. security interests nearby.
The growing Chinese influence is evident in Washington as well. During the recent U.S. operation to apprehend Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, President Trump brought back a contemporary version of the “Monroe Doctrine,” which emphasizes the U.S. right to intervene against foreign adversaries in the Western Hemisphere.
This sentiment has sharpened due to the Venezuelan situation, a place where China has developed a substantial economic and technological presence, raising alarms about its long-term strategic ambitions in Latin America.
Experts point out that China’s expanding role in satellite launches and data-sharing is indicative of a broader strategic rivalry that extends beyond traditional infrastructure into space.
Besides security implications, the report underscores potential economic consequences if China emerges as the preferred space ally for developing nations. The global space economy is expected to reach trillions of dollars in the next few decades, and partnerships established now could dictate future control of the market.
Despite China’s progress, Funaioglu emphasizes that the United States can still turn its advantage into effective strategies if it chooses to.
“The U.S. retains significant strengths,” he remarked, highlighting companies like SpaceX, which are notably ahead of their Chinese counterparts. “China is looking to replicate that success.”
The essential question now is whether the U.S. government will embrace space not just as a venue for scientific and business ventures but also as a strategic avenue for diplomacy and competition.
“It’s certainly not too late,” Funaioglu asserted. “The U.S. can still provide a viable alternative, but it demands unwavering focus and commitment.”
